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Abstract 
This research was performed to investigate public participation in highly technical policy 
scenarios and the outcomes of this participation.  A detailed evaluation of community 
involvement at Superfund sites (via the Technical Assistance Grant, or TAG, Program) was 
performed by researching a specific type of complex, highly-technical policy problem, using a 
mixed methods approach, incorporating a quantitative econometric evaluation and qualitative 
multiple case study of selected Superfund sites.   
The existing literature on public participation argues that citizen involvement is central to 
democratic decision-making and is an important part of the policy process.  This study was 
rooted in a series of research questions about public participation in technical settings. These 
questions addressed the attributes of successful participation, the characteristics of technical 
policy issues that could lead to gaps in successful participation, the expected impact of the 
Superfund TAG program in addressing these gaps, and questions about the specific impacts of 
the TAG program at Superfund sites on outcomes (schedule, remedy selected, and community 
perceptions and satisfaction with the outcomes).   
The Superfund program has the hallmark characteristics of a highly technical, complex 
policy situation – it is characterized by technical complexity, solutions to the problems are 
expensive, public involvement is expensive, the process is slow, and the technical parties 
typically have better access to information than does the public.  The quantitative research herein 
identified several drivers for obtaining a TAG and demonstrated the impact of a TAG on 
schedule and remedy. The case studies provided support for the expectations about barriers to 
public participation in complex, technical settings, and expectations about the ability of the 
TAG program to address some of the participation gaps.  The research also identified areas for 
public participation improvement, through providing independent technical advisors, support for 
establishment of community networks, support for citizen advocates, and agency support for 
capacity building.    
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
This research was performed to investigate the impact of public participation in highly 
technical policy settings.  In twenty-five years of environmental engineering consulting, I have 
had the opportunity to directly observe (and participate in) public participation in action in highly 
technical settings.  Through this experience, I have witnessed citizen involvement in many 
technical programs and seen the apparent frustration on the part of all parties.  This frustration 
was partially the result of a sense of exclusion (on the part of the public) and not understanding 
how to address community concerns (on the part of public administrators).   My interest in 
understanding, and providing ideas for potential improvement, arise from this experience in 
technical programs.   
Previous studies have suggested that the involvement of the public in policy decisions, in 
the Superfund program and elsewhere, results in more desirable outcomes, where desirable is 
sometimes defined differently by scholars and practitioners and may vary by program.  
Identification of the drivers and impact for public participation and the areas to improve the 
process, therefore, should yield valuable information to be used to improve community 
involvement programs.  This study examines the driving factors and outcomes for a specific and 
underutilized type of formal public involvement – the Technical Assistance Grant (TAG) 
program at Superfund, a specific type of complex, highly-technical policy problem.  The 
research was performed utilizing a mixed methods approach to evaluation of the program – a 
quantitative component that utilized a nationwide database of information on Superfund sites and 
a qualitative, multiple case study that provided in depth research at six Superfund sites in Central 
New York.   
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The existing literature on public participation argues that citizen involvement is central to 
democratic decision-making and is an important part of the policy process.  This study was 
rooted in a series of research questions about public participation in technical settings. These 
questions addressed the attributes of successful participation, the characteristics of technical 
policy issues and how these characteristics could lead to gaps in successful participation, the 
expected impact of the Superfund TAG program in addressing these gaps, and questions about 
the specific impacts of the TAG program at Superfund sites on outcomes (schedule, remedy 
selected, and community perceptions and satisfaction with the outcomes).  The specific research 
questions (RQ) are: 
Research Question 1: What are the hallmarks or attributes of successful public 
participation? 
 
Research Question 2: What are the characteristics of highly technical and complex 
policy decisions that could impact successful public participation and how do they impact 
participation? 
 
Research Question 3: What are the characteristics of the Superfund Technical 
Assistance Grant (TAG) program that could address participation gaps resulting in this 
highly technical setting?  
 
Research Question 4: Is the Superfund TAG program successful in addressing these 
gaps? 
 
Research Question 5: What factors determine the rate of utilization of TAGs at 
Superfund sites? 
 
Research Question 6: Does the presence of a TAG at a Superfund site have an 
impact on the schedule for completion of remediation for Superfund sites? 
 
Research Question 7: Does the presence of a TAG have an impact on the remedy 
selected to address environmental issues at a Superfund site? 
 
Research Question 8: Are there findings from the research that can be applied to 
improve the TAG program implementation, and more broadly improve participation in 
other highly technical policy settings? 
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This document is organized as follows; Chapter 2 discusses the Superfund program, 
which was established to address the toxic and hazardous waste sites in the U.S. with the greatest 
potential risk to human health and the environment.  The chapter includes a history of the 
Superfund program, an overview of the process for identifying, addressing and remediating 
Superfund sites, and a discussion of the evolution of public participation within Superfund.  
Chapter 3 presents a review of the literature on public participation.  It begins with a 
detailed look at theories regarding public participation from the perspectives of the governmental 
agencies and citizens in the process and includes a discussion of the theories that address the 
design and performance of public participation programs. The chapter also discusses the existing 
literature on the history of participation in governmental decisions, the goals and drivers for 
public participation, and the cost, benefits, and barriers to public participation.  The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the requirements of successful participation and a review of 
public participation in environmental policy decisions.       
Chapter 4 brings together the concepts of Superfund and participation and provides the 
foundation for my research.  It defines highly technical and complex policy issues, identifies the 
desirable attributes of public participation in these settings, and discusses the expected impact 
public participation.  The chapter also discusses the attributes of the TAG program and the 
anticipated impacts of the TAG program components on specific participation criteria.     
Chapters 5 presents my research questions and outlines the framework of the research.  In 
addition to the questions related to the qualitative case study that flow from the previous chapter, 
Chapter 5 presents my hypotheses on public participation that were addressed in the quantitative 
study.  These hypotheses address the expected characteristics of communities that will obtain a 
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TAG as well as the anticipated outcomes related to schedule and decisions about solutions at 
Superfund sites with a TAG.   
Chapter 6 then presents the details of the methods used in the quantitative and qualitative 
pieces of the study.  The quantitative research utilizes data from individual Superfund sites and 
the U.S Census in a series of econometric studies to assess TAG utilization, schedule impacts of 
TAGs and remedy decision impacts at TAG sites.   
Chapters 7 and 8 present the findings of the quantitative and qualitative research, 
respectively.  The quantitative evaluation provides answers to environmental outcome based 
questions with measurable results, such as the attributes of communities that obtain TAGs, and 
the schedule and remedy impacts of a TAG.  The qualitative assessment provides more detailed 
understanding of the “why and how questions” and addresses topics of process outcomes and 
community satisfaction and gains beyond the environmental outcomes.  The case studies added 
significant insight into the reasons for and results of TAG awards based on factors that were not 
measurable in the quantitative data set (such as trust, experience and relationships of community 
advocates, desires to change the remedy, and previous activity of the community at the site).  
The case studies also added knowledge about outcomes: capacity building within the 
community, credibility gains for EPA and the community, and increased acceptance of the 
agency decisions.     
Chapter 9 presents a synthesis of findings across the quantitative and qualitative studies, 
identifies results that can improve participation in technical policy settings, and identifies areas 
for future research.  The findings of the quantitative study – the importance of wealth and tenure 
in the community, the complexity and perceived risk of a site, and the presence of powerful 
potential adversaries in the process – were supported in the qualitative study.  The case studies 
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also revealed a number of factors that were not observable in the quantitative dataset; the 
importance of trust, communication, credibility and the presence of a strong community leader.  
The importance of this study is underscored by two points.  First, if public participation 
in policy decisions yields better outcomes, as many public administration scholars have posited, 
then efforts to improve the participatory process will facilitate improved outcomes.  Second, this 
study yields significant information regarding the factors that are important in determining 
whether a community will choose to pursue participation programs.  These factors shed light on 
efforts that policy makers and their agents can take to improve the community involvement 
process.   
While this research focuses on the Superfund program, there are policy implications for 
many complex and highly-technical policy areas, including environmental and energy policy 
areas, such as brownfield redevelopment activities, community revitalization programs and 
decisions regarding the location of energy infrastructure.  The findings of the study identify 
numerous areas for improvement of the public participation process, including capacity building 
within communities and public agencies, support for and investment in developing community 
advocates, and policies to support the growth and reach of community networks.
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Chapter 2 – Superfund  
This section provides background information on the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
(EPA’s) Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 
also referred to as Superfund, with a focus on elements that are important to my evaluation of 
public participation at Superfund sites.  Superfund was established to provide solutions to 
environmental concerns at what were referred to as the nation’s worst hazardous waste sites.  
 
2.1  A brief history of Superfund 
The late 1960s and the 1970s were a time of growing awareness of environmental and 
health and safety issues and increased Congressional response to threats to human health and the 
environment.  A flurry of major Federal laws was passed to address the impacts of major projects 
on the environment - National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969; air pollution - Clean 
Air Act (CAA) of 1970, water pollution - Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) of 1974 and Clean 
Water Act (CWA) of 1977, worker health and safety - Occupational Health and Safety Act 
(OSHA) of 1970, among numerous other laws aimed at environmental improvement.  
In 1976, Congress passed legislation to address the environmental impacts of production 
of potentially dangerous chemicals - the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) and the 
environmental impacts resulting from the management of hazardous wastes - the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).  By the late 1970s, it was obvious to Congress and the 
EPA that RCRA and TSCA had not addressed a major area of environmental and human health 
risk – inactive former industrial facilities that, although no longer operational, were ongoing 
sources of potential environmental impacts.   
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In response to this regulatory gap, and as a response to the damages at high-profile waste 
sites such as Love Canal in Niagara Falls, New York, Congress passed CERCLA (or Superfund) 
legislation in 1980 to address these inactive former industrial operations.  Superfund was 
promulgated to address the most dangerous, abandoned hazardous waste sites in the US.  The 
name Superfund refers to the funds, primarily sourced from a tax on chemical producers as part 
of the legislation, that are used for EPA expenditures.  In 1986, Congress passed the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) to address many concerns that were apparent in 
the original legislation, including public involvement (Barnett, 1994).  As of 2007, over 12,000 
sites had been identified by EPA for initial assessment to determine whether they should be 
included in the Superfund program.  A summary of the major milestones in the Superfund 
program are presented in Table 2-11. 
 
1976 Congress passes RCRA and TSCA laws 
1978 State of Emergency, Love Canal in NY 
1980 Congress passes CERCLA (Superfund) into law 
1982 EPA establishes Hazard Ranking Score (HRS) 
process to prioritize sites 
1982 EPA develops regulations for implementing 
Superfund 
1983 EPA publishes first National Priorities List (NPL), 
formally identifying Superfund sites 
1986 First site deleted from NPL 
1986 Congress passes SARA, which includes the 
Technical Assistance Grant (TAG) Program 
Table 2-1. History of EPA’s Superfund Program.  
 
1 Information from EPA website, EPA.gov/Superfund. 
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2.2  The Superfund Process 
CERCLA, and its implementing regulations, provides a detailed and prescriptive process 
for addressing inactive hazardous waste sites.  A simplified schematic of the Superfund process 
is presented in Figure 2-1, with the number of sites that had reached the critical stages in January 
2008 shown in parentheses.  
 
 
Note: lighter shading and bold text indicates steps incorporated into this study. 
 
Figure 2-1. Schematic of the Superfund Process  
 
The first step in the Superfund process is site discovery.  A site can be nominated for 
assessment (or discovered) by EPA, by state or local officials, or by members of the public.  
When a site is identified, EPA (or its contractor) performs a Preliminary Assessment/Site 
Inspection (PA/SI).   The PA/SI includes review of operational information for the site, a site 
visit to preliminarily assess hazards, and calculation of a Hazard Ranking Score (HRS) used to 
prioritize sites based on severity and type of environmental hazard and the potential (or actual) 
Site Discovery
Preliminary Assessment/Site Inspection- PA/SI
Hazard Ranking Score - HRS
National Priorities List - NPL  (1564 sites)
Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study - RI/FS
Record of Decision - ROD (1396 sites)
ROD Amendment(s)
Remedial Design/Remedial Action - RD/RA
Contruction Completion
Post-Construction Completion
Deletion from the NPL (315 sites)
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impact on human health and the environment.  The HRS is a screening measure and considers 
aspects such as population within a certain distance of the site, potential (or documented) 
releases of hazardous chemicals to air, soil, surface water or groundwater, the toxicity and 
quantity of hazardous chemicals presents at the site, the presence of sensitive populations (such 
as the elderly or the very young), and other factors to estimate the overall risk associated with the 
site.  A site with an HRS of greater than 28.5 is proposed for the National Priorities List (NPL). 
This proposal is published in the Federal Register and a public comment period is initiated.  If 
EPA deems that the NPL designation is appropriate after reviewing public comments, the NPL 
designation is finalized.  Of the more than 12,000 sites identified as potential Superfund sites, 
1564 had been placed on the NPL as of January 2008. 
Once a site is placed on the NPL, a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) is 
completed to determine the nature and extent of contamination and to evaluate potential site 
remediation alternatives.  The RI/FS is typically a multi-year investigation, engineering 
evaluation and human health and ecological risk assessment effort that can be performed by 
private entities that were deemed responsible, in some manner, for previous site activities and 
environmental impact or by EPA, if no such viable parties are identified.     
Utilizing the data and results of evaluation from the RI/FS, EPA prepares a Proposed 
Plan of Action presenting the evaluation of potential remediation alternatives and the details of 
the selected remediation measures to address site risks, followed by another public comment 
period.  EPA evaluates the public comments, revises the proposed remedy, if warranted, and 
issues a Record of Decision or ROD.  Two components of the ROD are important to the public 
participation (and information) process; the Administrative Record and the Responsiveness 
Summary.  The Administrative Record is a listing of all available documents pertaining to the 
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site.  The documents generated through the Superfund process are made available at a central 
local location (typically a public library or government building), referred to as the records 
repository.  The Responsiveness Summary provides all comments received on decision 
documents and EPA responses to the comments.   
The next step in the process is the Remedial Design/Remedial Action.  During the RD/RA 
process, detailed engineering design is performed, remediation contractors are selected and site 
cleanup is performed.  In some instances, changed site conditions are encountered during the 
RD/RA that warrant changes to the selected remedy.  If the changes are major, a ROD 
Amendment may be issued by EPA.  For lesser changes, the modifications are documented 
through an Explanation of Significant Differences (ESD). 
Construction Completion marks the point where the remediation activities are fully 
implemented.  Depending on the type of remedy chosen, there may post-closure activities to be 
implemented.  It is common for long-term groundwater treatment or monitoring to demonstrate 
the effectiveness of remediation to continue for several years (sometimes a decade or more) after 
completion of remediation.  These activities are considered Post-Construction Completion 
actions.   
Once EPA is convinced that the remedy is complete and no unacceptable risks remain for 
the site, the site is Deleted from the NPL, and site activities under Superfund are complete.  Of 
1564 sites on the NPL in January 2008, 315 had progressed successfully through the process of 
remediation and been deleted from the NPL.  
For the purposes of my quantitative study (see Chapters 5 and 6), the important phases in 
the process are 1) discovery, 2) inclusion on the NPL; 3) issuance of the ROD; 4) construction 
completion; and 5) deletion from the NPL.  
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In addition to the Superfund laws and regulations, EPA has produced technical guidance 
documents that specify the procedures to be utilized in accomplishing the steps in the Superfund 
process.  Some of these guidance documents detail the requirements of the RI/FS, human health 
and ecological risk assessment, laboratory analytical procedures, and data validation procedures 
and identification of “presumptive remedies” based on general site characteristics. 
It is common for EPA to identify several operable units (OUs), or discrete areas of 
concern, at a Superfund site.  EPA may divide the site into OUs based on differences in 
contaminants present (solvents or metals), physical properties (an impoundment or landfill), 
contaminated media (soil or groundwater), or remediation approach or schedule.  EPA may 
divide a site into an OU consisting of site soils and an OU that includes site groundwater.  The 
processes can proceed independently and on different schedules for the two OUs.  In this 
manner, lower complexity problems can be investigated and remediated separate from more 
complex problems that may take a much longer time to address.  A simplified depiction of a site 
with three operable units is presented Figure 2-2.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-2. Depiction of Operable Units (OUs) at a Superfund site. 
 
Operable Unit 01 
(e.g., landfill) 
Operable Unit 02 
(e.g. impoundment) 
OU 03 
(e.g. groundwater) 
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It is also possible for there to be multiple RODs issued for a complex site.  This can occur 
when there are multiple OUs as discussed above.  In addition, multiple RODs may be issued for 
a single OU if there is the discovery of new data regarding the severity or type of contamination 
after the issuance of the first ROD.  For instance, EPA may revise a remedy decision based on 
the availability or newly discovered viability of new remediation technology, or based on valid 
input from the public, industry, or State regulators after issuance of the initial ROD.     
Responsibility for investigation, evaluation and cleanup at an NPL site can reside with 
one of three parties; private companies (or potentially responsible parties , PRPs) can perform 
the investigation and cleanup under the direction of EPA, EPA can perform the work if viable 
private parties are not located or are not willing to accept responsibility, and other governmental 
agencies (such as the Department of Energy or Department of Defense) may perform the work 
under the direction of the EPA.  Data regarding activities that are performed at Superfund sites, 
and the approximately 12,000 sites that are identified for evaluation but are not added to the 
NPL, are compiled by the EPA and maintained in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Information System (CERCLIS) database.  This database is 
periodically updated by EPA and publicly available.  Information from the CERCLIS database 
was utilized in this study. 
 
2.3  Public Participation and Superfund 
The Superfund program, through the original CERCLA legislation in 1980, incorporated 
community involvement requirements that included public notice and comment periods at 
various stages of the process, as well as informal communication between EPA site managers 
and members of the community.  In 1986, with the passage of SARA, Congress expand the 
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citizen involvement process of the Superfund program, including the addition of two 
mechanisms for formal community involvement.  SARA expanded the public participation 
aspect of the Superfund program by encouraging and recognizing Community Advisory Groups 
(CAGs) and providing Technical Assistance Grants (TAGs) to successful applicants to 
encourage community involvement in decisions related to Superfund sites.   
Per Applegate (1998, pp. 911-913), Congress made the "deliberate choice to focus 
cleanup decisions on technical issues and limit delay in implementation by limiting public 
participation" and placed public comment in a "narrow time frame after the remedial decision 
was made".  The adoption of SARA added the Proposed Plan of Action (essentially a draft 
ROD), increased public comment (written and oral), and added the TAG program to the 
Superfund public participation process.   EPA awards up to $50,000 to a community group to 
hire technical advisors to assist citizens with technical issues at the site.  To receive a TAG, the 
community group must be incorporated or willing to incorporate, submit a proposal, represent 
the community near the site, not be a municipality, and provide funds (or services) to cost share 
in the process.  Some of these requirements, as well as the administrative burden of accounting 
and reporting, can make eligibility and compliance significant barriers to the TAG program (see 
Chapter 8 for additional discussion of this topic).   
An Office of Inspector General Report on the performance of the TAG program (OIG, 
1996) found that program was “in general compliance with … regulatory requirements”, but a 
low number of TAGs were awarded and the program was not successful in “affording local 
community groups access to technical advisors”.  This failure was attributed to poor definition of 
program needs, poor dissemination of information to the public and inconsistent implementation. 
There are two primary sources of this inconsistency; regional differences and individual 
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leadership.  The TAG program is implemented by EPA regional personnel in EPA ten different 
geographical regions; it is essentially a federal policy that is implemented ten different ways.  In 
addition, like many policy initiatives, the program depends on agency managers to drive and 
focus implementation.  The strength of the leader is expected to impact the success of the 
participation program.  
The TAG program is the focal point of my evaluation of public participation under 
Superfund.  Public participation in the Superfund process is an important topic, as approximately 
26% of the U.S. population lives within 4 miles of an NPL site (Golden, Yetman, & Chai-Onn, 
2008).  I investigate the reasons that citizens pursue a TAG and the impact of TAGs on outcomes 
at Superfund sites, in the form of schedule impacts and remedy selection.   
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Chapter 3 – Literature Review 
 
This chapter presents a review of the literature on public participation with a focus on 
citizen involvement in policy setting and implementation in the environmental policy arena.  It is 
important to understand the previous research that has been performed on public participation to 
properly formulate this research and build on the previous work.  I identified the following 
questions as important to this understanding and the literature review provides a summary of the 
previous work in the field: 
• What is the theoretical basis for public participation from the perspective of the agency 
or public official? What is the theoretical basis for the citizenry to engage in policy 
decisions? What are the theoretical bases for performance (success and failure) of public 
participation processes? 
• What is the history of public participation and how has the involvement of citizens in 
public decisions evolved with time?  
• What does the literature say about the goals and drivers for public participation? 
• What benefits are realized by agencies and the public from citizen involvement in policy 
processes? 
• What are the barriers that keep the public from becoming involved in the policy process? 
• What are some of the costs associated with increased public participation in policy 
decisions? 
• What is required for “good” public participation processes? 
• What methods of public participation are available and used in public decision-making 
processes? 
• What are the outcomes of public participation in policy decisions? 
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• What has evaluation of public participation efforts revealed about the impacts in specific
policy settings?
• How is public participation evolving and what are the recent advances, especially
collaborative governance and deliberative democracy?
• How has public participation been implemented in environmental policy decision 
making, especially in the federal Superfund program, brownfields and community 
development programs, and facility siting programs (specifically waste disposal 
facilities and energy infrastructure)?
3.1  Theories of public participation 
Citizen participation in the development of public policy and its implementation is 
explained by theories rooted in public administration, law, economics, management, behavioral 
psychology, sociology and organizational theory.  I examine citizen participation in public 
administration and policy decisions and summarize the theoretical literature to address three 
questions.  Specifically, (1) why are government agencies and administrators prone (or reluctant) 
to use participatory processes in policy and public administration settings? (2) Why do individual 
citizens and groups of citizens choose to participate in policy and administration decisions?  (3) 
How does public participation impact performance in policy decisions (and as an extension how 
does it impact the individual or group participating)?   
3.1.1   Theories from the Agency Perspective 
This section presents the theoretical basis for public participation from the perspective of 
the agency or the public administrator.   There are drivers that speak positively to the occurrence 
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of participatory processes – administrative law theory, democracy (and deliberative democracy) 
theory, managerial theories, and diffusion of innovation theory – as well as theories (primarily 
organizational and behavioral) that predict a reluctance or negative likelihood of engaging the 
public in the policy process – institutional theory, transaction cost economics, and scientific 
management.  While the research questions in this study focus on the reasons that community 
groups decide to engage in public participation, understanding the theoretical underpinnings of 
involving the community provides useful information for understanding the acceptance and 
barriers to such participation.    
Figure 3-1 depicts the theories applicable to agency decisions related to public 
participation processes.  It should be noted that there is overlap in the theoretical constructs 
described in the following sections.  As an example, the concept of procedural justice could be 
characterized as a subset of administrative law or democracy theories. 
 
Administrative Law Theory 
Administrative law is “the body of rules and procedures that organizes government and 
provides mechanisms for redress of grievances as a result of decisions or actions of government” 
(Stewart, 2006).  Administrative law theory explains the legal and administrative requirements 
that govern the inclusion of citizens and the methodology to perform such inclusion.  
Most rulemaking and program implementation policies include some manner of direct 
public involvement.  These may take many forms: public notice and comment on rulemaking or 
implementing policy, public meetings to inform or garner information input from the public, 
regulatory negotiation procedures, the formation and use of citizen advisory boards, and more 
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direct and inclusive deliberative processes (Applegate, 1998; L. Bingham, Nabatchi, & O'Leary, 
2005; Charnley & Engelbert, 2005; O'Faircheallaigh, 2010).   
Administrative law theory also incorporates the concept of procedural justice, or fairness 
of the process.  The direct (as opposed to representative) participation of citizens in policy and 
implementation processes “complies with the administrative law concept of the ‘right to be 
heard’” (Ellis & Disinger, 1981).  According to some, procedural justice has more of an impact 
on the inclusion of participants and their satisfaction with the process than with measurable 
environmental outcomes (Beierle, 1998).  Efforts to more substantially involve the community in 
environmental decisions can increase the citizens’ perception of justice and fairness in the 
process (L. Bingham, Nabatchi, et al., 2005; Rowe & Frewer, 2000), result in consensus building 
(Nabatchi & Amsler, 2014), and increase the public’s acceptance of the final decision (Herian, 
Hamm, Tomkins, & Zillig, 2012; Hourdequin, Landres, Hanson, & Craig, 2012).   
Administrative law theory, in summary, predicts that the agency and agency officials will 
pursue and support public participation, at least to the degree required by law or policy, or to 
design and implement a process that meets the mandates of fairness. 
Democracy Theory 
Public participation in policy setting and implementation has long been recognized in the 
public administration literature as an important democratic principle (Frederickson, 1982).  The 
ability of the citizenry to voice its collective and individual opinions on governmental decisions 
that affect them is a valuable part of the policy process (Depoe & Delicath, 2004) and is core to 
democracy.  
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Democracy theory presents three power distribution scenarios in the democratic state; 
pluralistic (with multiple groups expressing their desires for governmental actions), elitist (where 
a more powerful group controls decisions of the governing body at the expense of other less 
powerful groups) and hyper-pluralistic (where multiple groups exert extreme power with 
differing ends in mind which can lead to decision gridlock).  In the first two instances, the need 
for the agency to design, oversee and implement a participatory process is paramount to assess 
the input from the public and ensure that the ultimate decision incorporates the preferences of the 
public.  In the latter scenario, pressures from multiple powerful influencers may lead to gridlock 
in the decision-making process.  Schumaker presents a more granular modeling of community 
power including orthodox pluralism, elitism, representative democracy, populism, activism-
dominance, hyperpluralism and democratic rule (Schumaker, 1993). 
Democracy theory, and its application in public participation, is normative in nature.  It is 
seen as a fundamental right of citizens in a democracy to express their opinions and concerns and 
weigh in on decisions that directly impact them (Beierle, 1998; Folk, 1991; Frederickson, 1982; 
Innes & Booher, 2004; Nabatchi, 2012a; Renn, Webler, Rakel, Dienel, & Johnson, 1993).  The 
primary question then is to what degree and in what form public participation occurs or should 
occur.  Direct democracy, and the specialized form deliberative democracy, hold that impactful 
and meaningful involvement by citizens in decisions of the government agencies and 
administrators is the desirable manifestation of democracy (Delli Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004; 
Nabatchi, 2010).  This contrasts with strict representative democracy in which the agency (via 
the power given by elected officials) makes the decisions with less (or no) direct public input.   
Delli Carpini and colleagues contend that participatory democracy is not an alternative to 
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representative democracy, but rather an expansion of it.  A more detailed discussion of 
deliberative democracy is presented in Section 3.4. 
Democracy theory holds that public participation is an “ideal of democracy” (Folk, 1991) 
and results in a more active citizenry (Barnes, Newman, Knops, & Sullivan, 2003).  Furthermore, 
public participation can address power imbalances (Barnes et al., 2003; Beierle, 1998; Schroeter, 
Scheel, Renn, & Schweizer, 2016), expand the scope of democracy (L. Bingham, Nabatchi, et 
al., 2005; Cooper, Bryer, & Meek, 2006; Delli Carpini et al., 2004; Fung, 2006; Petts & Leach, 
2000), and restores and strengthens democracy (L. Bingham, Nabatchi, et al., 2005; Halvorsen, 
2003; Lowndes, Pratchett, & Stoker, 2001; Moynihan, 2003; Tuler & Webler, 2010). It is also 
viewed as the administrator’s obligation under democracy (L. Bingham, Nabatchi, et al., 2005), 
and is considered a basic human right in a democracy (Rowe & Frewer, 2000).  Citizen 
involvement in government decision-making also provides an opportunity to address issues of 
environmental justice (Beierle, 1998; Brulle, 2010; Ferris, 1994; Probst, 2006; Schweitzer & 
Stephenson, 2007; Tuler & Webler, 2010) and results in capacity building among individual 
citizens and communities (Nalbandian, 1999).  Citizen participation is a normative ideal under 
democracy theory and “is an accepted foundation of democracy” and fosters legitimacy, 
transparency and accountability (Nabatchi, 2012a).  Democracy theory predicts that public 
officials will support public involvement measures out of sense of inclusion and fairness, and to 
address power imbalances. 
Managerial Theory 
Managerial theory addresses the performance of the public official’s job and the and the 
efficient and effective performance of activities to achieve agency goals and objectives.  
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Different aspects of the theoretical perspectives can predict increased motivation for the manager 
to include the public in decision making as well as built in barriers to citizen involvement.   
Managerial theory concepts of new public management (NPM), public service motivation (PSM) 
of the administrator, and decision theory are discussed in the following sections.   
New Public Management (NPM) is a broad spectrum of initiatives based on the 
“Reinventing Government” movement of the 1980s and 1990s.  NPM called for “fixing a broken 
government by running it like a business” (J. V. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015).  NPM includes 
goals to reduce or reverse governmental growth, privatize as many functions of government, 
increase entrepreneurial actions of public officials, automate government service delivery 
through the increased use of technology, and institutionalizing government processes with a 
focus on globalization of methods (R. B. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000; Hood, 1991).  Specific 
components of NPM include performance measurement and allocation of resources based on this 
evaluation, disaggregation of service delivery, competition within the agencies of government, 
management styles that are like those of private organizations (including performance 
incentives), and a focus on discipline (Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow, & Tinkler, 2006; Hood, 
1991).  The concept presented in the seminal work Reinventing Government: How the 
Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector is one of “steering rather than rowing 
the boat” (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992).  The concept is that an administrator can help an agency 
more effectively reach the desired endpoint by controlling the destination rather than the day-to-
day means of production.  According to Denhardt and Denhardt, what is lost in this scenario is 
“who owns the boat?” and they suggest serving versus steering.  The focus on efficiency, 
production, performance evaluation and allocation clouds the picture of public involvement.  
Citizens tend to make the business of governing a messy one.  The alternative approach is one 
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that includes service to the citizen as a key component of public administration (J. V. Denhardt 
& Denhardt, 2015; R. B. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000).  Denhardt and Denhardt (2000, pp. 553-
556) propose that NPM be modified to include the following approaches: 
1. “Serve, rather than steer …
2. The public interest is the aim, not the by-product …
3. Think strategically, act democratically …
4. Serve citizens, not customers …
5. Accountability isn’t simple. (e.g. Performance evaluation must include more
than a market analysis of service production) …
6. Value people, not just productivity …
7. Value citizenship and public service above entrepreneurship …”
New Public Management theory predicts that the agency would be less likely to involve 
the public in decision making, but the concepts of Denhardt and Denhardt, and like-minded 
public administration scholars that followed, provide a powerful counterbalance to that approach. 
Public Service Motivation (PSM) theory addresses the role of the individual manager in 
delivery of public services.  PSM incorporates the “public values, altruism and prosocial 
behavior” (Andrews, 2016) to predict and describe the methods used by administrators in 
delivering government services.  The underlying concepts are that public servants are, at their 
core, predisposed to “serve” and the efficient running of government becomes less important 
than ensuring that services provided meet the needs of citizens.  PSM theorizes that 
administrators who are selected, trained and incentivized to incorporate citizen preferences into 
the decision making and policy implementation processes will be even more likely to support or 
even champion enhanced forms of public participation (Coursey, Yang, & Pandey, 2012; Huang 
& Feeney, 2016).  A nuanced view of this theory, from the perspective of the citizen, is 
presented by Vigoda (2002), who claims that “neomanagerialism and NPM encourage a 
passivity among the citizenry” (p. 533).   
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Decision theory is an economics-based schema that addresses the manner in which 
rational players will determine the optimum behavior in making choices (Zaccour, 2013).  The 
rational participant, in this case the agency or the agency manager, will make decisions based on 
the established goals and objectives of a program, the information available to them and their 
own assessment of the best outcome in each situation.  The degree to which the managers 
chooses to incorporate public participation in the process is dependent on the complexity of the 
question or issue, the value that the public organization places on such involvement and their 
own assessment of whether public participation will lead to a better outcome.  The view on 
public participation leading to a better outcome is especially salient for complex or highly-
technical decisions, where many managers and some citizens feel that the difficult decisions are 
best left to experts (Folk, 1991).  
Overall, the managerial theories are a bit of a mixed bag when it comes to predicting 
agency desires and actions when it comes to public participation.  Classic managerial theories 
predict lower incidence or less energy to the participatory efforts, while public service and public 
values predict a higher likelihood that the manager or agency will diligently pursue public input.  
Diffusion of Innovation Theory 
Diffusion of innovation theory (Abrahamson, 2013), for the most part, is a positive 
predictor for an agency to include public participation efforts into policy implementation 
decision.  The manager (or agency) sees the efforts and outcomes for similar undertakings and 
implements similar methods in their own projects.  The manager (or agency) is part of a 
community of practitioners (or organizations) that provide services (similar or not) to the public.  
Through communication and direct observation within their work sphere, the methods employed 
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by others or are part of an information distribution system that acknowledges and publicizes the 
successful efforts to involve the public in the decision-making process.  They then mimic and 
adopt procedures or adapt the procedures to fit their circumstance.  Similarly, a manager (or 
agency) can feel the pressure to keep up with other agencies with which they are compared for 
evaluation purposes.  This diffusion can occur horizontally - from locality to locality or state to 
state - or vertically - from federal agencies to states or states to municipalities (Daley, 2008). 
Diffusion of innovation can have a positive effect on the growth of participatory processes as 
well, when advancements are made with each iteration of the involvement process.  This concept 
of learning by seeing and improving by doing can be a mechanism for continual improvement. 
Innovation includes adoption by others, advanced rates of adoption with time, development and 
adoption of improved methods, and the adoption of methods by unexpected participants in the 
process.  This adoption can be increased if the agency (or others) put in place mechanisms or 
incentives in place to induce innovation (Popp, Newell, & Jaffe, 2010) or increase the range or 
rate of diffusion.  
There is a potential deterrent within this theory; if the original public participation effort 
was deemed a failure, there is a likelihood that the observing manager or agency will eschew 
efforts to more actively engage the public.  In whole, the diffusion of innovation theory predicts 
an increased use of participatory methods and continual improvement of the methods employed.  
Organizational Theories 
Classic organizational theory speaks to public participation in policy decisions and 
implementation through the lenses of hierarchal bureaucracy theory, scientific management, 
institutional theory, resource dependence theory, and transaction cost economics.  Most, but not 
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all, of the theoretical concepts of organizational theory would predict a lower likelihood of 
involving the public; it is “messy”, inefficient and potentially unproductive (Roberts, 2008). 
Hierarchal bureaucracy theory dates to the beginnings of public administration 
scholarship and is founded on the concepts of professional administration of government where 
the administrator is the expert in implementing policy decisions and implements policy through 
discretion (Frederickson, 1982; O'Leary, 2010).  Specialization, departmentalization of decisions 
and roles, and compliance to established rules and regulations govern the performance of the 
administrators duties (L. Bingham, Nabatchi, et al., 2005; Hood, 1991; Nabatchi, 2010; Vigoda, 
2002).  With the many uncertainties that come from citizen participation in decision-making, the 
security of organizational procedure will reduce the propensity for the administrator to actively 
involve the public in more than a cursory manner.      
Scientific management theory, which dates to the late 19th and early 20th centuries, 
outlines the “optimal” relationship between workers and management, presents a methodology 
for division of labor and specialization, proposes the use of science as opposed to “rules of 
thumb” for achieving efficiency in management (Taylor, 1911).  The concepts presented were 
ground breaking at their time, proposing that more efficient processes could result from more 
cooperative, although structured and prescriptive, relations between management and workers, 
rather than the harsh approaches normally invoked during that time period.  The methods 
presented would be considered Draconian by today’s standards, but were revolutionary when 
presented.  While Taylor’s audience was primarily the private firm, the principles were adopted 
by many early public officials and scholars for the performance of public administration (Hood, 
1991; Nabatchi, 2010).  Modern organizational theory has modified or even rejected many of the 
principles of scientific management; nonetheless some foundation principles of scientific 
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management have been incorporated into business practice such as management by objective 
(MBO), total quality management (TQM) and even some of public administration’s New 
Performance Management (NPM) movement (Wagner-Tsukamato, 2013).  While scientific 
management theory does not preclude the inclusion of public preferences, the focus on efficiency 
and a well-defined bureaucracy and a mechanistic division of labor would predict less 
involvement in decision making.   
Institutional theory attempts to explain organization behavior based on concepts that are 
sometimes contrary to conventional economic theory.  Institutional theory predicts 
organizational actions that will result in organizational stability and survival (Suddaby, 2013).  
Underlying concepts of institutional theory (and its successor neo-institutional theory) that 
inform actions related to public participation are those of organizational values, formal structure 
and the concomitant rules and norms of behavior, “rational myths” that bely activities as opposed 
to reasoning behind organizational behavior, maintenance of organization legitimacy, ceremonial 
activities that are rooted in previous behavior without proper context in the moment, and 
“isomorphism” or conformity of action and structures (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Tolbert & 
Zucker, 2013).  
A prime2 example of institutional theory is the “institutional pot-roast”.  A newlywed 
couple was preparing their first Sunday lunch together when the husband proceeded to cut both 
ends off the roast and set them aside.  When his bride asked why he did this, he replied “I’m not 
sure, but that’s the way my mother always did it.”  Upon asking his mother the next time he 
spoke about the rationale behind it, she stated “I don’t know, but that’s the way my mother 
2 Pun intended. 
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always did it.” The next time he spoke with his grandmother, he asked her too about the origins 
of the practice.  She couldn’t recall having done this before and after a while recalled “Oh yes, 
when we were first married the only roasting pan we had was too small for the roast that the 
butcher always sold and I had to cut off the ends to fit it in the pan.”   This is too often how 
organizational behaviors are passed down to subsequent managers.  
While institutional theory has continually evolved to better explain organizational 
adaptation and change (Suddaby, 2010), the core concepts of institutional theory point to an 
organization that is slow to change, slow to give up accumulated power and less likely to involve 
outsiders (i.e., the public) in problem definition and solving and decision making.   
All organizations interact in some manner with other organizations to achieve their goals 
and objectives.  Resource dependence theory describes the way organizations and individuals 
will modify or adapt their behavior to gain resources from outside sources for effective 
achievement of goals, or even for survival.  Resources include legitimacy, funding, inputs for 
production, and distribution systems (Pfeffer, 2013).  In the context of public participation, the 
most important resources are legitimacy and information.  By involving citizens in decision-
making, the agency can increase its legitimacy with the public and thereby increase the chances 
for public support of the decision.  In many instances, information from the public (either 
technical information or community preferences) may be a key component to crafting a 
successful solution.  Additionally, outside resources (funding or organizational support) may 
depend on the agency incorporating public preferences in a meaningful way.  This dependence 
can be subverted by powerful agents with an agenda for excluding the public.  While there are 
usually procedures in place to counteract these methods, it is possible that one party in a process 
can provide disincentives to public involvement in exchange for their continued participation in 
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the process.  Resource dependence theory predicts a higher likelihood that the agency will adopt 
an inclusive attitude to the public in decision making.   
Transaction cost economics (TCE) addresses the methods by which an organization goes 
about the business of performing its work in an efficient manner.  The founding principles of 
TCE lie in a firm’s decision to produce their own goods and services or to outsource them, 
considering the cost of entering transactions (Williamson, 2010).  The absolute, or perfect, 
application of TCE can predict whether governance (not to be confused with governing or 
government) of the organization and the production of goods and services will occur through 
either hierarchy (internal production) or markets (transactions).    There are numerous hybrids 
that exist between markets and hierarchies, especially in public organizations.  The application of 
TCE to public organizations applies different analytical lenses because of the nature of the public 
bureaucracy, the existence of different incentives in public bureaucracies, different goals for 
public entities, the presence of “probity” (or loyalty to the cause), and the fact that outsourcing 
may not be an option for some outputs (Williamson, 1999).  In the context of public 
participation, the fundamental TCE question is whether the cost of public involvement (in terms 
of process efficiency and a potentially suboptimal decision) is greater than the increased benefit 
from public participation in the process.  The costs incurred by the manager or agency in public 
participation can be real dollars, time, inefficiency or the stress or uncertainty introduced into the 
process.   
Since many of the costs and benefits of participatory programs are difficult (if not 
impossible) to quantify, managers have difficulty in assessing the value of the added interaction.  
TCE predicts that agencies and managers will be less likely to accept and promote public 
involvement into decision-making processes. 
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 3.1.2   Theories from the Citizens’ Perspective (Internal) 
This section presents the theoretical bases for public participation from the viewpoint of 
the community or citizenry.  There are theoretical concepts that predict an increased willingness 
of citizens to pursue participatory processes – democracy (and deliberative democracy) theory, 
certain economic and organizational theories (rational choice theory, and contingency theory), 
certain sociological theories (social movement and legitimacy theories), and diffusion of 
innovation theory.  There are also theories that predict a reluctance or negative likelihood of the 
public to engage in the policy process – economic theories (transaction cost economics and 
principal/agent theory).  In addition, some theories include concepts that positively predict 
citizen action as well as concepts that predict a reluctance to participate – resource dependence 
theory, social capital theory and network theory.  
Figure 3-2 depicts the theories applicable to citizen group or community decisions related 
to public participation processes.  As with theories that are applicable to the agency side of the 
decision, there is overlap in the theoretical constructs described in the following sections, such as 
social capital and network theory.  Several of these theories were described in Section 3.1.1 and 
the discussion in this section focuses on the aspects that apply to the citizenry.   
 
Democracy Theory 
Democracy Theory from the perspective of the agency was discussed in Section 3.1.1.   
From the citizens’ perspective, democracy theory addresses imbalances of power between the 
citizenry and private interests or between groups within the public that are presenting different 
preferences (Barnes et al., 2003; Beierle, 1998; Schroeter et al., 2016), allows the public to 
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 express their preferences in a policy setting (Nabatchi & Amsler, 2014), can result in a better 
educated and more active public (Hourdequin et al., 2012), increase civism (Frederickson, 1982), 
address issues of inequity and injustice (Schweitzer & Stephenson, 2007), and build the capacity 
of citizens to participate in democratic decisions (Nalbandian, 1999).  It can also build trust in 
the government where trust is fragile or non-existent (Halvorsen, 2003) as well relieve the 
frustration that have with bureaucratic agencies and managers (Moynihan, 2003). 
Nabatchi (2010) identifies two fundamental concerns with the future of democracy, 
public administration and citizen faith in government – the citizenship deficit and the democracy 
deficit - that can be addressed through a diligent development and inclusion of deliberative 
democracy.  Deliberative democracy is a specialized form of public participation and the ways 
that public participation can address democracy and citizenship deficits are discussed in detail in 
Section 3.4.  The citizenship deficit is “an erosion of civil society and civic engagement and 
more specifically to an erosion of civic skills and dispositions among the general public” (p.378).  
Public participation also addresses issues such as the citizenship deficit and the democracy 
deficit.  The democracy deficit is “a situation where democratic organizations, institutions, and 
governments, are seen as falling short of fulfilling the principles of democracy in their practices 
or operation” (p.378).   
Frederickson (1982) identified the concepts of “high citizenship” and low “citizenship” 
(p.503).  In high citizenship “citizens are free, equal, and engaged with one another in pursuing 
matters of high and distinctive import”.  Low citizenship is a setting that fails to achieve these 
ideals, and he states that many scholars propose that high citizenship is an unattainable ideal.  He 
surmises that the growth of direct democracy (public participation) is needed to move citizenry 
toward high citizenship.  
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 Economic and Organizational Theories 
Transaction Cost Economics with respect to the agency is discussed in Section 3.1.1.  
Transaction cost economics, from the public’s perspective, predicts a lower likelihood of 
participation in policy decisions as there are sometimes significant costs to participate.  First, 
there is typically a large gap in the information needed to participate and the information 
available to the public (Laurian, 2003).  Obtaining this information requires an investment on the 
part of the citizen.  Second, the participatory process can be time consuming and citizens may be 
reluctant to invest in the process.  Third, the outcomes of the process are typically unknown and 
the lack of trust in government to utilize public input in a meaningful way will present a barrier 
to participation that many citizens are not willing to overcome.      
Resource dependence theory is discussed in Section 3.1.1.  Community groups often lack 
the resources to come together and present preferences on policy issues and, in this way, can be a 
negative predictor of public participation when communities lack the necessary resources 
(Mitchell, O'Leary, & Gerard, 2015).  This lack of resources can include time, funds, expertize, 
or even basic information on the issue.  Participatory programs (such as the TAG addressed in 
this study) can provide many of these resources and increase the likelihood of public 
participation.  The lack of such a support and incentive program, or significant co-funding 
requirements (as with the TAG program), can present resource barriers to participation.   
Principal agent theory in public administration is focused on the relationship between 
elected officials (the principal) and the implementing body or individual (the agent) (Worsham, 
2011).  The agent acts on behalf of the principle to carry out the work of government.  Issues 
arise when the agent is either unable (because of poor selection, training or goal communication) 
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or unwilling (based on a conflict between the agent’s self-interest and the principal’s objectives 
or information asymmetry).  The problem with public participation is that the citizen does not 
overtly appear in either side of the principal-agent paradigm.  Therefore, it is unlikely that the 
citizen or community group has faith that the agency (or manager) will act on their behalf and 
will be more likely to participate in policy decisions.   
Contingency theory is based on the central theme that an organization (in this case the 
public or a community group) will adapt in such a way that its needs are met or goals can be 
achieved (Lorsch, 2013).  In this case of public participation, this means that if a policy decision 
is important enough to the public then the group will participate in the policy process.  
Contingency theory not only predicts that citizens will participate if the stakes are high enough, 
but can also predict the way they will choose to participate.  Contingency theory contends that 
there is no best way to organize or operate and is used to describe organizational adaptations to 
environment, including the policy type, governmental actions, opposing viewpoints in the 
process and degree of severity of the issue.   
Rational choice theory governs the ways that actors and organizations will behave and 
make choices in given situations.  Rational choice theory states that an actor (in this case the 
public or an individual) will act in a self-interested manner (within the constraints of information 
and options available) and will choose to act to derive the highest benefit to cost ratio for 
themselves (Jin Lee & Sang Yoo, 2012).  Many times there is there is a conflict between the 
interest of the individual and the interest of the community at large (Delli Carpini et al., 2004).  
If such an individual is altruistic, then the choice will be made to increase the overall benefit to 
the organization or community.  For the organization, rational choice theory suggests that the 
organization will take resource inputs (information, rules, materials) and convert them into 
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outputs (goods, services, policies) in as efficient a manner as possible (Suchman, 1995).  
According to Nabatchi (2012), “deliberation is seldom so neat and structured because of 
emotional, values-based, and other non-technical reactions” (p.8) presenting a barrier to rational 
decision making.  Rational choice theory for the public or potentially impacted community 
predicts that, as long as the issue is big enough and the benefit high enough, then citizens will 
choose to invest in the decision process, voice their preferences and be a part of crafting 
solutions.  As a counterpoint to rational choice, Koontz and Thomas (2006) state that individuals 
tend to exaggerate the positives of participation to rationalize their participatory efforts. 
 
Sociological Theories 
Social movement theory describes the drivers and impact of group mobilization to act to 
challenge the status quo, take on more powerful adversaries, or affect change in their 
environment.  In addition, it presents the settings in which social movements will be impactful 
(B. G. King & McDonnel, 2013).  Social movement theory also incorporates the concepts of 
collective behavior, issue framing, mobilization of resources, rational choice and actions to 
address real or perceived injustices.  Social movements consist of committed citizens to “identify 
problems, develop solutions and pressure governments” and allow citizens to take actions in line 
with public preferences (Brulle, 2010).  Social movement theory predicts that citizens will 
participate in policy decisions if three conditions are met; 1) the issues are hand are concrete and 
defined in manner that is clear, 2) the issues are significant and will have a direct impact on the 
citizens, and 3) the citizens feel that their voice will be heard and they can make a difference 
(Webler, 1999).  
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Social capital theory speaks to relationship issues that apply to growth and involvement 
of groups in common endeavors.  It includes concepts of reciprocity, trust and cooperation.  
Social capital theory can speak to precedent; if you have existing relationships, credibility, a 
history of successful relations and trust then you are more likely to engage in a participatory 
process (Ansell & Gash, 2007).  Similarly, low social capital (trust or previous experiences) 
reduces the ability to resolve conflicts (Beierle, 1998).  Social capital theory can speak to 
outcomes; participation in citizen engagement helps to build social capital, which in turn 
strengthens democracy (Cooper et al., 2006).  More inclusive, discursive, and frequent forms of 
participation help to build social capital (relationships and trust) and improve the participatory 
process (Barnes et al., 2003; Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015). 
Legitimacy theory addresses the concept of an organization (in this case the group 
desiring to represent the community) performing in a manner that is acceptable and recognized 
within its operating environment (Bhattacharyya, 2015).  Suchman (1995) defines legitimacy as 
“a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values and definitions” (p. 574).  
With legitimacy, community groups have credibility and continuity and will be more impactful 
in policy decisions if they are recognized by the larger community and government agencies to 
make valid claims on policy or implementation strategies.  A single individual, in the absence of 
legitimation, can be seen as “a troublemaker” or a “rebel” and have little to no impact on agency 
decisions.  A group of citizens, organized for action and with more legitimacy, can have 
significant impact on policy decisions.       
 
Diffusion of Innovation 
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Diffusion of innovation theory (discussed in Section 3.1.1 for the government agency) 
predicts that a community group will adopt the mechanisms that have been positively utilized by 
groups in a similar setting.  Knowledge of these prior practices can come from other community 
groups or through information provided by the public agency.  This is a factor that is mentioned 
in almost every case investigated in this research as discussed in detail in Chapter 8.  
Communities learn not only about methods to address problems but also about issues in which 
they should be interested in through diffusive means.  
 
Network Theory 
Network Theory addresses the interactions of individuals within groups and interactions 
between groups in the performance of activities to do the work of the organization to achieve 
goals and objectives of the organization.  Core to social network theory is that “relationships 
matter and structure matters” (DeJordy, 2013).  The relationships provide the avenues for 
interaction and structure provides the opportunity for impactful work to be performed.   Network 
theory describes the linkages (formal and informal) between groups and builds on the concepts 
of social capital, diffusion of innovation, and resource dependence.  Social capital (relationships, 
trust) can be the building of networks and work to build networks where none exist or are in their 
infancy (Innes & Booher, 2004).   
Some of the concepts of network theory that are important to public participation are 
reciprocity, the “strength” of ties, and structural holes (Lee & Kim, 2011).  Reciprocity is 
presented as an extension of self-interested behavior.  For instance, individuals and groups may 
perform actions that have no immediate benefit for the issue at hand.  This can be done to build a 
relationship and strengthen the network.  The continued performance of such actions builds a 
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relationship and enhances trust between actors that can provide the basis for long-term and 
positive interaction.   
The strength of ties (or connections between network members) is based on frequency 
and quality of interaction, emotional bonds, and “reciprocity” between the members 
(Granovetter, 1973).  It was initially proposed that strong ties were more influential within 
networks but later work identified the “strength of weak ties”, or the concept that higher volume 
of members with less frequent interaction can provide even more network influence.  Further to 
this is that too many strong ties result in a necessary reduction in weak ties (after all time and 
emotional energy are scarce resources) and a heterogeneity of ideas within strong ties.  Many 
weak ties can lead to numerous “introductions” and a contagion-like spread of networks for the 
motivated community advocate. 
The concept of structural holes refers to the density of a network and the number of 
connections between members of the network.  A sparse network with many structural holes will 
have a few non-substitutable members who are at the core of interactions between the members. 
A dense network with few structural holes will have multiple connections between members and 
less reliance on central members (Lee & Kim, 2011).  Two ideas are important here; 1) a 
network with few structural holes will increase the likelihood of diffusion of information and 
ideas throughout the network, resulting in a more effective network and 2) a structure with many 
structural holes will result in members striving to “fill the gaps” and make connections to meet 
the needs of the organization (as predicted by contingency and resource dependency theories).  
In summary, vibrant and growing networks can elicit community support, provide opportunities 
for resource sharing, enhancement of power, and sharing of information and ideas. 
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3.1.3   Theories of Process and Performance 
This section presents the theoretical bases for the process of public participation, looking 
at both the process design and process performance perspectives.  These theories surmise how 
participation should be performed and how successful the participatory programs will be.  As 
discussed in Section 3.9, the concept of success is not value-neutral and most of the evaluation of 
public participation has focused on normative success and not policy outcome success and theory 
follows this pattern.  Figure 3-3 depicts the theories applicable to design and implementation of 
participatory programs. 
The concepts of deliberative democracy outline the need for and drivers for success of 
citizen engagement processes.  Deliberative democracy has been defined (p. 384) as the process 
of “infusing the government decision-making process with reasoned discussion and the 
collective judgements of citizens; it connects public participation in public decision making to 
the practice of deliberation” (Nabatchi, 2010).  Deliberative democracy, whose implementation 
is discussed in more detail in Section 3.8, expands upon indirect democracy (i.e. voting) and 
other forms of direct democracy, such as public hearings, public comment hearings, and advisory 
committees (Delli Carpini et al., 2004). It includes a more discursive and communicative process 
that is characterized by two-way communication and reasoned processing of information, values 
and preferences.  Deliberative democracy presents the basis for the most inclusive and powerful 
forms of public participation. 
Communicative action theory outlines the requirements for attaining the "ideal speech 
situation" or ISS (Palerm, 2000; Webler, 1999).  The core concepts of the ISS incorporate the 
concepts of inclusiveness, equality and validity of input from participants, valid challenges to 
inputs from other participants and equal opportunity to participate in final decisions.   
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Implementation of the ISS for public participation is discussed further in Section 3.4.  
Communicative action theory identifies the design features for useful, inclusive and complete 
participation.  
Conflict resolution theory presents the framework for successful deliberation and solution 
of issues in an adversarial situation or one in which different groups have different desired 
outcomes.  Conflict resolution theory is premised in effective communication, identifies different 
conflict styles, is based upon development of interpersonal skills, builds upon the concepts of 
identifying interest to be attained instead of focusing on positional statements, based in 
consensus building, and incorporates ideas presented in deliberative democracy (Beierle, 1998; 
L. Bingham, Nabatchi, et al., 2005; O'Leary, 2010).   Another concept within conflict resolution 
theory is that the process itself leads to process improvements – the more you are engaged in 
conflict resolution the better the you get at it (O'Leary & Pizzarella, 2008).  This is consistent 
with the deliberative democracy of thick participation, where more frequent and meaningful 
interactions result in a better foundation for future deliberative encounters (Nabatchi & 
Leighninger, 2015). 
Collaborative governance theory defines collaborative governance as a “governing 
arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a 
collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that 
aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets” (Ansell & Gash, 
2007, p. 544).  While only the most inclusive public participation processes are truly 
collaborative governance, the concept of direct engagement and inclusion (not just consultation 
or informing), building consensus, and including the public in the information gathering, 
synthesis and evaluation process are all applicable to enhance the quantity and quality of public 
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participation (L. Bingham, Nabatchi, et al., 2005).  A collaborative governance approach to 
citizen engagement is presented as the pinnacle of the civic engagement spectrum, which ranges 
from adversarial and electoral to informative to deliberative to a “citizen-centered collaborative 
public management” (Cooper et al., 2006). 
Network theory relative to formation of community groups is discussed in Section 3.1.2.  
The important concepts of network theory relative to process design and performance are says 
that the concepts of collaborative learning (Ackerlund, 2011; McKinney & Harmon, 2002; 
Webler & Tuler, 2006), the importance of weak ties (Granovetter, 1973; Lee & Kim, 2011) and 
the ability to learn about processes from those in your network (a form of diffusion of 
innovation).  The presence and health of a network community enhance the chance of success of 
public participation. 
Managerial theories relative to agency decisions to adopt participatory methods are 
discussed in Section 3.1.1.  Scientific management theory, transaction cost economics and 
decision analysis theory all play important roles in the development and implementation of 
participatory programs.  Typical bureaucratic agencies (especially technical agencies like the 
Environmental Protection Agency) will be more receptive and respond better to well-designed 
programs with clear goals and objectives, clear communication with links to action (Fung, 2004), 
efficient implementation procedures that enhance rather than hinder the problem-solving process, 
and processes that are formulated in a manner that articulates the benefits to the decision making. 
 
3.2    History of public participation 
The public having a strong and direct voice in the decisions that government makes goes 
by a variety of names – direct democracy; public, resident or citizen participation; community, 
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citizen or stakeholder involvement; citizen, public, community or civic engagement; public 
deliberation; participatory governance; “democracy in action”, “getting democracy”, “the heart 
of democracy”, and deliberative democracy (Nabatchi & Amsler, 2014; O'Faircheallaigh, 2010).  
This section presents a concise history of the progression of public participation efforts in the 
U.S. 
The idea that citizens should have an active role in these policy decisions dates to the 
founding of the country.  Eighteenth century New England town hall meetings, while limited in 
access, provided the opportunity for citizens to make many of the governing decisions of the 
community (Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015).  Nineteenth century advances included the 
formation of numerous special interest associations to address governance issues surrounding 
farming businesses (the Farmer’s Alliance), urban economic, health and environmental issues 
(Hull House and the first workers’ unions), cultural division (populism and the Populist Party), 
governmental accountability and reform (the Progressive reforms) and environmental 
conservation, including popular literature (Thoreau and Emerson), naturist art (the Hudson River 
School), and the activist movements of John Muir and the Sierra Club (Merchant, 2007; 
Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015).   
One of the early social environmental movements was the battle over Hetch Hetchy from 
the 1890s through the 1910s.  Hetch Hetchy was a natural valley within the confines of Yosemite 
Park and very similar to the area of El Capitan within the same park.  Officials of San Francisco 
proposed to dam the valley to create a much-needed water supply reservoir for the City.  The 
effort was opposed by preservationists and conservationists and was a catalyst to the formation 
of the Sierra Club under the direction of John Muir.  A decades-long battle ensued and the 
damming of the valley and construction of the reservoir was approved by Congress.  While many 
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considered the efforts a losing battle, the community and capacity building that took place 
resulted in a formation of a movement that was cohesive and powerful enough to successfully 
oppose similar National Park dam proposals in the 20th century, including the proposed 
construction of a similar reservoir in the Grand Canyon’s Colorado River valley.  
 
 
Muir’s (left) and San Francisco’s 
(right) 
 Hetch Hetchy Valley. 
 
 
 
Progress in the area of public participation has typically coincided with other major 
political movements in the United States (Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015; Roberts, 2008; 
Thomas, 1995), including the aforementioned Progressive Movement of the late 1800s.  Citizen 
involvement in government advanced with the passage of the New Deal in the 1930s (Roberts, 
2008).  Urban renewal efforts of the 1940s incorporated “blue ribbon commissions”, a more 
elitist form of participation, in lieu of meaningful public input by the affected populace on 
community development decisions.   
The Administrative Procedures Act of 1946 incorporated public notice and comment into 
the rulemaking process (Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015).  Significant changes in the role of the 
citizenry were also found in the social changes that accompanied the Great Society and Civil 
Rights movements of the 1960s (Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015; Roberts, 2008; Thomas, 1995).   
The most significant leap forward, especially in the area of environmental policy, was 
during the 1970s following the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 
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1969 and the wave of administrative responses and environmental activism that ensued (Depoe 
& Delicath, 2004; Graham, 2004; Smith, 2013).  The NEPA process impacted the role of public 
participation on two fronts.  First, it formalized the process for public involvement for most 
governmental agencies and provided direction for those citizens who had an active interest in 
influencing political decision-making.  Second, it provided a set of rules with which 
administrators were required to comply in seeking out and incorporating public opinion.  These 
rules prescribed a method that was more of the notice, inform, and convince variety and, while 
not deliberative in nature, were an advancement of the process of inclusion (Applegate, 1998). 
The 1990s presented a time of change for public involvement as the pendulum swung 
from encouraging participatory efforts to a focus on administrative efficiency and back again as 
public administration and public management struggle to “find itself”.  With the New Public 
Management (NPM) movement in the 1990s, administrators were held to higher standard of 
accountability to the citizen and the citizen took on the role of client instead of subject of the 
governing body (Thomas, 1995).  Citizen input then took the form of New Public Involvement 
(NPI) with a focal change from policy implementation to policy decision-making (ibid, pp. 3-4).  
New forms of citizen groups began to emerge and the role and potential impact of the citizen was 
enhanced.  Within the NPM movement, there was change from citizen inclusion to a focus on 
efficient service delivery, outsourcing of government functions to private organizations, and an 
impersonal nature to the administrative function (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992).   
The 1980s and 1990s also saw the growth of community action in opposition to 
environmental pollution and development of infrastructure (landfills, power plants, incinerators, 
etc.) in their neighborhoods.  This Not In My Back Yard or NIMBY movement, signaled a 
rebirth of community activism in land use decisions (Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015).  
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The New Public Service movement of the late 1990s and 2000s again focused on the 
enhanced the role of citizen by acknowledging that the citizen was not a consumer or client of 
government, but the owner of government (J. V. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015; R. B. Denhardt & 
Denhardt, 2000).  The move to greater citizen involvement includes concepts of collaborative 
public governance that defined the citizen as one of the collaborators, deliberative democracy, 
and involvement of citizens in ever-increasing roles in the decision making process (Cooper et 
al., 2006; Delli Carpini et al., 2004; Fung, 2015; Nabatchi, Ertinger, & Leighninger, 2015; 
Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015).   
The current decade has seen an increase in the use of technology – the dissemination of 
information through internet resources, the use of the internet for preference gathering and 
community building, and the growth of social media for participation (J. V. Denhardt & 
Denhardt, 2015; Fung, 2015; Huang & Feeney, 2016; Nabatchi, 2012a, 2012b; Nabatchi & 
Amsler, 2014; Nabatchi et al., 2015).  In addition, public administration and citizen engagement 
scholars have developed advanced strategies for involvement and encouraged the move from 
theory to action (Delli Carpini et al., 2004; Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015).  More detail on these 
recent developments is presented in Section 3.4. 
 
3.3   Goals and drivers for public participation  
The drivers, goals and objectives for public involvement in policy setting and 
implementation are numerous.  As stated in Section 2.1, they date back to the founding of the 
country and rest on the “desire for a strong democracy” (Thomas 1995, p. 3) in which the citizen 
not only had the right to influence governmental decisions but the responsibility to do so.  
Beierle and Cayford (2002) state that “(t)he purpose of participation has shifted from merely 
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providing accountability to developing the substance of policy" (p.5) and that in highly-technical 
policy settings "(o)ne reason that participation has become more central to environmental 
decision making is an expectation that it can temper the confrontational politics that typify 
environmental policy" (p.5). 
Beierle (1998) and Beierle and Cayford (2002) identify the following “social goals” of 
public participation: 
• “To incorporate public values into decisions; 
• To improve the substantive quality of decisions; 
• To resolve conflict among competing interests; 
• To build trust in institutions; 
• To educate and inform the public; and  
• To achieve cost-effectiveness.” 
 
Innes and Booher (2004, p.422) identify the following purposes of public participation; 1) 
to understand and incorporate public preferences into decisions, 2) to obtain information from 
the public that can be used to improve decision-making, 3) to address inequities in the policy 
determination, 4) to provide the agency with legitimacy in decision-making, 5) because it is 
legally required, 6) to build community capacity for continued participation in the work of 
government, and 7) to create an “adaptive, self-organizing polity” to address more difficult 
future problems. 
Addition goals of public participation are to attain fairness and completeness, “getting 
democracy” (C. S. King, Feltey, & Susel, 1998), to obtain justice (Fung, 2004), even if “justice is 
an elusive goal” (Fung, 2015), and to get to better technically and socially acceptable decisions 
(Folk, 1991).  Recent advances in participatory methods (such as deliberative democracy) and 
the additional expectations of these more inclusive forms of public are presented in Section 3.10. 
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3.4    Typologies and methods of public participation  
The decision to enhance public participation in a policy setting may be the easy part; one 
then must determine how to implement.  Once the decision is made (or mandated), the design 
and selection of participatory methods can make or break the process.  Successful outcomes from 
public participation processes - regardless of how success is defined - hinge on this selection, the 
decision by administrators to fully embrace public participation, and the details of the 
implementation phase. 
Public participation can take many forms – public hearings, public comment on proposed 
rulemaking, citizen advisory committees and more recently public involvement in regulatory 
negotiations, mediations, and collaborative and deliberative efforts to engage and involve the 
public in policy decisions (Beierle, 1998; Koontz, 2005; Richardson, 2003).  The understanding 
of participatory methods begins with Arnsein’s “ladder of participation” (Arnstein, 1971).   
The ladder of participation, presented here,3 presents a 
typology of participation methods ranging from “nonparticipation” 
(manipulation and therapy) to “tokenism” (informing, consulting, and 
placating), to “citizen control” (partnership, delegation, and 
ultimately citizen control).  This early summary of methods has been 
utilized by recent scholars as the starting point for discussions on the 
level of involvement and control that is afforded the public in the 
decision-making process.  In this vein, Applegate (1998) characterizes participation as basic 
review and comment, enhanced review and comment (which typically adds the dimension of 
“live” discussion and response to comments), regulatory negotiation (which includes all 
3 The image of Arnstein’s Ladder was reproduced from Vancouver, British Columbia’s “The Citizen’s 
Handbook” website (http://www.vcn.bc.ca/citizens-handbook/arnsteinsladder.html). 
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impacted parties), and includes citizen advisory boards (CABs) at the most inclusive end of the 
spectrum.  Applegate does not address more inclusive deliberative processes, as his study was a 
legal-centric evaluation of CABs.    
Nabatchi and Leighninger (2015) identify the various forms of citizen participation as 
conventional, thin or thick.  Conventional participation includes activities such as public 
meetings with preset agendas and structured presentation and question and answer components.  
Thin participation includes many online participatory efforts as well as two-way communication 
methods in which citizens can quickly provide information and indicate preferences for action.  
By contrast, thick participation includes deliberative dialogue between agencies and citizens 
(often “large numbers of people, working in small groups”) and includes recruitment of 
individuals to construct a large, diverse group of actors; allows individuals to “tell their stories,” 
hear and understand the motivations of other citizens, learn about the details of the issue, and 
frame the issues in ways that matter to them; and helps the assembled group to develop a 
consensus on a decision strategy.  “Generally, it (thick participation) is the most meaningful and 
powerful of the three forms of direct participation, but also the most intensive and time-
consuming and the least common” (ibid, p. 14). 
Webler and Tuler (2006) identify the following categories of participatory methods for 
complex scientific policy issues: 
• Science-centered stakeholder consultation, which is action oriented and conforms 
to Arnstein’s “informing” activity;  
• Egalitarian deliberation, “empowering participants and is a reaction against 
dominance of the agency” (p. 711) and conforms to Arnstein’s “placation” mode; 
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• Efficient cooperation, which increases citizen involvement, allowing 
recommendations on action from the public conforming to Arnstein’s 
“partnership”; and 
• Informed democratic collaboration, which results in higher levels of partnership 
and engenders additional trust and legitimacy in the agency decision. 
 
None of Webler and Tuler’s methods of engagement result in any form of full citizen 
control of the decision process.   
The choice of method also informs the form of resultant democracy.  The ensuing form of 
democracy can be adversarial, such as that found in social movements; electoral or representative 
democracy, with choices flowing indirectly through voting and supporting causes; democracy in 
the form of administrative information exchange, including standard public hearing approaches, 
civil encouragement and growth that results in capacity building of the citizenry; or deliberative 
democracy, resulting in true dialogue and collaboration between the agency and the public 
(Cooper et al., 2006; Delli Carpini et al., 2004; Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015).  The further 
along the inclusion spectrum the method moves, the more the process moves from “hierarchy, 
specialization and impersonality” toward the ideals of “equality, participation and individualism” 
(Vigoda, 2002).  In the absence of deliberative processes, the form of “participation” may be 
more akin to convincing citizens that the announced agency decision announced is the best 
decision with no true citizen input. 
Methodological perspectives for public participation address both macro level (or 
conceptual) and micro level (or detailed implementation) aspects.  At the macro level, the key 
aspects of public participation are the decision of who participates, how much power and 
information is shared, how the relational component of the process will be nurtured, the role of 
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consensus building in the process, how education of the public will take place, and how the 
implementation phase will unfold (Cooper et al., 2006; Thomas, 1995; Weeks, 2000).  At the 
micro level, one key criterion is the choice of a specific method of public involvement.  For 
example, will the process include public notice, community advisory groups, open public 
meetings, citizen panels or deliberative methodologies?   
Cooper et al (2006), identify five dimensions for consideration in the design of civic 
engagement (pp 84-85): 
• Who is involved? The “right public” must be identified and chosen, addressing issues of 
trust, efficiency and competence as well as the cost of the participation process;  
• Who initiates the civic engagement? If the governing agency initiates (top down), citizens 
themselves initiate (bottom up), or interested associations initiate (external forces) the 
resultant form of the engagement process will vary;  
• Why are citizens involved? Do they want to influence the creation of policy or drive the 
methods of implementation; 
• Where, in the government landscape, does engagement take place? Participatory efforts 
for local decisions are different for local, state and federal agency decision-making 
bodies; 
• How are citizens involved? Different methods must be employed to process questions 
and comments from those to encourage deliberation to understand community 
preferences and gather valuable information from the community.  
The quality of the communication process is also important to the participation process.  
An incorporation of Habermas’ theory of communicative action and “ideal speech situation”, or 
ISS, is presented by Webler and modified by Palerm (2000, p. 586-587).  The ISS for meaningful 
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and discursive participation necessary to afford fair and competent decisions includes the 
following elements:  
“1. Anyone person or group who considers themselves to be potentially affected by the 
results of a discourse must have an equal opportunity to attend the discourse and 
participate. 
  2. Every discourse participant must have an equal opportunity to make validity claims to 
comprehensibility, truth, fairness, normative rightness, and sincerity. 
  3. Every discourse participant must have an equal opportunity to challenge the validity 
claims to comprehensibility, truth, rightness or sincerity made by others. 
  4. Every discourse participant must have an equal opportunity to influence the choice of 
how the final determination of validity will be made and to determine discourse 
closure (i.e. to decide when there is no consensus.” 
 
The vantage point of the observer is also important.  The key questions for public 
participation look very different from the viewpoint of the administrator as opposed to the 
viewpoint of the citizen.  Thomas (1995) outlines the process of public participation from the 
viewpoint of the administrator and identifies three relevant approaches to public involvement.  
The public decision-making approach is a deliberative and collaborative effort and is the most 
open form of public participation he considers.  This approach can be employed if there is 
relatively low risk to the quality of the decision by involving the public.  If, however, the public 
does not share the goals of the agency, he posits that a “unitary consultation approach” may be 
more desirable.  In this case, the public is informed and consulted, but the agency is not bound to 
abide by public wishes.  In the event where there exist differing views of the path forward among 
groups of the citizenry, a “segmented consensus-building approach” is appropriate.  Thomas’ 
view on selection of who participates is also organizational-centric.  He claims that the choice is 
usually made based on what the public can add to the process.  The choice typically is between 
including those who can provide additional information and including those who can assist in the 
implementation of the process.  Decisions regarding the role of the public in the participatory 
process are also based on the agency’s interest.  The choices include involving the public for 
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informing them only, to engender approval for the decision, or to build strong relationships for 
the benefit of future interactions. 
Other scholars take a very different view of the selection processes, with a focus on the 
benefit to the public not the organization (Fung, 2006).  The decision of who participates (to 
provide representative makeup), how communication is performed, and how the communication 
is turned into decisions are at the core of the selection process and the selection criteria are 
evaluated based on benefit to the public.  Still others (Wang, 2001) advocate a “genuine” process 
that puts the decision-making impetus squarely on the citizens, with the agency serving in a role 
to “set goals, provide incentives, monitor processes, and provide information” (p. 402).      
Petts and Leach (2000) identify the variety of public participation methods available to 
policy makers, discuss the features of a good public participation process and present a model for 
evaluating the effectiveness of the public involvement methods.  
One of the themes of public participation that runs through the literature is that the 
makeup of the community has significant influence on the public input process.  This can be the 
result of the size and activist tendencies of the community (Koontz, 2005), the preferences of the 
community (Greenberg & Lewis, 2000), the unequal share of cost (in dollars or other impact) to 
be borne by the local community to address a larger social issue (Richardson, 2003; Upreti & 
van der Horst, 2004), or whether the community has the resources or skill set to successfully 
participate.   
From a micro perspective, Bartsh (2003) has written a primer on public participation in 
brownfields programs that is designed to guide all stakeholders (the public, developers, 
investors, city and state officials) through a successful public involvement process.  The basic 
steps include developing a shared community vision, encouraging community involvement 
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(including defining the representatives of the community and developing the participatory 
process), and overcoming barriers to accomplish the stated vision.  Bartsh goes on to identify 
common success factors for public participation processes to include proper identification of all 
stakeholders (i.e., making sure that the broad community is involved), developing knowledge of 
and thereby a trust of actors in the process (“leaders”), clear, effective and honest 
communication, developing an understanding of resource difficulties, and building on small wins 
to “promote successes.” 
 
3.5    Benefits of public participation  
The determination of the benefits gained from public participation in policy setting and 
implementation depends somewhat on the lens through which one views the participation 
process.  Some scholars believe that participation is an end unto itself in striving for greater 
democracy (Delli Carpini et al., 2004; Folk, 1991; Frederickson, 1982; Hourdequin et al., 2012; 
Nabatchi, 2012b; Vigoda-Gadot, Eldor, & Schohat, 2013).  Other scholars propose that 
participation (maybe additionally) is a means to an end; and that end is a more informed process, 
a public that has been included to optimize the decision-making, and improved outcomes.  The 
benefits of public participation can include the incorporation of technical and community 
knowledge from the public that may have been overlooked or not available to public officials 
prior to the participation process (Petts & Leach, 2000), the identification and selection of better 
solutions through the decision-making process, and the addition of diverse viewpoints and 
problem solving perspectives that can improve the creativity and generate solutions that may not 
have been considered in an agency-only process (Petts & Leach, 2000).   
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Additional benefits include increased capacity of the public to address technical issues 
and participate in a democracy (Roberts, 2008), fostering a sense of community and inclusion 
that can result in building relationships and understanding fellow community member views 
(Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015; Roberts, 1997), understanding of public preferences for issues 
to be addressed by the process, and tapping into resources that are only available from members 
of the community making citizens active solvers of problems (Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015).  
Public participation can also build trust among citizens and between citizens and the community 
and public officials, energize the community to action, help communities to identify “resources 
and allies” (Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015), and tap into public “passion” for the issues (Petts & 
Leach, 2000).  Public participation can also increase community legitimacy to the agency and 
allow citizens to become trusted partners in the process (Barnes et al., 2003), increase the 
legitimacy of decisions that are made by public officials can be legitimized with the public 
(Roberts, 2008), and transfer power from the regulator to the regulated resulting in a sense of 
ownership that enhances the potential for later success (Roberts, 2008), and create civility that 
can increase citizens’ ability to hear and understanding alternate viewpoints and present their 
own in structured and beneficial conversations (Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015). 
Public participation can also achieve justice for marginalized groups (Fung, 2006), build 
a citizenry that is knowledgeable of public issues and the constraints that exist in the policy 
process (Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015), support democratic decision-making and address 
citizenship and democracy deficits (Nabatchi, 2010), streamline the decision-making process 
(Petts & Leach, 2000); and develop leaders within the community (Nabatchi & Leighninger, 
2015).  Participants will grow to trust and understand the members of the community that are 
passionate about the community and the issues that affect the community.  They will identify 
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members who are action oriented and move decision forward and push implementation.  
Likewise, individuals will gain an understanding of their own passion for the issues and put forth 
the effort to gain positive solutions. 
 
3.6    Costs of public participation 
Fostering an environment that is conducive to public participation is not without its costs 
to the process and the public.  The balance between the democratic principle of responsiveness 
and the administrative pressures for efficiency while involving the citizenry in policy decisions 
and implementation is a tenuous line.  It has been stated that democracy was designed to “reflect 
and engender an active citizenry” (C. S. King et al., 1998), while the political system in the 
United States also “protects the political and administrative process from a too active citizenry” 
(ibid, p. 384).  Those who promote more public participation and more inclusive techniques must 
do so with the recognition that there can be significant barriers (See Section 3.7) and costs to 
such changes. 
The potential costs associated with increased public participation or poorly implemented 
participation include a loss in cost efficiency in the decision-making process because of 
increased transaction costs as the number of decision makers increases (Roberts, 2008), schedule 
delays associated with increased deliberation and citizen engagement (Roberts, 2008), creation 
of unnecessary conflicts (Barnett, 1994; Roberts, 2008), diversion of agency resources from 
other issues (Roberts, 2008), and time and financial costs of participation to the public (Nabatchi, 
2012a). Community involvement can also increase the risk of poor technical decisions with 
incorporation of uninformed citizen input or a participating public that doesn’t understand the 
technical aspects and risks of the possible solutions.  Furthermore, there can be potential negative 
impacts on community members if active participants support a decision that ultimate fails to 
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achieve goals or is co-opted by unpopular interests.  Other potential negative consequences 
include loss of credibility of the agency if the process fails or is seen as a formality as opposed to 
meaningful involvement (Petts & Leach, 2000), loss of credibility of the public if the citizen 
involvement is not serious, sincere and positive to the process, poor decision-making based on 
self-interested behavior of participants instead of community-interested behavior (Roberts, 
2008), the selection of the “wrong public” for inclusion in the process, such as a vocal minority 
that dominates the process (Petts & Leach, 2000); the potential exclusion of "counter publics" 
who do not fit into the mold of the established public (Barnes et al., 2003), potential instability in 
the policy process caused by erratic citizen involvement (Roberts, 2008), and the selection of a 
popular solution that is not in the larger public interest.    
Many of these costs of participation are issues that can be addressed to a degree with 
proper design and implementation of the participatory process.  According to Roberts (1997, p. 
130) – public participation is “not a constraint on effectiveness but an aspect of the job (of 
administration) itself.” 
 
3.7    Barriers to public participation  
The barriers to public participation and the issues to be overcome through the public 
involvement process are often the same.  These include difficulty in the general public 
understanding highly technical matters; lack of public trust in governmental officials and the 
regulated community; the divergent interests of stakeholders; differing tolerances for risk for 
members of the community, agencies and other stakeholders; divergent beliefs about what 
constitutes “good” public participation; and potential disconnects between the bearers of costs 
and receivers of benefits for policy implementation (Beierle, 1998; Green, 1997; Greenberg & 
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Lewis, 2000; Petts & Leach, 2000; Richardson, 2003; Thomas, 1995; Upreti & van der Horst, 
2004; Webler, Tuler, & Krueger, 2001). 
Accordingly, there exist barriers to public participation and direct citizen involvement.  
Some of these barriers impeded the public from pursuing participation and others provide a 
disincentive for administrators to seek out or incorporate public wishes in decision-making and 
implementation of policies.  Roberts (2008, pp. 12-13) identifies several reasons that public 
participation is opposed by administrators and politicians, including a perceived inefficiency of 
processes that include citizen participation, the “naïve” and under-educated nature of the 
populace, and the unrealistic expectations of the process.  She also highlights several dilemmas 
that come along with public involvement, including problems associated with the size of a 
decision-making entity (efficiency), the lack of ability to participate for low-power groups 
(equity), the lack of agency accountability if solutions selected by the community fail, the lack of 
technical expertise of the public in many policy arenas, the fact that some policy decisions 
require quick action and thus preclude meaningful participatory efforts, and the potential for a 
citizen group to put their interests ahead of the “public good.”76     
One of the significant set of constraints placed on public participation is the emphasis that 
is placed on agency professionalism and expertise.  The rise of the expert in policy-making has 
often led to an exclusion of the citizenry in this area (Benveniste, 1977).  Benveniste portrays the 
average citizen, or “beneficiary”, in the following passage (p.7): 
“These are the people for whom the plans are made in the first 
place, the people who may support or fight planners and who may be 
peaceful or violent depending on the way the play unfolds.  In this 
book, we call them beneficiaries.  At times they are victims, in the 
sense that the recommendations of experts run contrary to their 
interests.  But whatever the outcome, the experts rarely know them.  
In most policy situations the experts do not have the time, the 
resources or the know-how to communicate with their beneficiaries.”  
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The increasing dependence of governmental leaders on expert input in the policy-making 
and implementation phases has resulted in a wall between the citizen and the process.  Who can 
question an “expert”?  Why would we go against the recommendations of “experts” in whom we 
have invested so much time and money?  Unfortunately, as uncertainty increases, the need for 
experts increases and the wall gets built a little higher and a little stronger.  The conflict between 
organizational goals and citizen needs is often exacerbated by experts and their involvement in 
the process. 
The professionalism of administrators also presents a barrier to public participation.  As 
society (and government) become increasingly technical and complex, the dilemma of keeping 
the public educated and involved falls to the administrator (Ventriss & Pecorella, 1984).  This is 
sometimes in direct conflict with the perception that as a professional, the administrator should 
not be questioned (by a less informed public) on the decisions that are made.  Furthermore, the 
incorporation of public preferences into the decision-making process presents time constraints on 
the manager, adds unpredictability to what may be a well-defined process, can be emotionally 
draining to the administrator and, above all, can present a threat to overall quality of the decision 
(Thomas, 1995).   
The public involvement process itself can provide a barrier to public participation.  The 
language of policy and the discourse in which the issues are addressed often seem designed to 
keep the public at bay (Toker, 2004).  The bureaucratic response to mandated public 
participation sometimes results in a process that hinders any meaningful citizen involvement.  
Examples include a process filled with technical language with little or no technical support from 
the lead agency, scheduling of meetings that are long and infrequently held and scheduled at 
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times when public attendance is difficult, and selection of poor agency leadership for the public 
participation process (Depoe & Delicath, 2004; C. S. King et al., 1998).     
Additional barriers to public participation and quality discourse on policy matters include 
the lack of resources for citizens that may be consumed with the “realities of daily life” (C. S. 
King et al., 1998), bureaucratic procedures of citizen engagement that may discourage public 
involvement (C. S. King et al., 1998), and agency managers and the regulated community who 
may be reluctant to increase the involvement of citizens because of the potential loss of agency 
and cost-bearers control. There may also be a lack of consensus within the community on the 
preferred solution (Bartsch, 2003),  community apathy toward agency decisions or a particular 
issue (Bartsch, 2003), the lack of an established regulatory framework for the participation 
process (Petts & Leach, 2000), the lack of public experience, or the lack of access to information 
or technical support to digest available information (Petts & Leach, 2000; Roberts, 2008). 
Identification of these barriers provides an opportunity for the resourceful agency or 
manager committed to meaningful community engagement to design participatory programs that 
incorporate measures to remove or ameliorate the impediments to direct citizen participation in 
policy decisions.   
 
3.8    Requirements for “good” public participation  
To capitalize on the potential benefits and to mitigate barriers to participation, the design 
and implementation of the participatory process should incorporate aspects that are core to 
“good” public participation.  A core set of characteristics of meaningful participation are 
presented by Nabatchi and Leighninger (2015, p. 25-28).  These components include: 
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• The process should be based on “adult-adult” relationships and not adult (agency)-child 
(public) relationships; 
• Make sure that the participants have as much information as they want in advance of 
meetings; 
• Develop the interaction around “sound group processes”; 
• Provide a forum and the time for people to “tell their stories”.  Understanding why 
others are interested and what their concerns are cultivates an atmosphere of listening, 
learning and growing to solutions; 
• Do not try to sell a pre-established solution.  Allow participants to develop or choose 
from several alternative decision outcomes; 
• Make sure that participants know they are being heard to establish legitimacy of the 
process; 
• Allow multiple avenues for participation that consider individual interest and 
commitment to the process; 
• “Make participation enjoyable”; 
• Remove barriers to participation by recognizing schedule constraints and incorporating 
technology as much as possible; 
Ansell and Gash (2007) identify elements that often result in successful collaboration, 
including a history of conflict resolution or cooperation between participants, the provision of 
incentives to participate, and recognizing and addressing power or resource imbalances that exist 
within the policy process.  The active presence of a leader (or champion) of the process within 
the governmental body, the design of a process that promotes interaction between participants 
and addresses personality and power differences, recognizing the importance of “face-to-face 
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dialogue” and incorporating this into the process, and utilizing small wins to build trust in 
participants can also encourage successful collaboration.  Furthermore, establishing the goals and 
basis for the decision-making process upfront and developing a “shared understanding and 
commitment” to the process is important to the success of collaborative efforts. 
Depoe and Delicath (2004, p.3) add that “early and ongoing, informed and empowered 
public participation is the hallmark of sound public policy” and further state that the citizenry 
often provides necessary information that is not available elsewhere.  Thomas (1995, p.36) 
claims that the core theory of public participation is that “the desirability of public involvement 
depends primarily on the relative need for quality versus the need for acceptability in an eventual 
decision.”  Additionally, effectively answering the question of “who participates?” is important 
to good participatory programs (Barnes et al., 2003).  Often the participation program excludes 
groups that are considered marginal or “counter publics,” agency managers decide who should 
participate, or legitimation of the community impedes the inclusion of needed parties in the 
process.  The decision-making will suffer if the “right” public is not party to the process.  
Greenberg and Lewis (2000) further define a desirable public participation process as one in 
which the public opinion reflects the full participation of the community, not just the active or 
more vocal powerful subset.         
  Webler, Tuler and Krueger (2001) define “good” public participation (p. 447) as 
processes that are representative and democratic, encourage dialogue among central actors, are 
fair to all actors, allow a power struggle to determine the outcome, and depend on leadership to 
gather, assimilate and utilize varying viewpoints and information.  Some of these characteristics 
are synergistic (such as representative nature, fairness and dialogue) and some are clearly at odds 
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(such as democratic process and power plays), highlighting a dichotomy that often appears in 
public participation in policy making.   
Deliberation and democratic principles provide the foundation of good participation.  
Fung (2006) presents the “democracy cube”, which can be used to assess and characterize 
participation methods.  The cube is a three-dimensional model that includes measures of 
“participant selection, communication and decision method, and authority and power”.  Good 
participation includes a broad base of participants, deliberative communication processes, in 
which real decision-making power rests in the citizenry.  Renn (1999) identifies the ideal of 
“analytic-deliberative decision-making” for technical processes (e.g. risk management).  The 
process requires understanding the values of the affected community, expert evaluation of 
options, and evaluation/selection by citizens.     
 
3.9    Evaluation of public participation 
As outlined earlier, there are benefits and costs of public participation and barriers to 
citizens and public officials fully utilizing the processes.  Therefore, the evaluation of citizen 
involvement programs and efforts is important to understand the balance between the benefits 
and costs and to provide information to design and implement successful participation processes.  
Evaluation of public policy can include studies of the implementation of the process, the impact 
of the specific process, or an overall evaluation of the policy itself (R. D. Bingham & Felbinger, 
2001).       
The evaluation of outcomes from the public participation process depends on the goals of 
citizen involvement (Rosener, 1978).  Some scholars view the process as an end to a means, 
where the success of the program results in an improvement in the delivery of services.  Others 
posit that the process is an end unto itself (J. D. Hamilton, 2004; Nabatchi, 2012b; Senecah, 
63
2004).  In this instance, it is important that the public be engaged and involved in a manner that 
promotes equity, democracy, and transparency.  Rosener (1983) states that "(t)he participation 
concept is value-laden; there is no widely held criteria for judging success and failure; there are 
no agreed-upon evaluation methods; and there are few reliable measurement tools".  
Additionally, Beierle (1998) finds that inconsistent (or non-existent) evaluations of public 
participation are primarily the result of differing views of what public participation is supposed 
to accomplish and differing views of democracy.  The managerial view holds that the agency 
gathers information from the public and decides, while the pluralist view holds that the manager 
is the mediator in a deliberative process, and the populist view contends that the policy process 
should consist of direct participation and decision-making by citizens.  The different perspectives 
suggest different participatory methods and expected outcomes which are difficult to evaluate 
based on common criteria. 
Chess presents a discussion of many of the approaches and obstacles to evaluation 
studies of public participation.  She reviews the various methods of evaluating participation 
and the benefits and drawbacks of these approaches (Caron Chess, 2000), which vary by 
timeframe, focus, evaluating party, and performance measures.  Regarding timing of 
evaluations – precursor studies estimate the impact of a program, concurrent studies attempt 
to measure the ongoing effect, and studies after implementation address long-term and 
lasting effects of the programs.  The focus of public participation evaluations can be on 
processes (does the public participation enhance the democratic nature of the overall process 
and is the public given a voice) or on outcomes (does the public participation process result 
in “better” results for the program).  The actors that perform the study can greatly influence 
the focus, with internal participants likely to focus on process and external auditors more 
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likely to focus on achievement of stated goals.  There is a predominance of qualitative 
studies, resulting from the fact that many of the measurement parameters are difficult to 
identify, measure or concurrence on the key parameters is a stumbling block. 
Bixler and colleagues (2016) establish a performance matrix and utilize social network 
analysis to evaluate the performance of collaborative networks.  The study focuses on 
measurement of network improvements such as the addition of new members, improved 
exchange/transfer between members, and increased connections within the network.  The 
evaluation utilizes a process-oriented evaluation of success instead of the “traditional approaches 
to evaluation in public administration apply a rather linear logic, where program inputs produce 
(or fail to produce) measurable outcomes.”  
Charnley and Englebert (2005) present an 8-year evaluation of EPA's superfund 
community involvement program (CIP), with a focus on democracy of public participation 
programs and success in achieving “broad social goals” (p.167), and whether public participation 
is meeting specific goals of the groups engaged in the process.  The study measured “citizen 
satisfaction with EPA-provided information, citizen understanding of risks, citizen satisfaction 
with EPA-provided chances to participate, and citizen satisfaction with EPA response to input (p. 
165).  The study found that (1) the public prefers to get information from EPA but more citizens 
get information from media outlets; (2) more than half of the respondents were satisfied with the 
quality and quantity of information that they received from EPA; (3) citizens who felt that they 
were well-informed also had a positive view of EPA's effectiveness (and vice versa); (4) citizens 
feel that EPA is average to below average in "understanding community concerns, using input, 
explaining its decision and earning trust"; and (5) citizens that chose not to participate were 
unaware of the site, lacked geographic connection to the site in question, were satisfied with the 
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job EPA was doing, felt inadequate to provide meaningful input or felt that EPA would do what 
it wanted regardless of input from the community. 
This last finding is germane to my study as it speaks to the reasons that citizens will not 
invest in public participation efforts.   
Koontz (2005) finds in his research that community heterogeneity often results in 
theoretical formulations that end up with almost as many independent variables as cases in the 
study.  Therefore, attempts to formulate quantitative analysis of public participation processes 
prove to be difficult and lead the researcher to a multiple case study approach.  Koontz 
approached the problem of heterogeneity of community by categorizing public groups according 
to a number of other characteristic parameters to perform such a multiple case study. 
Bierle and Cayford (2002) perform such a multiple case study evaluation of public 
participation programs in environmental decision-making.  The study looks at 239 cases that 
vary by context - policy setting versus site specific, positive and negative pre-existing 
relationships, level of government, and lead agency; by process – participant selection, type of 
output, use of consensus, and measures of agency responsiveness, participant motivation, 
deliberation; and by results – with a focus on relationship and capacity building.  In identifying 
the key attributes of successful programs, they suggest a process for successful participatory 
efforts, including needs analysis, goal identification, process design (participant selection and 
type of engagement), selection and evaluation and modification.  
There is not general agreement on whether public participation results in better outcomes 
when looking at the effectiveness of policy outcomes.  Some scholars claim that the research on 
public participation in policy decisions has generally found that greater public interest and 
involvement significantly improves policy outcomes, specifically in environmental policy 
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(Beierle, 1998).  Others (Koontz & Thomas, 2006) claim that there has been no demonstration 
that collaborative public participation improves the quality of outcomes. 
 
3.10    Recent advances in public participation – collaboration and deliberative  
  democracy   
Early public participation processes, implemented to meet the legal requirements of 
governmental mandates, have been described as the “decide, announce, and defend” approach to 
citizen involvement (Depoe & Delicath, 2004).  In this approach, administrators made decisions 
and used the public participation phase to inform citizens what they were going to do and why it 
was the right approach.  This is consistent with the professionalism and expertise model 
discussed earlier.  This one-way dialogue resulted in what has been referred to as the 
“participation gap” (J. D. Hamilton, 2004) (p. 61).  In addition, Nabatchi (2010) identified 
democracy and citizenship deficits that can be addressed via improved participatory methods 
(see Section 3.1.2 for a discussion). 
Participatory advances in the last two decades have transformed an adversarial process 
under the administrative state to a deliberative and collaborative process (Cooper et al., 2006).  
The transformation began with the New Public Involvement (NPI) initiatives of the 1990s 
(Thomas, 1995), which focused on better addressing citizen interests and promoted the view of 
the citizen as a client of the state.   
King, Feltey, and Susel (1998) have also noted the change in public participation 
methods over the past two decades.  They note four aspects of the public participation model – 
the issue, the administrative process, the administrators and the public.  Historically, public 
participation included the issue at the core of the debate and the process revolved around the 
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administrator with the public as a peripheral actor.  The new public participation process still 
includes the issue at the core, but the citizen is now the central actor with the process moving to 
the periphery.  This change in focus (public not process) results in more deliberative and 
collaborative efforts.  Hourdequin, et al (2012, p.40) adds that deliberative democracy is to “get 
people to think beyond self-interest and take into account the good of others”. 
 Vigoda (2002) also notes that public participation processes have gone through a life 
cycle that began with coerciveness on the part of administrators (the decide, announce and 
defend approach), then a transformation to a process that included delegation of some 
responsibility to the public, and then to a process that is more responsive to public concerns, and 
calls for a process that is collaborative, not just responsive.  The difference between these two 
modes is best represented by viewing the roles of the actors in the process.  In a responsive 
process, the administrator is a manager and the citizen is the client.  In the collaborative process, 
citizens and administrators are true partners in the process (Vigoda, 2002).  Collaboration in 
public participation is characterized by openness of the process and transparency in decision-
making, methods that use innovative tools to educate and increase capacity of the citizenry, and 
involve the citizenry at earlier phases of the policy process. 
Nabatchi and Leighninger (2015) identify citizen engagement through deliberative 
democracy as the driver for changes in how democracy is manifest and the public is empowered 
to be a part of the policy process.  They identify information sharing, participatory budgeting 
measures and the equity in cultural differences as key components to advancement of the 
democracy that citizens want.   
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3.11    Public participation in environmental policy 
In highly technical situations, such as environmental policy decisions, there are additional 
challenges to the participatory process.  The technical matters are much more complex and the 
role of experts sometimes overwhelms the average citizen.  Citizen involvement in these 
situations can result in a better understanding of the issues by the public and a legitimation of the 
decision made by the experts. 
Three environmental programs are of particular interest in developing, framing, and 
answering my research questions.  These programs – the Federal Superfund program, the 
brownfields and community redevelopment program, and facility siting arena - each present a 
unique set of challenges the administrator and the citizen.   
Research on public participation in environmental policy decisions has generally found 
that greater public interest and involvement results in positive normative outcomes, although the 
data on improved environmental outcomes is thin at best (Beierle, 1998).  Evaluation of public 
participation processes presents the classic public administration and economic balance of 
achieving desired goals within a set of given economic and value constraints. 
Public participation studies for environmental issues includes discussions on public 
opinion regarding hazardous waste facilities (J. T. Hamilton, 1993), studies of the effectiveness 
of sharing federal responsibilities with local stakeholders in the Superfund and brownfields 
programs (Wernstedt, 2001), identification of lessons from Superfund that can be applied to 
brownfields sites (Wernstedt & Hersh, 1998), the role of community preferences on brownfields 
policy decisions (Greenberg & Lewis, 2000), and the effectiveness of the Environmental Impact 
Assessment process (O'Faircheallaigh, 2010). 
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Hamilton (1993) studied the impact of public opinion on firms’ decisions regarding the 
expansion of hazardous waste facilities.  He found that firms incorporated the potential for public 
collective action into their decision-making regarding waste siting.  The analysis of plant 
expansions indicated that firms were less likely to expand a hazardous waste facility in areas 
where the likelihood of public participation was greater, as measured by voter turnout.  
Furuseth (1989) performed a survey study to determine local awareness of and attitudes 
towards an existing hazardous waste treatment facility.  Not surprisingly, he found that residents 
were significantly opposed to the presence of the facility in their neighborhood.  More germane 
to my research questions, he also found that proximity to the site and level of education were 
accurate predictors of community knowledge of waste management operations and that such 
knowledge was a precursor to negative attitudes regarding the site.    
In his study of public participation in brownfields redevelopment, Bartsh (1993) 
identifies barriers – differing end-use visions, outcomes uncertainties, community apathy, and 
mistrust – and success factors – a broad base of stakeholder selection, knowledge and trust 
among actors, clear and honest communication, acknowledgment of resource limitations, and 
building on “small wins” - for public participation processes.  The guiding legislation for the 
TAG program does not formally incorporate these steps into the process.  The case study 
findings presented in Chapter 8, however, demonstrate that effective incorporation of these steps 
is central to a process that is viewed as successful by the participants. 
The Superfund public participation program is highly rationalized and prescriptive in 
terms of methodology and required activities.  In addition, the program is very confusing to the 
lay public and even to environmental professionals who do not deal with the program daily.  The 
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process is long, tedious and frustrating to all parties involved.  There are opportunities for public 
involvement that are not often utilized.   
A recent study evaluated the impact of public participation on remedy selection at 
Superfund sites (Daley, 2007).  The study found that community involvement, the presence of 
either a Community Advisory Group (CAG) or the award of a Technical Assistance Grant, has a 
positive and significant impact on the degree of remediation undertaken at Superfund sites.  The 
data also showed that formal public participation (award of a TAG) was only undertaken at 15% 
of the sites, even though a grant program exists for technical assistance.  This finding of 
underutilization of the available participation program is core to one of the central questions 
addressed in this research.  If the community benefits so directly from the award of a TAG, as 
Daley finds, why are there so few communities that take advantage of the program? Furthermore, 
Daley’s study does not address schedule impacts of the award of a TAG, another of my research 
questions.  I also revisit the impact of TAGs on the remedy selection process and outcome.     
The brownfields and community development program presents some similar issues as 
Superfund relative to technical complexity.  While Superfund is driven by a goal of reducing 
risks to human health and the environment, Brownfields programs target the redevelopment of 
blighted or environmentally impaired property.  A Brownfields program attempts to balance 
environmental concerns, with community desires for neighborhood redevelopment and the 
economic drivers for a private developer to cleanup and redevelop a property.  This provides the 
opportunity for collaborative efforts between private parties, environmental regulators, local 
economic development officials and the public. 
The siting of infrastructure, such as renewable energy facilities or power transmission 
lines, presents yet another opportunity to understand the public participation process.  This can 
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be viewed as the Not in My Back Yard (NIMBY) problem.  The concerns of the local 
community are often at odds with what may be perceived as the public good.  The role of 
collaborative public participation in this arena can provide valuable insights into this dilemma.  
 
3.12 Synthesizing the Literature 
 
 The focus of my research is on a particular form of public participation in a highly 
technical and complex decision-making process – the TAG program at Superfund sites.  The 
findings of this literature review as they pertain to public participation in highly technical 
settings are presented in the next chapter, which discusses the characteristics of these technical 
policy scenarios and identifies the expected impact on the participation process.  It also identifies 
the attributes of the TAG program and their anticipated impact of the participation barriers or 
hurdles in complex, technical decision-making.         
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Chapter 4 – Superfund, Public Participation, and Theoretical 
Connections 
This research investigates how the TAG program aligns with the ideals of public 
participation as discussed in Chapter 2 and what impacts are observed in outcomes in the 
decision-making process at Superfund sites as a result of the TAG program.  This chapter 
presents a synthesis of the theoretical discussions as they pertain to public participation in highly 
technical and complex policy settings.   
The first part of this chapter identifies the characteristics of highly technical and complex 
policy issues that are expected to impact citizen involvement in either negative or positive ways.  
The next section identifies the desirable attributes of public participation in these settings as 
informed by the public participation theory discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  This is followed by 
a discussion of the specific impact of each characteristic of the highly-technical issues on the 
desired participation criteria. 
The next part of the chapter discusses the attributes of the TAG program that are 
designed to address these gaps in the public participation process, followed by a discussion of the 
anticipated impacts of the TAG program components on specific participation criteria.  This 
chapter concludes with a synthesis of the expected impact of the TAG program and provides the 
foundation for the theoretical frame for the qualitative studies presented in Chapters 6 through 9.   
The decision about how to deal with contaminated sites in the Superfund program is but 
one example of a complex, technical problem whose solution is expected to benefit from 
meaningful and impactful participation from affected citizens.  Other examples include policies 
about climate change; local, state and national energy policy; the need for and location of critical 
infrastructure (e.g. bridge replacement, water supply systems, pipelines, or highways); scientific 
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and medical research programs; land use planning; and Brownfields programs that determine the 
future of environmentally impacted properties.  As discussed in Chapter 3 and later in this 
chapter, public participation in these decisions is important and often difficult to accomplish.   
 
4.1  Characteristics of complex, technical problems 
To examine public participation in highly technical policy settings, we must first 
understand what is meant by these policy situations.  Technically complex policies have several 
characteristics that are likely to impact the success of citizen involvement programs; they address 
a problem that (1) is characterized by technical complexity, (2) is expensive to evaluate and 
resolve, (3) results in public participatory efforts that are also expensive to undertake and/or 
require intensive involvement, (4) takes a long time to resolve, and (5) is characterized by 
significant differences in information available to various parties.  In addition to these unique 
elements, highly technical policies also are characterized by features that are representative of 
many policy decision scenarios; namely, (6) there are multiple stakeholders with competing 
interests, (7) public participants involved in the evaluation of and decision-making for the 
problems typically lack experience in collaboration and conflict resolution, and (8) the problem 
and, therefore its solution, has a significant potential impact on the community.    
The technical complexity of these problems is difficult for the average citizen, without 
specialized technical education and years of experience in the field, to fully comprehend and 
evaluate.  In some instances, even the experts in the field disagree on the degree of the problem 
and the range of potential solutions.  For Superfund sites, the evaluation of site problems is 
primarily performed by professionals with training in environmental science, geology, 
engineering, human health assessment and toxicology.  In many instances, the technical 
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personnel evaluating, assessing, and solving environmental problems have advanced degrees in 
these specialty fields.  Community members without specialized training can be intimidated 
when trying to understand the technical complexity and state their concerns about such problems. 
Highly technical problems require very expensive solutions.  These complex situations 
often require significant investments to investigate and evaluate the problems.  The solutions to 
resolve these problems often require capital from multiple funding sources, and can require 
consensus-building among numerous potentially affected groups.  Because the solutions are 
expensive to implement and the impact of the solutions are far-reaching, these are high stakes 
and high-profile situations.  For example, the average cost for the investigation, design and 
remediation of a Superfund site can exceed $25 million (Superfund Fact Book).   
In addition, it is expensive for the community to participate during the evaluation, 
decision, and implementation process.  Understanding and evaluating problems can overwhelm 
the average citizen and can require a significant investment of time and resources. The average 
citizen may not have the background or capacity for involvement at the level these situations 
demand.  The nature of the problems require that citizens invest significant chunks of time to 
understand and impact decisions.  In addition, the policy decisions may require that citizens 
commit to and engage in the process for a very long time. Specifically, in the Superfund process, 
citizens must access, read, and comprehend thousands of pages of technical documents and 
determine how these technical studies affect them and which solutions may address the problem. 
Evaluating technical problems, determining and designing a solution, and implementing a 
technical solution is a slow process, often without much visible progress.  In the Superfund 
process, for example, it can take from 15 to 20 years for a site to move from discovery to 
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ultimate closure.  This can be disheartening for citizens and other stakeholders impacted by a 
Superfund site.   
Asymmetric availability of information is also a characteristic of technically complex 
problems.  The quantity and timing of information availability to technical participants and the 
public varies.  At a Superfund site, government personnel and PRPs may have access to more 
information and earlier access to most information regarding the site assessment and remedy 
decision.  Furthermore, the ability of the public to process the technical documents is often 
significantly less than the government agency and private company participants.  There are also 
numerous guidance documents and technical procedures that are intimately understood and 
incorporated into the daily work of technical representatives.    
Most, if not all, policy decisions involve competing stakeholders, often with different 
goals for the solution of the problem.  In the Superfund program, private companies that are 
responsible for the cleanup may desire a less costly remedy than the community members that 
live near a Superfund site.  Local officials may side with industrial representatives to maintain 
good relations and protect jobs or they may side with the citizens who desire more aggressive 
(and expensive) solutions.  Since state officials need to balance response actions at numerous 
sites across the state, they may have a differing agenda for an individual site than the other 
parties involved. 
Public participation in policy decisions often involves inexperienced collaborators. The 
evaluation and selection of solutions to problems requires the successful negotiation of 
competing interests and this collaboration is enhanced when the participants have a specific 
skillset or have established trust in surrogates that have the requisite skills.  Community 
representatives are often not trained or experienced in these areas.  
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Policy decisions, including highly technical problems, have some degree of impact on the 
community. The higher the real or perceived impact on the community, the more important it is 
that public participation be impactful.  In the Superfund program, the presence of contaminated 
soil, water, and air presents a health hazard to community members.  The stigma associated with 
Superfund sites also results in reduced property values in the neighborhood and the sites are 
often characterized as physical blights. 
  
4.2  Attributes of Meaningful Public Participation in Technical Problems 
Chapter 3 provided a discussion of the literature review on theory of public participation 
in policy and decision making.  This section draws upon that review to identify the core 
components of successful public participation in technical policy decisions.  For public 
participation to be successful, it should engender trust.   The public is more likely to engage in a 
meaningful way and assist in problem solving if they trust the other parties in the decision 
process.  Principal-agent theory predicts that the public will not view government officials as 
acting on their behalf (or as their agent) without first building a relationship through meaningful 
interaction.  Credibility is also important to the participatory process; credibility of the agency 
with the public and other stakeholders and credibility of the citizen participants with the agency 
as well as other members of the affected community.  This credibility is important in establishing 
the parties as legitimate to the decision-making process.  Several scholars point to the importance 
of trust, legitimacy and transparency in the process to create a positive and successful 
participatory programs (Bhattacharyya, 2015; Nabatchi, 2012a; Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015; 
Worsham, 2011). 
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Quality communication, through transparency, the open flow of information between the 
parties, and clear communication, results in improvement in the participation process.  
Transparency ensures that all participants in the decision-making process are accountable to one 
another and there are no “side deals” or private discussions and negotiations that could 
compromise trust in the process.  Transparency will engender trust among the participants, foster 
open dialog on important topics, and can result in conciliatory attitudes.  The open flow of 
information encompasses the full and timely transmittal of data, decision criteria and potential 
solutions to the problem to the public and the willing acceptance of information provided by the 
public.  Clear communication is attained by presenting technical information in manner that the 
non-technical public can understand it.  It also encompasses the communication of concerns, 
without rhetoric or hyperbole, from the public to agency representatives.  The participation 
process should incorporate clear communication between participants with varying levels of 
technical knowledge, knowledge of the “rules of negotiation” and potentially opposing views of 
the desirable policy outcome.    
Satisfaction of the participants is also a hallmark of good participation.  This includes 
satisfaction with the process – through access to information and other participants, 
acknowledgement and serious consideration of input, and meaningful impact on the decision – 
and the outcome itself.  Participants see the benefit of their investment in the process and are 
more likely to maintain meaningful involvement.  The lack of satisfaction can lead to 
participants dropping out of the process, or worse, becoming a roadblock to the solution. 
In many participatory ventures, there is a natural imbalance of power between 
participants.  Those with higher levels of knowledge, money, influence, access to information or 
decision makers often have a higher level of influence on decision-making.  Good participatory 
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process will result in an even balance of power, ensuring that those participants with less natural 
influence are afforded a legitimate opportunity to be involved in a meaningful way and 
enhancing equal participation in the process.  
The decision-making process is also often characterized by inherently unequal 
participation. Public administrators and technical stakeholders have different access to 
information and differing abilities to influence the decisions.  In some cases, all of the 
participants in a policy discussion, except for the community members, are technically trained 
and possibly engaged in in the discussion on a professional basis.  There also exists a knowledge 
gap between the stakeholders, that further reinforces this unequal participation.   
A low cost of participation also characterizes high quality participation. This can be 
attained by assisting communities and removing resource impediments to the process and other 
potential barriers to participation. Participation should also be representative, ensuring that the 
participants mirror the affected community.  The question of who participates is an important 
one; the voice of the community should be from the whole community, not just a vocal minority 
(Barnes et al., 2003; Cooper et al., 2006).  Participation should be impactful, not just 
perfunctory; public input should be incorporated in a manner that the process, the decision and 
outcomes are improved.  This type of engagement can result in growth among community 
members and increase the capacity for future public participation (Frederickson, 1982).  Properly 
designed and implemented participatory processes will also provide education of citizens.  
Community participants should be provided information and resources to understand, use and 
evaluate information to make informed input.  This education can include training on the process 
as well as technical resources to understand the technical policy issue at hand.   
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The participatory process should not be limited to experts.  The process should allow for 
inclusion of stakeholders with varying degrees of technical capacity.  Community members are 
not typically experts in the topic of the policy decision and efforts should be made to present 
information and engage in dialog that allows the public to understand the issue and weigh in on 
the matters that impact without feeling intimidated by the process or other participants.  It is 
beneficial to have a government agent with a strong public service motivation (PSM) or 
competence in public participation process (J. V. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015) to assist and guide 
the process and the participants in the successful completion of the participatory process.  
However, a strong public participation process will have measures in place that do not rely on 
this service motivated manager for success.    
    
4.3  The impact on public participation  
Understanding and evaluating technically complex problems can be a process that is at 
odds with the premise of high-quality public participation.  This section presents a discussion of 
the impact and potential barriers that each of the policy characteristics has on the various 
attributes of a quality participation process.  An evaluation of the areas of intersection of the 
characteristics of highly technical problems and desirable attributes of participatory processes is 
depicted in Table 4-1.  Areas where the technical policy problem negatively affects the 
participation process are indicated by red dots, while areas where the technical problem can 
enhance or encourage participation are shown with green dots.  The resulting set of participation 
criteria present the participation gap that exists (or potentially exists) in these policy settings – 
the participation ideals that are not attained. 
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Table 4‐1
Issues with public participation in
highly technical policy settings
Red dot: Tension between 
characteristic and goal
Green Dot: Enhances goal 
achievement
Characteristic of Policy Issue Description
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Technical Complexity
Problems are difficult to understand; 
evaluation of potential soultions requires 
specialized knowledge.
Expensive solutions Studies and solutions are high cost efforts. 
Expensive involvement
Participation often requires intense and/or 
long‐term involvement. Participation 
requires resources
Slow process
Gathering data, formulating options, 
identifying and evaluating soultions, and 
implementing remedies takes a long time
Asymmetric Information
Technical participants better understand 
problem than effected community, less 
information provided to public.
Competing stakeholders
Private parties and citizens (and often 
citizen sub‐groups) have different 
objectives.  
Inexperienced Collaborators
Lack of common basis (information, goals) 
results in unprincipled negotiation. 
Community preferences missed.
Impact on Community
The policy issue has a significant (real or 
perceived) impact on the community so 
that they are invested in the outcome. 
Participation Criteria
Unique to Technical Policies
Common to Public Participation Settings
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The technical complexity of these policy decisions can present a number of barriers to 
quality public participation.  First, it can result in a lack of credibility for the community as the 
members of the public are viewed as not having the background, knowledge, and experience to 
understand and provide meaningful input to the process.  Second, it can hamper the quality of 
communication and flow of information since the government agency representative may be 
reluctant to engage in information transfer with the public.  The information flow is likely to be 
characterized by a low signal to noise ratio – the signal being meaningful information to the 
decision-making process and the noise being information that may provide no useful input for 
solving the problem.  Technical complexity also impedes the education process because the gap 
between the knowledge base of the typical citizen and the knowledge needed to participate is 
large enough that it would require an inordinate investment of time for the government agent and 
the citizen.  Similarly, the technical complexity overwhelms the average citizen and creates a 
situation that discourages non-experts from participating. 
The expensive nature of solutions can result in public dissatisfaction with the process 
since the selection and implementation of solutions will typically take a long-time and, in 
general, the community members do not care about the cost of the solution, only that the solution 
be right and be quick. The high stakes and high profile nature can also be a deterrent to non-
expert participation, both from the perspective of the participant and the government agent.  
It is also expensive for the public to engage in the process; other participants are typically 
involved in the process in a professional manner – it is a part of their career -  while participation 
by community members is usually an activity that is extracurricular to their full-time endeavors.  
This can threaten the credibility of the public, who are perceived to be ill-informed and not fully 
involved, and can also raise the cost of participation.  The requirement of significant personal 
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investment to participate can also detract from representative participation in the community  
and impactful participation.  In the Superfund process, the high cost of participation includes a 
commitment of time and resources on the part of the community to obtain and review highly 
technical documents that are filled with analytical data, complex environmental modeling, 
human health and ecological risk assessments, engineering analysis, evaluation of complicated 
remedies and detailed cost estimates for remediation. Furthermore, meaningful involvement also 
includes preparing for and attending numerous public meetings and providing comments on 
various documents through the process. 
The decision-making process for complex, technical problems is a slow process; it is 
necessary to gather extensive data to evaluate these high stakes issues and the process of 
formulating options, evaluating remedy alternatives and garnering the needed support to 
implement remedies is time consuming.  This often results in frustration (or a lack of 
satisfaction) in the community since much of the work and progress toward solutions are not 
seen by the community members who are participating at the fringe of the process.  The 
requirement for constant and long-term involvement requires a significant commitment of time 
and other resources raising the cost of participation.   
The different avenues by which the professional, technical participants and the general 
public participate in highly technical policy matters results in an asymmetry of information. This 
can result in an erosion of trust since the public does not have the same information as other 
more technical participants, a reduction in credibility of the agency since the public may feel that 
they are being excluded from important parts of the process, and an overall degradation in open 
communication and transparency.  The lack of information transfer can be rooted in the 
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administrator’s lack of competence in the process, since they may not have the time, resources, 
or knowledge to present the technical information in a way that the community can readily 
understand.  This apparent lack of full disclosure of information severely restricts the 
community’s ability to have an impact on the process. 
Several characteristics of the policy process are not unique to technically complex 
problems, but are nonetheless important to overall success of the participation process.  As 
discussed in Section 4.1, policy decisions often engage competing stakeholders, with different 
ideas of success of the process and success of the solution.  The inherent conflict between these 
competing values can result in a lack of trust and transparency, can maintain, or increase the 
unequal balance of power, and can present a further deterrent for non-expert participation.       
Most participation processes in technical arenas include a public contingent that is 
inexperienced in collaboration.    In the Superfund process, there are often several different 
solutions to address environmental concerns and a strong collaborative process is required to 
understand the interests of all parties to build a solution that meets the needs of the most parties.  
This type of consensus building requires extensive conflict management and collaboration skills. 
The lack of collaboration experience, by the public and members of the technical community, 
can result in lack of transparency (the participants don’t always understand what they can reveal 
regarding information and preferences), barriers to even balance of power and equal participation 
by all parties, and is often confounded by the inexperience or lack of PSM on the part of the 
administrator. 
A policy decision process, by its nature, will result in an impact on the community.  In 
highly technical policy processes, and Superfund decision particularly, the high level and 
personal nature of the potential impact can encourage a representative group of community 
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members to participate, can increase the commitment of the community members to educate 
themselves on the process and the potential solutions, and result in a more impactful 
participation.  The high stakes for the community can provide the catalyst to meaningful action. 
 In summary, highly technical policy decisions can present numerous barriers to high 
quality, successful public participation.  The most important barriers identified in Table 4-1 are 
centered on aspects of information flow and understanding, meaningful and balanced 
involvement in the process, and a trust in and credibility of the process and participants.  These 
are the result of the technical nature of the problems, the slow pace of the process, the expense of 
participating and the uneven availability of information to public participants.  This is especially 
true in Superfund, where the decisions about site cleanup unfold over a decade or more and are 
based on a high quantity of scientific data, complex environmental modeling and risk 
assessments, and knowledge about the ability of treatment technologies to address site risks and 
address the health concerns and stigma of a Superfund site. 
4.4  Attributes of the TAG program 
Congress identified numerous problems with the Superfund Program after its inception in 
1980.  Progress toward identification and cleanup was slow, the cost of study and response was 
even higher than anticipated, the program was fraught with conflict between regulators and the 
regulated community, and citizen involvement was not achieving the goals of consensus 
building, support and education that were desired.  Congress realized the problems with 
participation and information exchange and included the TAG program in the 1986 Superfund 
Amendments to encourage and improve public participation in these highly technical settings.   
Congress realized that Superfund sites are complicated, expensive to address and controversial 
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(expensive, slow, technical complexity, multiple and conflicting stakeholders) and that it was 
difficult to please all stakeholders in the process.  Congress and EPA designed the TAG program 
to improve the community involvement process.   
The program includes a formalized process that outlines the requirements for the EPA 
project manager (PM) and the community that chooses to participate.  The TAG program 
identifies key points and methods for including the public in the process. Public meetings and 
review of key documents in the remedy selection and implementation process provide specific 
points of input.  The TAG program also provides for establishment of a separate community 
involvement coordinator (CIC) function to assist the EPA project manager (PM) with citizen 
engagement activities.     
The TAG program also provides funding (a $50,000 grant) to allow the community to 
hire an independent technical representative to assist in understanding the complex nature of the 
Superfund process and the technical issues related to solving the environmental problems.   
There is also a fund matching requirement of twenty percent for the community group, which 
can be a monetary contribution or can be provided through the provision of in-kind services.   
The TAG program also includes administrative requirements for the community group to 
incorporate, to perform specified accounting and recordkeeping activities, and the dissemination 
of information to the entire community. 
The TAG program, through its funding mechanism and ability to hire an outside 
consultant, provides technical resources that can help in navigating the Superfund process.  The 
community group selects their own representative as an independent technical advisor, providing 
an added level of influence and autonomy for the community.  
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4.5  Expected Impact of the TAG Program on Public Participation 
The TAG program was designed to and is expected to address some of the participation 
gaps in technical, complex policy situations that were presented in Table 4-1.  This section 
presents a discussion of the specific impact that each attribute is expected to have on these 
participation gaps.  The details of the expected impact of the TAG attributes on the participation 
process are summarized in Table 4-2. 
The formalized process established in the TAG program is expected to enhance the 
decision-making process so that it includes a representative cross section of the community, 
instill trust among parties through continued and regular and transparent dialog, bring credibility 
to community members and to the regulatory agency, and result in meaningful and impactful 
participation.  The regular and transparent communication is expected to also result in a balance 
of power in the process and result in a more equitable participation program.   
As the community members become regular participants in meetings and decision-
making, they are likely to gain a level of respect and credibility that makes them an integral part 
of the process.  The community involvement coordinator (CIC) adds a level of competence 
within the agency to specifically address community issues, reducing the reliance on the public 
service motivation of the PM for meaningful public involvement, and provides a balance to the 
technical bias that may be presented by the expert at the agency.  The regular interaction of the 
community representatives with the regulatory and technical members should enhance the 
overall communication quality and flow of information. 
Through the funding mechanism, the cost of participation is lowered and the potential 
impact of participation is increased by providing the resources needed to allow the group to hire 
an independent technical consultant.  This reduces the burden of the group having to “learn 
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Table 4‐2
Attributes of TAG Program and impact on public participation
Green dot: Positive impact
Red dot: Negative impact
Attribute of TAG Program Description
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Formalized process
Information exchange and goal 
communication occurs frequently; CIC 
provides assistance to PM
Funding
Provides $50K to hire technical advisor to 
assist group
Fund matching
Requires 20% match in money or in‐kind 
services
Administrative requirements
Requires detailed and cumbersome 
reporting of activities and expenditures
Provision of technical resources
Technical advisor assists group in 
understanding issues and formulating 
input in a meaningful way
Select own representative
Allows the community to select and hire 
their own technical advisor (agent)
Participation Criteria
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 Superfund” before ever starting to consume the site-specific data.  The group can then have a 
more impactful contribution in the site evaluation process.  The fund matching requirement can 
be an impediment to participation if the community has difficulty in raising the needed capital or 
identifying the in-kind services that they can provide.  This matching can also provide a strong 
positive signal to the agency and the remainder of the community regarding the seriousness and 
credibility of the group.  Since the community must identify the technical expert to hire to 
provide assistance, this can also present a barrier to participation. 
The administrative requirements of the TAG program can be burdensome to communities 
that do not have the resources, expertise or experience in dealing with such matters.  It can erode 
trust, since it can appear that the agency is more concerned with “checking off” administrative 
boxes than with gaining meaningful input on the site.  The community can become discouraged, 
lowering the satisfaction with the process.  However, some of the administrative requirements 
can also improve the participation process.  The group is required to demonstrate that it is 
representative of the community as a whole, provide information and educate other members of 
the community, and hold regular community meetings to make sure that information is provided 
to the entire community.  
The ability to hire a technical consultant with a strong background in Superfund, and to 
pick this representative on their own, to review data and distill the information for presentation to 
the community allows the community group to better understand the process, the environmental 
data presented and the technical issues related to remediating the Superfund site. Communication 
and education are improved as the technical advisor provides a mechanism for distilling 
information into usable chunks for the community and translating issues to the public and the 
community desires to the agency.  As the community members gain a greater understanding of 
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the technical issues, they are better able to formulate and communicate the community goals for 
site response actions, and the negotiation process can become more principled and effective, 
resulting in more representative, impactful and principled participation.  Through education, free 
exchange of information, constructive engagement, and transparent communications better input 
into the process can be achieved.  This technical representative can also serve as an intermediary 
(and translator) to communicate with EPA and PRP technical representatives, in a role similar to 
that of an attorney in a legal matter. They serve as an advocate for the community within the 
framework of the accepted process, communicating with other technical parties in a way that 
increases the signal to noise ratio dramatically.  In this case, the signal is informational input that 
improves the technical remedy decision-making process and is presented in the manner that the 
other technical participants can use and understand.  The noise is information that the technical 
participants determine not to be germane to the technical issue at hand or is presented in a 
manner that does not allow the other stakeholders to incorporate the information into the 
decision-making.    
The TAG program, while not without drawbacks, appears to have been designed and 
implemented in a way to alleviate many of the participation gaps that exist in the Superfund 
public participation process.  The TAG program is expected to reduce the burden on the EPA 
PM of educating the community by introducing an intermediary to assist in this role.  In addition 
to technical education, the technical consultant can also serve as intermediary between the 
technical members (EPA and PRPs) and the public.  Technical consultants know the unwritten 
rules of engagement – how to present information to the EPA, not trying to negotiate technical 
issues that cannot be changed, reducing the role of emotion in the process – improve the 
communication process and trust and transparency among all parties, and streamline the 
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technical decision-making process.    The TAG program is also expected to address problems 
with information asymmetry by incorporating a community representative with the technical 
knowledge to comprehend the data and perform a detailed analysis. 
4.6  Implications and Plan for Research 
Congress and EPA introduced the TAG program to improve citizen involvement at 
Superfund sites, build consensus around the remedy selection process, improve community 
acceptance of remediation decisions, and improve public education about Superfund sites.  The 
primary mechanism for attaining these goals was to provide Technical Assistance Grants for 
communities to hire technical advisors to guide them through the process and provide an avenue 
for public to engage in the remedy selection process in a meaningful way.  The program has the 
potential to successfully accomplish many of these goals.   
I have evaluated the TAG program relative to the ideals of quality public participation 
presented in Chapter 3.  The potential gaps in the public participation process in highly technical 
and complex policy settings, such as the Superfund TAG program, are presented in Table 4-1 
and the expected ability of the TAG program to address these participation gaps is presented in 
Table 4-2.   
The TAG program is expected to result in improved trust and credibility, result in more 
open and meaningful communication, improve community satisfaction with the process, and 
address power imbalances in the decision-making process.  However, all of these benefits arise 
only if a community actual obtains a TAG.  If a TAG is not obtained, the community cannot hire 
a technical advisor, and the process improvements cannot be realized.  The low uptake rate of 
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TAGs (approximately 15 % of Superfund sites get a TAG) indicates that the costs and barriers of 
the program outweigh the perceived benefits for a large group of communities.   
To more fully investigate these findings, I have designed and implemented a qualitative 
study of six Superfund sites.  The primary component of this qualitative study is a series of semi-
structured interviews to address topics of the rationale behind obtaining a TAG, the benefits and 
improvements from the TAG process, the drawbacks of the TAG process and the impact of the 
TAG program on the Superfund evaluation process.  I attempted to interview EPA project 
managers (PM), community representatives and technical consultants for each of the sites (only 
one EPA PM was not willing to be interviewed).  The design and results of this qualitative 
evaluation are presented in Chapters 6 and 8.   
  This research also includes a quantitative study that investigates what happens when a 
community gets a TAG – investigating measures related to schedule, take up rates, and remedy 
selection.  This quantitative portion of the study is presented in Chapters 5, 6, and 7.  Some of 
the questions that are addressed in the qualitative part of the research arose from the results of 
the quantitative assessment (e.g. why is the uptake for TAG programs so low – approximately 
15%). 
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Chapter 5 – Research Questions and Study Framework 
This research evaluates both the process and outcomes of public participation in the 
Superfund TAG program.  The first part of the study utilizes theoretical understanding of public 
participation from Chapters 3 and 4, along with site-specific data from Superfund sites across the 
United States, and demographic data for the communities near Superfund sites to evaluate 
behaviors and outcomes associated with the TAG program.  The second part of the study utilizes 
a multiple case study approach to gain additional insight into the Superfund TAG program in 
central New York. 
This study addresses the research questions identified in Chapter 1 regarding formal 
public participation at Superfund sites, as implemented through the TAG program.  These 
questions are: 
Research Question 1: What are the hallmarks or attributes of successful public 
participation? 
Research Question 2: What are the characteristics of highly technical and complex policy 
decisions that could impact successful public participation and how do they impact 
participation? 
Research Question 3: What are the characteristics of the Superfund Technical Assistance 
Grant (TAG) program that could address participation gaps resulting in this highly 
technical setting?  
Research Question 4: Is the Superfund TAG program successful in addressing these gaps? 
Research Question 5: What factors determine the rate of utilization of TAGs at Superfund 
sites? 
Research Question 6: Does the presence of a TAG at a Superfund site have an impact on 
the schedule for completion of remediation for Superfund sites? 
Research Question 7: Does the presence of a TAG have an impact on the remedy selected to 
address environmental issues at a Superfund site? 
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Research Question 8: Are there findings from the research that can be applied to improve 
the TAG program implementation, and more broadly improve participation in other 
highly technical policy settings? 
The first four questions were partially addressed in Chapter 4 and will be more fully 
addressed in the qualitative study discussed in Chapter 8.  The remaining research questions, 
were used to formulate the working hypotheses for the quantitative research.  The first set of 
hypotheses pertains to the factors that are anticipated to influence the involvement of community 
groups in Superfund decision-making through the TAG program.  The second set of hypotheses 
relates to the effect that public participation has on outcomes at Superfund sites, specifically the 
schedule for cleanup and closure of sites. 
5.1   Hypotheses of TAG Application and Award 
The selection of a site for inclusion on the NPL is based on the potential for unacceptable 
risk to human health and the environment as described in Chapter 2.  Once a site is placed on the 
NPL, several site characteristics and demographic measures should have an impact on the 
decision of community to apply for a TAG and the subsequent award of a TAG.  The TAG 
program is not competitive or resource limited; if the community meets the requirements of the 
TAG program as discussed in Section 2.3, a TAG award is made by EPA.  The decision to obtain 
a TAG is, therefore, made by the community.     
It is expected that Community Characteristics, such as community resources and social 
capital, will influence a community’s decision to participate in the remedy-selection process. 
Consequently, a higher relative wealth, stability and education of the neighborhood near a 
Superfund should result in an increased interest in the site by the community and an increased 
ability of the community to maintain and improve the quality of their neighborhood.  This 
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combination of knowledge, interest and capacity should, therefore, result in an increased 
likelihood of citizen involvement and TAG award.  Some of these factors will be based on 
preferences of the citizens (education and stability), some will be rooted in constraints of the 
citizens (education and wealth) and some will have components of both.  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): As the relative wealth, stability, and education of the citizens near a 
Superfund site increase, the likelihood that a TAG will be applied for and awarded increases. 
Site Characteristics will also affect the likelihood that a community will be actively 
involved, apply for and be awarded a TAG.  An increase in site complexity should result in a 
greater need of the community to enlist outside technical assistance and may be an indicator of 
greater potential environmental impact or environmental risk.  Therefore, increased site 
complexity is predicted to increase the likelihood of application for and award of a TAG.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): As the complexity and perceived hazards of a Superfund site 
increase, the likelihood that a TAG will be applied for and awarded increases. 
The party responsible for cleanup of the Superfund site should also have an impact on the 
involvement of the community and the decision to apply for a TAG.  Private parties (and Federal 
agencies in the case of Federal sites) were found to be responsible, either directly or indirectly, 
for creating the environmental impacts at the site, while EPA is typically viewed as the party 
responsible for ensuring proper cleanup of the environmental problems.  Thus, the involvement 
of parties in addition to EPA at a site is likely to result in a decreased trust in the process by the 
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community, based on real or perceived power imbalances.  Because of this decrease in trust of 
private companies and other Federal Agencies and an increased desire to engage technical 
support to navigate the Superfund process, performance of site cleanup by any party other than 
EPA is predicted to increase in the likelihood of a TAG award.   
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Sites where study or remediation is performed by a party other than 
EPA (either Federal Agency or private party) will be more likely to have a TAG awarded.    
5.2    Hypotheses of Schedule Impacts  
The Superfund process has a well-established process roadmap as discussed in Chapter 2 
and shown in Figure 2-1.  In the context of this study of the TAG program, the three important 
milestones are the discovery of the site, the initial selection of the remedy (which occurs when a 
Record-of-Decision, or ROD, is issued), and site closure.  The discovery of the site is the time at 
which EPA becomes aware of potential environmental concerns at the site.   A preliminary 
identification has been made and the site has been acknowledged as problematic.  
The issuance of the ROD is the time when a policy-level decision has been made 
regarding the future response activities to be undertaken at the site.  Public involvement prior to 
the ROD can influence this decision-making process.  The announcement of a remedy decision 
may also influence the decision by the community to pursue a TAG.  For instance, if the 
decision-making process is moving too slowly the community may choose to become more 
involved to accelerate response.  Additionally, if the community is unsatisfied with the chosen 
remedy, they may choose to apply for a TAG and enlist technical support to obtain a more 
satisfactory remediation approach. 
The third event of importance is site closure at the end of the Superfund process.  Two 
options were considered for this event; the date of the final closure report and the date that the 
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site is delisted from the NPL.  Remediation is deemed to be essentially complete at the time a 
closure report is finalized.  However, there are numerous instances where a long period elapses 
between the completion of the remedy and the delisting of the site from the NPL - such as sites 
with groundwater contamination that require a long period for cleanup or demonstration of the 
performance of the remedy.  In these cases, the site is cleaned up although not removed from the 
NPL.  For this reason, the closure report date is used as the “end of the process” in this study.  
This is consistent with the methodology used in previous studies of Superfund site closures, 
including the previously mentioned study by Daley. 
For the purposes of this evaluation, the process is divided into two phases; Phase I is 
defined as the period from discovery through issuance of the ROD, and Phase II as the period 
from issuance of the ROD through site closure.  The impact of TAG award on the schedule of 
the site is expected to be different based on the phase of the program and the timing of the TAG 
award.  For example, complexity theory predicts that a TAG award before the ROD will increase 
the time required to complete the ROD because of the addition of another party (the public) in 
the decision-making and negotiation process.  However, the award of a TAG before the ROD is 
expected to result in a schedule decrease for the period from ROD to closure, since potential 
conflicts that may arise are likely to have been addressed among the parties prior to the issuance 
of the ROD.  A simplified schematic of the Superfund process indicating the various points in 
the process where a TAG might be awarded is presented in Figure 5-1.   
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Three scenarios for TAG award are considered in estimating the impact of the TAG on 
Superfund process schedule.  All scenarios compare the schedule impacts of TAGs relative to the 
baseline condition of no TAG awarded.   The first scenario addresses the award of a TAG during 
the Superfund process, regardless of the timing of such an award.  In this scenario, complexity 
theory suggests that the overall schedule (from discovery through site closure) will be increased, 
although without specifying the timing of TAG award, the impact on the specific phase is not 
estimable. 
The second scenario addresses TAG award before the ROD is issued at a Superfund Site.  
This is predicted to result in an increased duration of Phase I and a decreased duration of Phase 
II.  The net effect is predicted to increase the total project duration, with the organizational 
complexity of an added party driving the schedule increase. 
The third scenario addresses the award of a TAG after the ROD has been issued.  In this 
instance, there is no impact on the schedule since this is still the baseline condition (no TAG).  It 
is predicted that the duration of Phase II would be appreciably increased in this scenario for two 
reasons; first, complexity theory suggests that adding a negotiating party will increase the time 
for decision-making.  Second, the award of the TAG after the ROD suggests that the community 
NPL 
Proposal
Final 
NPL RI/FS ROD Complete
NPL 
Deletion
Figure 5-1. Superfund Process and TAG 
award points 
Potential TAG award events 
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was in some way dissatisfied with the progress made on the site or the remedy selected.  This 
increases the chance of conflict in Phase II and the potential to revisit many decisions that were 
made during Phase I.  Like the previous scenario, it is theorized that the overall project duration 
will increase because of the inclusion of another party in the deliberations and the potential for 
renegotiating previous decisions.  Table 5-1 presents a summary of the predicted impacts on 
schedule based on TAG award at these various points in the Superfund process. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The impact of the award of a TAG award at any time in the process 
will result in an increase in the time required to progress from NPL listing to site closure. 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): A TAG award before the ROD at a Superfund will result in an 
increased time to issue the ROD and a shorter duration from the ROD to site closure.  The 
overall schedule from NPL listing to site closure will be increased. 
Hypothesis 6 (H6):  A TAG award after the ROD will have no impact on the time to 
issue a ROD and will increase the time from ROD to site closure. The overall schedule from 
PL listing to site closure will be increased.  
 
5.3    Hypotheses of Remedy Selection 
There are conflicting factors at play when evaluating remediation choices when a TAG is 
awarded.  Some of this predict no impact on the remedy chosen at sites with a TAG, while others 
suggest that the TAG will have an impact on the remediation method. 
Democracy theory suggests that the remedy would be influenced and a more complicated 
or “bigger” remedy would result.  If the TAG was awarded because of power imbalance or lack 
of trust in agency, then the presence of the community group should influence agency decisions 
in a manner that would result in a more protective (i.e. bigger remedy).     
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Timing of TAG Formation Phase I Phase II Phase I and II Discussion
Baseline Condition (no TAG) 0 0 0 No TAG, baseline schedule
TAG any Time ? ? + Predicted to increase overall schedule due to multi-party complexity 
TAG before ROD + - +
Predicted to increase time to ROD 
(complexity) but decrease the ROD to 
closure time (reduced conflict) and increase 
overall schedule
TAG after ROD 0 + +
No impact before ROD, and increase ROD 
to closure (complexity and conflict) and 
increase overall schedule
NOTES:
  Schedule impact is defined as the expected variation from the baseline schedule with no TAG 
  0 indicates no expected change
  - indicates that the schedule is expected to be shorter
  + indicates that the schedule is expected to be longer
  ? Indicates that the expected schedule impact is unknown
  Phase I defined as the time from site discovery to completion of the first ROD for a site 
  Phase II defined as the time from the first ROD to site closure
  Phase I and II combined is the time from site discovery to site closure
Table 5-1
Theoretical Framework 
Schedule Models
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Management and professionalism of the agency, however, suggests no impact on the 
remedy selection.  The agency will perform its duty in the same way with or without public 
input.  The primary function of the process resulting from a TAG, per this theoretical 
perspective, is to inform the public and make them more comfortable and accepting of the 
remedy chosen.    
There is likely a combination of impacts from the TAG on the remedy selected, but I 
predict that the overall influence of TAG on the remedy selected will be insignificant. 
 
Hypothesis 7 (H7):  A TAG award will have no significant impact on the remedy 
chosen to address environmental impacts at a Superfund site. 
 
The seven hypotheses in this study are investigated using a combination of techniques: 
(1) empirical quantitative modeling using site and community level data, and (2) a qualitative, 
multiple case study for six Superfund sites in central New York.  The next chapter presents the 
methodologies of these studies.  
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Chapter 6 – Study Methodology 
This section presents the research methodology for the quantitative and multiple case 
study (quantitative) components of this evaluation.  This mixed methods approach allows for 
broad based analysis of nationwide data to address the hypotheses presented in Chapter 4 and a 
deep dive into specific cases to examine aspects of the TAG program that are not fully captured 
in the quantitative dataset. Details of the evaluation methodologies are presented in the following 
sections. 
6.1  Quantitative Study 
6.1.1  Data Utilized  
The primary data used in this analysis was obtained from two sources; EPA’s CERCLIS 
database and the United States Bureau of the Census data for the 2000 Census.  Information 
regarding site-specific characteristics and process duration was obtained from EPA’s CERCLIS 
database.  The data utilized cover the period from the Superfund program’s inception in 1980 
through December 2007.  The CERCLIS database includes a broad range of data including 
information on site characteristics - location, setting type (urban, rural, suburban), number of 
OUs, types of chemical contaminants, types of contaminated media, EPA region, HRS for the 
site, whether PRPs or Federal agencies were involved). In addition, it includes data on numerous 
activities at the site and the date of occurrence – discovery, NPL proposal and listing, RI/FS 
completion, ROD issuance, remediation start and completion, TAG award, and many others.    
Census tract level demographic data were obtained from the 2000 Census (US Bureau of the 
Census).  The census tract data were merged with the CERCLIS data utilizing GIS to provide a 
master database of site and demographic data.   A summary of these site and demographic 
factors and the anticipated impacts, as well as the rationale, is presented in Table 6-1. 
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Variable
Direction of 
Change
Expected Impact 
on TAG 
Formation Rationale
  Home Value + +
Residents will get involved to maintain 
neighborhood home values
  Income + +
Higher income residents more likely to 
become involved
  Population Density + -
Higher density areas less likely to view 
Superfund site negatively
  Percent Minority + -
Minority groups less likely to become 
engaged
  Level of Education + +
Higher education level necessary to 
navigate TAG program and predicts 
involvement
  Percent Owner Occupied + +
Home owners will be more interested in 
maintaining property values
  Tenure + +
Long-term residents are more invested in 
community
  Complexity + +
Complex sites more likely to pose hazard 
and require technical assitance
  Private Party Resposibility + +
Less trust in private party to address 
community needs
  Federal Facility + +
Less trust in non-EPA governmental body to 
protect health and environment
Table 6-1
Theoretical Framework 
TAG Formation
Demographics
Site Characteristics
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6.1.2 Likelihood of TAG Application and Award 
The likelihood of TAG award should increase as the capacity, interest and knowledge of 
the community increases.  Neighborhood capacity measures include demographic wealth and 
education indicators, such as home value, income, proportion of non-minorities and education 
level in the community.  As these measures increase, community capacity increases and the 
likelihood of TAG award is predicted to increase.  Neighborhood characteristics that are 
potential measures of interest in the community include population density, home values, 
percentage of owner occupied units and average tenure in the neighborhood.  As home values, 
owner-occupation and tenure increase interest in maintaining the quality of the community 
should also increase.  As population density increases, it is hypothesized that community interest 
in an NPL site will decrease, since the overall impact of such a site in a dense (urban) 
neighborhood may be less likely to be viewed negatively.  The level of community knowledge 
about the Superfund process and TAG program should increase with the education level in the 
community, resulting in a greater likelihood of TAG application and award.  The theoretical 
causal chain for the decision to apply for a TAG and subsequent TAG award is depicted in 
Figure 6-1.   
As presented in hypotheses one through three (H1, H2, H3), it is expected that the 
likelihood of TAG application and award is influenced by site characteristics and the 
demographic makeup of the area near the Superfund site.  A logistic probability model is used to 
estimate the impact of each these variables on the likelihood of TAG application and award.  The 
logistic probability model (or logit) is used to identify the relationship between independent 
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Figure 6-1.  Schematic of Causal Chain for TAG Award. 
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variables and the likelihood of the dependent variable being 1 (true) or 0 (false) (Long & Freese, 
2014).  The dependent variable in this model is a dichotomous variable, “tagdum”, indicating 
whether a TAG was awarded at a site.   
The logistic model provides estimates of the incremental impact of a unit change in each 
independent variable on the probability of a TAG award.  The following describes the general 
relationship used in the analysis:   
),()Pr( SCDCfTAG = (Equation 1) 
Where 
Pr(TAG) = probability of TAG Award 
DC = set of demographic characteristics (normalized home value, normalized income, 
population density, percentage of minorities, percent of high school graduates, 
percentage of owner-occupied homes, percentage of residents with tenure greater 
than five years) 
SC = set of site characteristics (OU count, HRS score, PRP (or private party dummy, 
Federal Facility dummy).  
Fixed effects were included in models to control for EPA Region to address the 
considerable variation in the award of TAGs across EPA regions.  This fixed effect is needed 
since the program is decentralized and much discretion is left to the individual EPA regions.  
Controls for year of discovery (to address any year fixed effects such as funding differential or 
political climate) were also included. 
 A summary of the key independent, dependent and control variables is presented in 
Table 6-2.  Model specifications for evaluating the likelihood of TAG award are presented in 
Table 6-3. 
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Variable Description Included in Models Source
Tagdum Dichotmous; 0 if no TAG, 1 if TAG Logits CERCLIS, constructed
Duration (Discovery to ROD) Calculated time in days OLS, Survival CERCLIS, constructed
Duration (Discovery to Closure) Calculated time in days OLS, Survival CERCLIS, constructed
Duration (ROD to Closure) Calculated time in days OLS, Survival CERCLIS, constructed
US EPA Region Dichotmous; indicating USEPA Region Logits, OLS, Survival CERCLIS, constructed
Year of Discovery Dichotmous; indicating start year Logits, OLS, Survival CERCLIS, constructed
Home Value (Normalized) Median value of home, normalized Logits, OLS, Survival 2000 Census, calculated
Income (Normalized) Median income, normalized. Logits, OLS, Survival 2000 Census, calculated
Population Density Measure of population per square mile Logits, OLS, Survival 2000 Census, calculated
% Minority Non-white population Logits, OLS, Survival 2000 Census, calculated
% Less than Assoc. Degree Measure of education Logits, OLS, Survival 2000 Census, calculated
% Owner Occupied Measure of social capital, stability Logits, OLS, Survival 2000 Census, calculated
% > 5 year tenure Measure of social capital, stability Logits, OLS, Survival 2000 Census, calculated
OU count Number of Operable Units; measures complexity Logits, OLS, Survival CERCLIS, calculated
HRS Score EPA ranking score, measure of perceived risk Logits, OLS, Survival CERCLIS, calculated
PRP Site Dichotomous - 1 for private company lead Logits, OLS, Survival CERCLIS, constructed
Federal Facility Dichotomous - 1 for non-EPA federal agency Logits, OLS, Survival CERCLIS, constructed
Nearby TAG Award Dichotomous - 1 for TAG w/in 50 miles Logits CERCLIS, constructed
Number of RODs Number of RODS, measure of complexity OLS, Survival CERCLIS, calculated
Number of TAGs Number of TAGs awarded OLS, Survival CERCLIS, calculated
Tagdum Dichotomous; 0 if no TAG, 1  if TAG awarded OLS, Survival CERCLIS, constructed
TAG Before ROD
Dichotomous;  1 if TAG before ROD, 0 if no TAG or 
TAG after ROD
OLS, Survival CERCLIS, constructed
TAG After ROD Dichotomous;  1 if TAG after ROD is signed OLS, Survival CERCLIS, constructed
NOTES:
  Logit models are the likelihood models used to predict occurrence of a TAG or remedy effect
  OLS is ordinary least squares regression used to predict effect of variables on duration of schedule
  Survival is Cox-distribution survival analysis used to incorporate right-censoring of data for event that had not reached completion
Table 6-2 
Summary of key dependent, control and independent variables 
TAG Study Models
Dependent Variables
Control Variables
Independent Variables
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Table 6-3 
TAG Study Model Specifications 
Model 
Designation 
Research 
Question 
Specification 
Parameters 
Logit 1 Probability of TAG Site and Community Characteristics 
Logit 2 Probability of TAG Logit1 plus region effects 
Logit 3 Probability of TAG Logit1 plus region and year  
Logit 4 Probability of TAG Logit 3 plus nearby previous TAG variable 
OLS 1 Duration (DS to ROD) Site and Community Characteristics, no TAG variable 
OLS 2 Duration (DS to ROD) OLS 1 plus TAG before ROD 
OLS 3 Duration (DS to ROD) OLS 2 plus regional fixed effects 
OLS 4 Duration (DS to ROD) OLS 3 plus year fixed effects 
OLS 5 Duration (ROD to Closure) OLS 4 plus TAG after ROD 
OLS 6 Duration (DS to Closure) OLS 5 for full process period 
Cox 1a Duration (DS to Closure) Site/Community Characteristics, fixed effects, no 
TAG variable 
Cox 1b Duration (DS to Closure) Cox 1a with no year effects 
Cox 1c Duration (DS to Closure) Cox 1b plus OU2, removal action (new base model) 
Cox 1d Duration (DS to Closure) Cox 1c plus tagdum 
Cox 1e Duration (DS to Closure) Cox 1b plus TAG before ROD, TAG after ROD 
Cox 1f Duration (DS to Closure) Cox 1d plus probability of TAG (to address possible 
endogeneity) 
Cox 1g Duration (DS to Closure) Cox 1e plus probability of TAG (to address possible 
endogeneity) 
Cox 2a Duration (DS to ROD) Base model (w/ OU2, removal action), tagdum 
Cox 2b Duration (DS to ROD) Cox 2a plus probability of TAG 
Cox2c Duration (DS to ROD) Cox 2a plus TAG before ROD instead of tagdum 
Cox 2d Duration (DS to ROD) Cox 2c plus probability of TAG 
Cox 3a Duration (ROD to Closure) Base model (w/ OU2, removal action), tagdum 
Cox 3b Duration (ROD to Closure) Cox 3a plus probability of TAG 
Cox 3c Duration (ROD to Closure) Cox3a plus TAG before ROD and TAG after ROD 
instead of tagdum 
Cox 3d Duration (ROD to Closure) Cox 3c plus probability of TAG 
Cox 4a Duration (DS to Closure) Annual analysis, hasTAG, probability of TAG 
Cox 4b Duration (DS to ROD) Annual analysis, hasTAG, probability of TAG 
Cox 4c Duration (ROD to Closure) Annual analysis, hasTAG, probability of TAG 
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6.1.3 Process Duration Modeling 
As presented in hypotheses four through 6 (H4, H5, H6), and detailed in Table 5-1, the 
impact of TAG award is a complex relationship that was modeled for several scenarios.  The 
following general equation was used to model the relationships: 
),,( TAGSCDCfDurationphase =  (Equation 2) 
Where   
Durationphase = the duration of a given phase.  Value calculated based on the dates of the 
two events (obtained from the CERCLIS database) defining the beginning and 
end of the phase;    
DC = set of demographic characteristics (normalized home value, normalized income, 
population density, percentage of minorities, percent of high school graduates, 
percentage of owner-occupied homes, percentage of residents with tenure greater 
than five years);  
SC = set of site characteristics (OU count, HRS score, PRP dummy, Federal Facility 
dummy); and  
TAG = A dichotomous variable indicating the award of a TAG. Depending on the 
estimation question, this was specified as Tagdum (i.e. was a TAG awarded at any 
time in the process), TAGbeforeROD (i.e. was a TAG awarded before the ROD), or 
as TAGafterROD (i.e. was a TAG awarded after the ROD). 
As with the TAG award model (Equation 1), fixed effects were included in all duration 
models to control for EPA Region and year of discovery.   
Several versions of the duration model were developed to estimate the impact of TAG 
award on the project schedule.  Variations are as follows: 
• Methodological approaches.  Two different methodologies were used to estimate the
impact of independent variables on project durations.  Duration modeling was performed
using both ordinary least squares (OLS) and survival analysis methodologies as discussed
below.
109
• Schedule impacts on three distinct phases of the Superfund process were evaluated by
including different left hand side variables; 1) the duration of the overall project from
Discovery to Closure, 2) the duration of Phase I (Discovery to ROD), and 3) the duration
of Phase II (ROD to Closure).
• The effect of the presence and timing TAG award on durations was modeled by including
either a dichotomous variable for TAG award regardless of timing (Tagdum) or a pair of
dichotomous variables to indicate whether a TAG was awarded before or after the
issuance of the ROD (TAGbeforeROD or TAGafterROD).
Duration modeling was performed using two different methods: standard ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression and survival analysis (by Cox methodology) following the methods 
identified in An Introduction to Survival Analysis Using STATA (Cleves, Gould, & Gutierrez, 
2004).  OLS methodology has the advantage of returning estimates of schedule impact in 
standard time units (in this case days) making interpretation of the results more intuitive.  This 
method does have a major drawback, however, and is an incomplete approach, since a large 
percentage of the sites has not yet reached closure.   This results in a right censoring of the data, 
or dropping all observations from statistical calculations where the end of a phase has not been 
reached.  Survival analysis methodology (or Cox modeling) is used to address this characteristic 
of the data set.  By setting up the data in survival analysis format, all the data, including 
observations that have not reached the end of a phase (or failure), are included.  Model 
specifications for Superfund process duration are summarized in Table 6-3.  Descriptive statistics 
for the duration of various Superfund phases for the data set are presented in Table 6-4. 
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Duration Period (1) Units Filter Applied
Number of 
Observations
Median 
Value
Standard 
Deviation
Minimum 
Value
Maximum 
Value
TAG to ROD days TAG before ROD 89 1097 921 17 4776
ROD to TAG days ROD before TAG 129 1804 1454 1 6203
Discovery to ROD days None  (2) 1396 3770 1827 26 10164
Discovery to ROD days TAG awarded 220 3712 1758 196 8854
Discovery to ROD days No TAG awarded 1175 3781 1840 26 10164
Discovery to ROD days TAG before ROD 89 4971 1482 1932 8854
ROD to Closure days None  (3) 279 2276 1771 0 8022
ROD to Closure days TAG awarded anytime 36 3457 1970 0 8022
ROD to Closure days No TAG awarded 243 2101 1674 0 8003
ROD to Closure days TAG before ROD 15 2411 1325 0 4908
ROD to Closure days TAG after ROD 21 4204 2038 611 8022
Discovery to Closure days None  (3) 285 5376 1863 764 10116
Discovery to Closure days TAG awarded 36 6753 1785 3637 10116
Discovery to Closure days No TAG awarded 249 5177 1792 764 9986
Discovery to Closure days TAG before ROD 15 6657 1852 3637 9410
Discovery to Closure days TAG after ROD 21 6821 1778 4237 10116
Notes
  (1) TAG - Technical Assistance Grant
       ROD - Record of Decision
  (2) Only includes sites with a ROD issued
  (3) Only includes sites where closure has been achieved
Table 6-4 
Descriptive Statistics 
Duration Modeling
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6.1.4 Remedy Selection Modeling 
As presented in hypothesis 7 (H7) the impact of TAG award on the remedy chosen at a 
Superfund is predicted to be insignificant.  The following general model was used to model the 
relationships: 
),,( TAGSCDCfRS =  (Equation 3) 
Where   
RS = Remedy Score, a constructed variable depicting the type of remedy selected 
for the site. The value calculated based on whether the remediation 
included treatment, containment, or institutional controls;    
DC = set of demographic characteristics (normalized home value, normalized 
income, population density, percentage of minorities, percent of high 
school graduates, percentage of owner-occupied homes, percentage of 
residents with tenure greater than five years);  
SC = set of site characteristics (OU count, HRS score, PRP dummy, Federal 
Facility dummy); and  
TAG = A dichotomous variable indicating the award of a TAG. 
An ordered multinomial logistic model approach was used to estimate the impact of TAG 
award on remedy selection (Long & Freese, 2014).  Institutional controls, or IC, (such as deed 
restrictions or fencing) are used when site conditions are such that unrestricted use are not 
achieved.  Containment (C) remedies include the construction of an engineered cap or other 
containment structures to isolate materials that left onsite.  Treatment (T) remedies are utilized to 
reduce the mobility, toxicity or volume of waste at a Superfund site.  The remedy codes, and 
ordered outcomes is as follows: 
• Remedy Code = 7; Treatment only, maximum remedy since site risks are addressed via
treatment without the need for institutional controls or containment;
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• Remedy Code = 6; Treatment with containment, with no need for institutional controls.
In this case, treatment performed but constituent levels are such that risk targets cannot
be achieved without the addition of containment;
• Remedy Code = 5; Treatment, containment and institutional controls, which required the
use of controls for protection;
• Remedy Code = 4; Treatment with institutional controls and no containment;
• Remedy Code = 3; Institutional controls and containment with no treatment;
• Remedy Code = 2; Containment only; and
• Remedy Code = 1; Institutional controls only.
The ordered logistic model is like the logistic model except that multiple outcomes (the 
different remedy codes) are possible instead of the dichotomous left hand (or dependent) 
variable.  By ordering the outcomes as listed above, more protective remedies receive a higher 
ranking and less protective remedies receive a lower ranking.  The ordered multinomial logit 
model is then used to estimate the effect of TAG award (and other independent variables) on the 
remedy score. 
6.2 Qualitative Case Studies 
The qualitative study was performed at a select number of Superfund sites that received a 
TAG.  The purpose of the case study to obtain more in-depth information to questions about the 
TAG program than the EPA CERCLIS database provided – (1) why did communities decided to 
pursue a TAG; (2) what relationships and participatory capacity existed within the community; 
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(3) what were the benefits and drawbacks of the TAG program; and (4) what difference did the 
TAG make in the process?   
The case study approach is designed to answer just such questions, especially when other 
methodologies cannot be used to fully explain the phenomena of interest (Yin, 2009).  
Furthermore, the multiple case study improves the credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
confirmability (Trochim, 2001) of the research since multiple data observations are made to 
support or refute the findings that may result from a single case study.  
The important research design factors include case selection and identification of case 
study methods to be employed.  The selection of cases for this research was designed to provide 
a range of site settings (urban, rural and suburban), a range of site complexities (from a landfill 
to a barge terminal with many different types of operations), a variety of EPA project managers, 
variation in the remediation outcomes (consolidation and capping, incineration, offsite disposal), 
and TAGs that were awarded at different times in the process.  Six cases were selected in central 
New York, three near Binghamton and three near Syracuse that met these criteria.  Table 6-5 
presents a summary of case study site characteristics. 
The methodology employed included a review of the EPA files and news coverage 
related to the sites, followed by semi-structured interviews with relevant site representatives.  
Interviews were conducted with one or more community representatives, one or more EPA 
project managers (PMs), and the technical advisor that was hired for each site, except that for 
one site the EPA PM did not agree to be interviewed. 
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Site ID Site F Site A Site C Site D Site E Site B
Site Setting Rural  Rural  Rural  Suburban Urban Suburban
HRS 34.48 34.78 29.36 34.86 36.5 51.35
TAG Awarded? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of RODs 1 1 1 1 1 1
Discovery Date 01/01/80 06/01/80 05/01/79 05/18/82 05/01/82 05/29/84
TAG Award 03/24/89 09/26/91 10/01/95 10/01/95 09/30/88 09/30/90
Discovery to NPL (days) 2352 1194 3622 1891 495 1767
Discovery to NPL Deletion (days) 5882 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Discovery to ROD (days) 3284 3771 5994 5614 2708 5046
Discovery to ROD (years) 9.0 10.3 16.4 15.4 7.4 13.8
Discovery to NPL Proposal (days) 1749 942 3342 1484 243 1487
Discovery to Close (days) 5111 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Discovery to Close (years) 14.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Discovery to TAG (days) 3370 4134 5997 4884 2344 2315
NPL to ROD (days) 932 2577 2372 3723 2213 3279
Number of Operable Units 2 2 3 2 3 2
PRP Site? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TAG before ROD? No No No Yes Yes Yes
TAG after ROD? Yes Yes Yes No No No
Minority (%) 2.87 5.09 3.13 1.83 1.39 5.56
Tenure > 5 years (%) 57.04 57.45 56.51 61.95 63.70 34.78
Less than College Degree (%) 82.20 83.75 75.97 84.11 75.41 72.63
Normalized Income ‐1.93 ‐3.44 ‐3.07 ‐2.84 ‐0.90 ‐3.30
Normalized Home Value ‐4.08 ‐6.39 ‐5.20 ‐4.65 ‐3.96 ‐4.62
Owner Occupied (%) 75.32 55.84 57.92 52.63 80.84 25.49
Population Density (#/sq mile) 155.90 22.72 121.37 21.45 126.07 5808.53
Removal Action Performed? Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Table 6‐5 
Descriptive Statistics
Case Study Sites (Central New York)
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Because the case study process involved the use of human subjects, approval of the 
methodology was requested and received from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Syracuse 
University.  One of the conditions of the IRB approval was that anonymity of the participants be 
maintained.  For that reason, the cases are referred to as Case A through Case F, and the labels 
“Community Representative”, “EPA Project Manager” and “Technical Consultant” are used to 
identify the participants. 
The interviews were semi-structured; an interview script and list of questions was 
established, but the responses to the questions were open-ended and participants could answer as 
they chose.  Follow-up questions were asked as needed for clarification.  Community 
representative interviews were performed in-person, except for one interview which was 
performed via phone.  All EPA and technical consultant interviews were performed via phone.  
The interview questionnaires are included in Appendix A and covered the following topics:  
background of the individuals with community involvement and Superfund; the application and 
grant process in general; details of the timing and use of the TAG; benefits of being awarded a 
TAG; drawbacks of the TAG program; satisfaction with the TAG program; and the perceived 
impacts of the TAG on process, schedule and remedy. 
The answers to the questions were accumulated and data collected relative to the key 
research questions of why get a TAG, what did the TAG add or detract, and what was the impact 
of the TAG, as well as general observations that were offered by interviewees.  These results are 
presented and discussed in Chapter 8.       
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Chapter 7 - Quantitative Findings 
7.1  Data Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for Superfund sites, including EPA regional breakdowns and the mean 
duration of various phases, are shown in Table 7-1.  The average time from discovery to closure 
for NPL sites is 14.7 years (14.2 years for sites without a TAG and 18.4 years for sites with a 
TAG).  This is consistent with Hypothesis 4 and is investigated further in Section 7.3.    
Figure 7-1 depicts the number of Superfund sites at each stage of the process as of January 
2008.   Approximately 93% of sites proposed for the NPL were placed on the final NPL.  Of the 
sites that are on the final NPL, a ROD had been issued at approximately 89% of the sites and 
approximately 20% of the NPL sites had been remediated and deleted from the NPL. 
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process (January 2008). 
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Figure 7-2 shows the breakdown of TAG awards by the stage of the Superfund process in 
which they were awarded.  Approximately 15.6% of all NPL sites have been awarded TAGs.  
Slightly less than half of the TAGs were awarded before the ROD (46.3%), and slightly more 
than half (53.7%) after the ROD.  
There is considerable variation in the percentage of NPL sites with a TAG award by EPA 
region (as shown in Table 7-1 and Figures 7-3 and 7-4).  This fraction of sites with a TAG ranges 
from less than 10% for Regions 5 (upper Midwest with headquarters in Chicago) and 7 (Great 
Plains with headquarters in Kansas City) to greater than thirty percent in Regions 1 (New 
England with headquarters in Boston), 6 (Southwest/Gulf of Mexico with headquarters in Dallas) 
and 8 (Rocky Mountain region with headquarters in Denver).   There a number of factors that 
may influence this, including a potential mistrust of the agency in certain regions, a propensity 
for some EPA regions to support or present barriers to public participation, and regional 
differences in the public view of the role of government.  For example, the results in Regions 1 
and 8 (New England and the Rocky Mountains) may reflect the individual responsibility  
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Figure 7-2.  TAG award by stage of process. 
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Category All NPL Sites NPL Sites w/ TAG
NPL Sites w/o 
TAG
Percentage of 
Sites with TAG
EPA Region
  Region 1 (New England) 112 41 71 36.6%
  Region 2 (Northeast) 265 37 228 14.0%
  Region 3 (MidAtlantic) 208 22 186 10.6%
  Region 4 (Southeast) 211 29 182 13.7%
  Region 5 (Midwest) 287 16 271 5.6%
  Region 6 (Gulf Coast) 116 37 79 31.9%
  Region 7 (Plains) 82 5 77 6.1%
  Region 8 (Rocky Mountains) 61 26 35 42.6%
  Region 9 (Southwest) 125 21 104 16.8%
  Region 10 (Northwest) 97 10 87 10.3%
Total All Regions 1564 244 1320 15.6%
Sites w/ ROD 1396 220 1176 15.8%
Sites to reach closure 286 37 249 12.9%
Sites w/ TAG(s) 244 --- ---
Sites w/ PRPs 924 156 768 16.9%
Sites w/ Federal Facilty 191 43 148 22.5%
Sites w/ EPA lead 449 45 244 10.0%
Average Duration (years)
  Discovery to Closure 14.7 18.4 14.2 N/A
  Discovery to ROD 10.3 10.2 10.3 N/A
  ROD to Closure 6.2 9.0 5.8 N/A
TAG Award Timing
  TAG before ROD N/A 113 N/A N/A
  TAG after ROD N/A 131 N/A N/A
Table 7-1
Descriptive Statistics
Superfund Sites (as of January 2008)
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Figure 7-4.  Percentage of TAG awards by USEPA Region. 
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characteristics, while Region 6 (Southwest/Gulf of Mexico) are decidedly distrustful of industry 
and government-industry relations.  The average duration from discovery to closure for an NPL 
site is approximately 15 years and increases to approximately 18 years for NPL sites where a 
TAG is awarded.   The average duration of Phase I (discovery to ROD issuance) is about the 
same for each category of site at slightly over ten years.  The average time from ROD issuance to 
site closure is approximately six years for all sites and increases to approximately nine years for 
sites where a TAG is awarded. This implies a dissatisfaction with the remedy selected, the 
remedy process, or both.  This a key component to the multiple case study evaluation presented 
in Chapter 8.   
Table 7-2 presents a summary of the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables in 
the study, including number of observations, mean values, standard deviations, and minimum 
and maximum values.  
7.2 Determinants of TAG Formation 
The results of the logistic modeling for estimation of the effect of factors on the 
likelihood of TAG award are presented in Table 7-3.  The model “Logit1” includes demographic 
and site characteristic independent variables only.  “Logit2” incorporates EPA regional fixed 
effects while “Logit3” incorporates year of discovery fixed effects as well.   
An additional analysis was performed based on information obtained from the 
completion of the multiple cases studies.  One of the findings of the case study was the 
importance of a network of experience or mentor to guide a community through the TAG 
process.  To model this effect quantitatively, I constructed a dichotomous variable to indicate 
whether the sites had a previously awarded nearby TAG from which to draw experiences and 
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Table 7-2 
Descriptive Statistics - Study Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
tagdum 1555 0.156 0.363 0 1 
OU Count 1555 3.64 4.33 1 86 
OU2 1555 32.0 217.5 1 7,396 
PRP site 1555 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Federal Facility 1555 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Normalized Home Value 1511 0.00 6.97 -10 70.2 
Normalized Income 1511 0.00 3.99 -10 26.2 
Population Density 1510 1,184 1,967 0 23,976 
Minority (%) 1507 19.7 22.1 -15 100 
< college degree (%) 1506 72.6 14.9 0 100 
> 5-year tenure (%) 1507 51.2 14.5 0 100 
Owner occupied (%) 1504 62.8 22.0 0 99.2 
HRS Score 1555 41.2 12.06 0 84.9 
Probability of TAG 1478 16.1 15.5      0       91.0 
Remedy Code 1418 4.97 2.08 0 7 
Nearby TAG Dummy 1555 0.41 0.49 0 1 
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Table 7-3 Logit Models
Odds Ratios Reported 
Logit1 
No fixed effects 
Logit2 
Region effects 
Logit3 
Region and year 
effects 
Logit4 
Nearby TAG 
Nearby TAG dummy 1.511* 
(0.269) 
Normalized Home Value 1.054** 1.048* 1.041* 1.040* 
(0.0175) (0.0197) (0.0201) (0.0200) 
Normalized Income 0.908* 0.941 0.955 0.947 
(0.0378) (0.0434) (0.0459) (0.0456) 
Population Density 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(0.0000431) (0.0000437) (0.0000476) (0.0000482) 
Minority % 1.007 1.003 1.002 1.001 
(0.00372) (0.00436) (0.00450) (0.00456) 
Less than college degree 0.983* 0.990 0.992 0.991 
(0.00796) (0.00841) (0.00870) (0.00872) 
Owner Occupied % 0.994 0.994 0.993 0.994 
(0.00589) (0.00634) (0.00659) (0.00662) 
Tenure > 5 years 1.025** 1.022* 1.023* 1.024** 
(0.00810) (0.00893) (0.00922) (0.00931) 
OU Count 1.283*** 1.300*** 1.314*** 1.319*** 
(0.0653) (0.0683) (0.0694) (0.0707) 
OU Squared 0.995** 0.995** 0.995*** 0.994*** 
(0.00163) (0.00160) (0.00155) (0.00160) 
Removal Action 2.107*** 1.846*** 1.888*** 1.897*** 
(0.336) (0.308) (0.322) (0.325) 
HRS Score 1.007 1.007 1.007 1.007 
(0.00621) (0.00639) (0.00666) (0.00668) 
PRP Site Dummy 1.528* 1.659* 1.745** 1.758** 
(0.287) (0.328) (0.374) (0.377) 
Federal Facility Dummy 0.874 1.002 1.109 1.072 
(0.292) (0.351) (0.404) (0.392) 
Constant 0.0421*** 0.0273*** 0.0540* 0.0455* 
(0.0291) (0.0212) (0.0761) (0.0647) 
Observations 1506 1506 1480 1480 
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Logit 1 – No regional or year effects 
Logit 2 – Regional effects 
Logit 3 – Regional and year effects 
Logit 4 – Nearby TAG dummy 
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 resources.  The results of the logistic regression to evaluate the impact of the nearby TAG award 
are shown in Table 7-3 as “Logit 4”. 
Logistic model results are presented as odds ratios for each of the variables.  Larger odds 
ratios indicate a greater impact of the independent variable on the likelihood of TAG award.  An 
odds ratio greater than one demonstrates an increase in the likelihood of a TAG award as the 
variable value increases, while an odds ratio of less than one indicates that as the variable value 
increases the likelihood of TAG award decreases.  
The results show that increasing home values and increasing percentage of occupants 
with tenure of greater than five years significantly increase the likelihood of TAG award (at the 
0.05 level) both with and without regional and year of discovery fixed effects.  None of the other 
demographic parameters (income, population density, percentage of minorities or education) are 
significant influences on the likelihood of TAG award in the fixed effects model. These findings 
are supportive of the wealth and stability assumptions of Hypothesis 1, but do not support the 
concept that increased education results in increased TAG award.  
Of the site characteristic measurements, an increase in the number of operable units at a 
site (a measure of site complexity), the performance of site work by a private party significantly, 
and the performance of a removal action significantly increase the likelihood of TAG application 
and award (at the 0.05 level), consistent with Hypotheses 2 and 3.  None of the other site 
characteristic variables have a significant impact on TAG award.  The fixed effects modeling 
demonstrated that TAGs were more likely to awarded (and the results were statistically 
significant) in Regions 1, 6, and 8 and were significantly less likely to occur in Regions 5 and 7, 
consistent with the summary presented in Table 7-1. 
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The evaluation of the impact of a nearby previous TAG (Logit 4) indicates that the 
proximity of a previous TAG does impact the formation of a group and award of TAG.  The 
odds ratio indicates that the odds of awarding a TAG is 1.5 times greater than not getting a TAG; 
an impact that is greater than all variables except for private entity (PRP) involvement at a site 
and the performance of a removal action (an indication of potential eminent health or 
environmental threat).  This underscores the importance of network connection and strong 
leadership and information sharing from EPA to the public. 
7.3 Impact of TAGs on Superfund Schedule 
7.3.1 Duration t-tests 
As a preliminary estimate of the impact of TAG award, statistical t-testing was performed 
for three TAG variables (tagdum, TAG before ROD, and TAG after ROD) and three process 
phases (discovery-to-closure, discovery-to-ROD, and ROD-to-closure).  The results of these t-
tests are summarized in Table 7-4 and show the following: 
• The award of a TAG (tagdum) results in significantly different average durations in the
discovery-to-closure (1573 days or 30%) and ROD-to-closure (1340 days or 63%)
intervals;
• The award of TAG before the ROD results in significantly different average durations in
the discovery-to-closure (1347 days or 25%) and the discovery-to-ROD (1290 days or
35%) intervals; and
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Table 7-4
Results of t-tests 
Durations and TAG Award
Variable Discovery to Close Discovery to ROD ROD to Close
tagdum 1573.2*** -70.13 1340.6***
(4.9) (-0.52) (4.38)
constant 5179.5*** 3776.0*** 2116.4***
(44.97) (70.38) (19.07)
TAG before ROD 1347.0** 1289.6*** 125.1 
(2.74) (6.54) (0.27) 
constant 5309.6*** 3681.6*** 2285.7*** 
(46.71) (73.41) (20.76) 
TAG after ROD 1556.3*** -1035.1*** 2070.4***
(3.75) (-6.19) (5.42)
constant 5265.1*** 3861.2*** 2133.9***
(46.31) (75.70) (20.16)
Number of
observations 280 1377 274
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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• The award of a TAG after the ROD results in significantly different average durations in
the discovery-to-closure (1556 days or 30%) and discovery-to-closure (2070 days or
97%) intervals.
These results raise some interesting questions, especially regarding the impact of TAG
award in the post-ROD period.  The overall schedule impact is greater for TAGs awarded later in 
the process (i.e., after the ROD), with average time from discovery to closure increasing by 
approximately 165 days. Sites that are awarded a TAG after the ROD, achieve the ROD issuance 
almost 3 years sooner, but that schedule gain is more than lost in the post-ROD phase.  It may be 
that a rush through the process yields a remedy that is not acceptable to the community resulting 
in group formation and TAG award.  The process does not meet the needs of the community, the 
TAG is a method for restoring trust and efficacy to process, and the resulting conflict results in 
re-work of the earlier stages and corresponding delay.  Statistical t-tests were not performed for 
the TAG after ROD dichotomous variable in the discovery-to-ROD phase since the TAG award 
occurs after the endpoint of interest.   
7.3.2 Duration Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Modeling 
OLS modeling was performed as another preliminary and illustrative evaluation method.  
It includes only those sites that have completed the given phase (i.e., it is right censored).  
Interpretation is relatively simple, but the right-censoring introduces error into the analysis that I 
address using survival analysis (Section 7.3.3). 
The results of the OLS modeling for estimation of the effect of TAG award on the 
schedule at Superfund sites are summarized in Table 7-5. Models OLS1 (no TAG variable), 
OLS2 (with a TAG before ROD dichotomous variable), OLS3 (adding EPA Region fixed 
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Table 7-5. OLS Duration Models 
Duration in days
OLS1
DS to ROD
OLS2
DS to ROD
OLS3
DS to ROD
Region Effects
OLS4
DS to ROD
Region/year
OLS5
ROD-Close
Region/year
OLS6
DS-Close
Region/year
TAG before
ROD 1,270.7*** 1,341.7*** 1,302.0*** 184.5 1,145.3*
(197.1) (199.8) (194.1) (480.1) (501.9)
TAG after ROD 1,142.8* 1,003.5* 
(452.6) (473.7)
Normalized
Home Value
-9.183 -13.95 -14.19 -13.59 72.29 50.71
(11.48) (11.33) (12.35) (12.03) (43.69) (44.70)
Normalized
Income
44.05 56.77* 48.92 42.06 -190.8* -87.54
(27.97) (27.62) (29.62) (28.86) (83.56) (87.17)
Population
Density
-0.0222 -0.0214 -0.0276 -0.00511 -0.170* -0.113
(0.0277) (0.0273) (0.0277) (0.0270) (0.0719) (0.0747)
Minority (%) 1.076 1.017 3.828 3.517 1.942 5.044
(2.617) (2.578) (2.811) (2.730) (6.028) (6.262)
< College
Degree
7.738 9.707 10.47 6.407 -37.75* -2.609
(5.630) (5.554) (5.594) (5.468) (15.97) (16.42)
Owner Occupied -7.912* -8.262* -5.725 -7.244 4.012 5.338
(4.031) (3.972) (4.088) (3.984) (11.20) (11.66)
Tenure > 5 years 1.168 -0.276 -2.947 -0.906 18.77 4.478
(5.198) (5.126) (5.461) (5.313) (13.64) (14.28)
OU count -45.93 -51.18* -56.15* -75.03** 561.4*** 436.5** 
(23.75) (23.41) (23.92) (23.26) (154.1) (159.5)
OU Squared 0.126 0.233 0.363 0.665 -15.18** -10.82
(0.401) (0.395) (0.400) (0.387) (5.432) (5.630)
Removal Action -225.8* -260.0** -272.6** -116.2 556.8* -27.04
(99.40) (98.07) (99.58) (97.60) (223.1) (232.3)
HRS Score 21.46*** 21.25*** 22.41*** 22.10*** 2.327 14.27
(4.140) (4.079) (4.072) (3.994) (8.376) (8.364)
PRP Site Dummy 12.21 7.496 -6.651 -238.3* 249.5 610.4* 
(114.0) (112.3) (113.9) (114.8) (228.5) (236.9)
Fed Facility 1,040.2*** 973.2*** 845.5*** 818.6*** -182.0 181.4
(213.3) (210.4) (211.3) (207.5) (565.5) (588.3)
Constant 2,925.4*** 2,849.7*** 2,818.5*** 2,751.0*** 825.2 1,400.4
(459.4) (452.7) (491.5) (656.2) (1683.6) (1761.4)
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
OLS3 includes regional effects; OLS4-OLS6 includes regional and year effects
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 effects), and OLS4 (adding year of discovery fixed effects) model the duration of the phase from 
discovery (DS) through the issuance of the ROD (Phase I).   
The average duration of Phase I is approximately 10.3 years (Table 7-1).  The OLS 
modeling demonstrates the award of a TAG before the ROD is issued has a significant impact on 
the schedule and results in an increase in duration for Phase I (discovery to ROD) of 
approximately 1300 days (3.7 years) including year ad region effects.  The award of a TAG 
increased the duration of Phase I by over 30 percent, supporting Hypothesis 5.  The results also 
demonstrate the impact of including EPA region and year of discovery fixed effects.   
The average duration of Phase II (ROD to closure) is approximately 6.2 years (Table 7-
1).  The results of OLS5 (ROD to Closure Phase) show that a TAG awarded after the ROD 
increases the duration of this Phase by 1,142 days (3.1 years or 50%), consistent with Hypothesis 
6. The award of a TAG before the ROD has a small but statistically insignificant effect of the
duration of Phase II. 
The average duration of the discovery to closure period is approximately 14.7 years 
(Table 7-1).  The results of OLS6 (Discovery to Closure) shows that a TAG awarded before the 
ROD has a significant impact and results in an increased duration of 1145 days (approximately 
3.1 years or 21%).  Similarly, a TAG awarded after the ROD has a significant impact and results 
in increased duration of 1003 days (2.7 years or 19%).  These findings support Hypotheses 5 and 
6.  
7.3.3 Survival Analysis Modeling 
The results of survival analysis modeling (using Cox analysis methods) are presented in 
Table 7-6 (Discovery to ROD), Table 7-7 (for ROD to Closure), and Table 7-8 (Discovery to 
Closure), for a dataset including one entry for each Superfund site.  Each of these models are 
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Table 7-6. Survival Analysis - Discovery to ROD 
(Hazard ratios reported)
Cox2a Cox2b Cox2c Cox2d
TAG Dummy 0.989 1.039
(0.0791) (0.0837)
TAG before ROD 0.508*** 0.530*** 
(0.0583) (0.0610)
Probability of TAG 0.979*** 0.982*** 
(0.00489) (0.00497)
Normalized Home
Value
1.015 1.027** 1.019* 1.028***
(0.00803) (0.00879) (0.00791) (0.00866)
Normalized Income 0.977 0.968 0.969 0.963* 
(0.0183) (0.0186) (0.0180) (0.0183)
Population Density 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.0000162) (0.0000167) (0.0000161) (0.0000166)
Minority (%) 0.998 0.999 0.998 0.998
(0.00166) (0.00167) (0.00166) (0.00168)
Less than College
Degree (%)
1.001 0.999 1.000 0.998
(0.00341) (0.00348) (0.00340) (0.00346)
Owner Occupied (%) 1.004 1.003 1.004 1.003
(0.00244) (0.00249) (0.00244) (0.00249)
Tenure > 5 years 0.998 1.003 0.998 1.003
(0.00324) (0.00353) (0.00326) (0.00356)
OU count 1.060*** 1.142*** 1.066*** 1.144*** 
(0.0163) (0.0316) (0.0181) (0.0347)
OU Squared 1.000 0.998* 0.999 0.998* 
(0.000388) (0.000693) (0.000479) (0.000791)
Removal Action 1.183** 1.352*** 1.203** 1.346*** 
(0.0682) (0.0906) (0.0693) (0.0906)
HRS Score 0.983*** 0.985*** 0.982*** 0.984*** 
(0.00224) (0.00228) (0.00227) (0.00232)
PRP Site Dummy 1.196** 1.327*** 1.214** 1.325*** 
(0.0783) (0.0932) (0.0794) (0.0931)
Fed Facility Dummy 0.743* 0.703** 0.758* 0.711** 
(0.0934) (0.0903) (0.0963) (0.0934)
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
All models include EPA region controls
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Table 7-7. Survival Analysis - ROD to Closure 
(Hazard ratios reported)
Cox3a Cox3b Cox3c Cox3d
TAG Dummy 1.181 1.200
(0.237) (0.248)
TAG before ROD 1.314 1.345
(0.379) (0.398)
TAG after ROD 1.103 1.120
(0.272) (0.279)
Probability of TAG 0.996 0.995
(0.0131) (0.0131)
Normalized Home Value 0.932** 0.934* 0.932** 0.934*
(0.0250) (0.0258) (0.0250) (0.0259)
Normalized Income 1.036 1.032 1.038 1.034
(0.0521) (0.0531) (0.0525) (0.0534)
Population Density 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.0000409) (0.0000416) (0.0000410) (0.0000416)
Minority (%) 1.002 1.002 1.002 1.002
(0.00363) (0.00372) (0.00362) (0.00371)
Less than College
Degree
0.996 0.996 0.996 0.996
(0.00838) (0.00856) (0.00839) (0.00857)
Pct Owner Occupied (%) 1.007 1.007 1.007 1.007
(0.00634) (0.00643) (0.00635) (0.00644)
Tenure > 5 years (%) 1.002 1.003 1.002 1.003
(0.00758) (0.00836) (0.00758) (0.00836)
OU count 0.672*** 0.681*** 0.674*** 0.684***
(0.0510) (0.0569) (0.0512) (0.0572)
OU Squared 1.004*** 1.004*** 1.004*** 1.004*** 
(0.000961) (0.00105) (0.000961) (0.00105)
Removal Action 1.082 1.110 1.084 1.116
(0.149) (0.175) (0.150) (0.177)
HRS Score 0.987* 0.987* 0.987* 0.987* 
(0.00521) (0.00534) (0.00523) (0.00536)
PRP Site Dummy 0.542*** 0.554*** 0.544*** 0.557*** 
(0.0797) (0.0907) (0.0799) (0.0914)
Fed Facility Dummy 0.816 0.812 0.812 0.808
(0.259) (0.258) (0.257) (0.257)
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
All models include EPA region controls
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Table 7-8. Survival Analysis - Discovery to Closure 
(Hazard ratios reported)
Cox1a Cox1b Cox1c Cox1d Cox1e Cox1f Cox1g
TAG Dummy 1.004 1.028
(0.196) (0.204)
TAG before ROD 0.805 0.826
(0.222) (0.231)
TAG after ROD 1.235 1.252
(0.303) (0.309)
Prob. of TAG 0.991 0.992
(0.0125) (0.0126)
Normalized
Home Value
0.939* 0.940* 0.940* 0.940* 0.940* 0.941* 0.941*
(0.0256) (0.0254) (0.0254) (0.0254) (0.0254) (0.0264) (0.0263)
Normalized
Income
1.014 1.022 1.023 1.023 1.020 1.023 1.021
(0.0514) (0.0509) (0.0512) (0.0513) (0.0510) (0.0522) (0.0520)
Pop. Density 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.0000390) (0.0000380) (0.0000381) (0.0000381) (0.0000381) (0.0000388) (0.0000388)
Minority % 1.002 1.001 1.001 1.001 1.001 1.002 1.002
(0.00349) (0.00347) (0.00348) (0.00348) (0.00350) (0.00356) (0.00357)
Less than College
Degree %
0.998 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999
(0.00874) (0.00842) (0.00847) (0.00849) (0.00848) (0.00862) (0.00862)
Owner Occupied 1.012* 1.012 1.012 1.012 1.012 1.011 1.011
(0.00621) (0.00611) (0.00613) (0.00613) (0.00612) (0.00621) (0.00620)
Tenure > 5 years 0.999 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998 1.000 1.000
(0.00737) (0.00733) (0.00733) (0.00733) (0.00734) (0.00797) (0.00799)
OU count 0.782*** 0.780*** 0.735*** 0.735*** 0.727*** 0.755*** 0.746***
(0.0447) (0.0444) (0.0481) (0.0489) (0.0491) (0.0568) (0.0570)
OU Squared 1.003*** 1.003*** 1.004*** 1.003** 1.003***
(0.000869) (0.000881) (0.000889) (0.000974) (0.000986)
Removal Action 0.974 0.973 0.969 1.018 1.008
(0.125) (0.126) (0.125) (0.152) (0.151)
HRS Score 0.977*** 0.976*** 0.976*** 0.976*** 0.976*** 0.978*** 0.978***
(0.00483) (0.00468) (0.00471) (0.00472) (0.00470) (0.00489) (0.00488)
PRP Site Dummy 0.586*** 0.608*** 0.615*** 0.615*** 0.610*** 0.641** 0.634**
(0.0803) (0.0816) (0.0827) (0.0829) (0.0824) (0.0946) (0.0938)
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
All models include EPA region controls
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 based on a dataset that includes one entry for each site, along with start and end dates for each 
process milestone.  In addition, I constructed a panel dataset to include site information for each 
year after discovery, to perform a more granular analysis of the data.  This set included an entry 
for each site and each year to evaluate the impact of TAG (approximately 45,000 observations 
instead of approximately 1500 for the one-entry per site data set).  Each observation in the 
constructed panel included measures for whether a site had a TAG during that year and whether 
the site completed the ROD or closure milestone.  The results of this annual survival modeling 
are included in Table 7-9.   
The Cox survival models report hazard ratios for each of the independent variables.  
Survival analysis is a failure model, with failure defined as achieving the milestone being 
modeled (ROD or closure).  A hazard ratio of greater than one signifies an increased probability 
of completion at any given time, or a faster completion of that phase of the process.  The larger 
the hazard ratio the faster the phase is expected to be completed.  A hazard ratio of less than one 
indicates a slowing of the schedule and increase in completion time. 
For Phase I (Discovery to ROD, Table 7-6), several Cox survival model runs are 
performed with different model specifications; Cox 2a with the variable tagdum (gets a TAG 
without regard to timing), Cox 2b which incorporates the predicted probability of TAG to 
address possible endogeneity in the schedule and drivers for TAG award, Cox 2c which utilizes a 
time dependent variable of TAG before ROD instead of tagdum, and Cox 2d which incorporates 
the TAG probability with TAG before ROD.  The time independent TAG variable (tagdum) is 
not found to be statistically significant relative to the discovery to ROD schedule.  When the 
timing of the TAG is evaluated (Cox 2c and Cox 2d), the TAG before ROD is significant and 
found to slow down the ROD issuance schedule, consistent with Hypothesis 5. The award of a 
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Table 7-9. Survival Models (Annualized Data Set)
(Hazard ratios reported)
Cox4a
DS to Closure
Cox4b
DS to ROD
Cox4c
ROD to Closure
hasTAG 0.705 1.621** 0.892
(0.248) (0.242) (0.336)
Probability of TAG 0.989 0.980*** 0.989
(0.0124) (0.00477) (0.0132)
Years from TAG 1.141*** 0.997 1.070
(0.0440) (0.0374) (0.0431)
Normalized Home Value 0.942* 1.024** 0.937* 
(0.0263) (0.00875) (0.0264)
Normalized Income 1.018 0.971 1.033
(0.0519) (0.0186) (0.0542)
Population Density 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.0000391) (0.0000167) (0.0000439)
Minority (%) 1.003 0.999 1.003
(0.00356) (0.00167) (0.00371)
Less than College Degree 0.999 0.999 0.995
(0.00860) (0.00345) (0.00884)
Pct Owner Occupied (%) 1.012 1.003 1.006
(0.00624) (0.00248) (0.00658)
Tenure > 5 years (%) 0.999 1.002 1.006
(0.00805) (0.00351) (0.00858)
OU count 0.740*** 1.127*** 0.708*** 
(0.0562) (0.0269) (0.0588)
OU Count Squared 1.003*** 0.999* 1.004*** 
(0.000979) (0.000534) (0.00104)
Removal Action 0.981 1.321*** 1.182
(0.147) (0.0882) (0.191)
HRS Score 0.980*** 0.987*** 0.988* 
(0.00487) (0.00229) (0.00541)
PRP Site Dummy 0.637** 1.311*** 0.622** 
(0.0939) (0.0923) (0.105)
Fed Facility Dummy 0.712 0.724* 0.907
(0.213) (0.0913) (0.291)
Observations 33,426 16,560 16,952
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
All models include EPA regional controls
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 TAG before ROD also has a greater impact on survival (duration) than any of the other 
variables, increasing the schedule duration.  Other factors that are significant (at the 0.05 level) 
relative to the duration of Phase I are increased home value, increase in site complexity (HRS, 
OU count and performance of a removal action) and the presence of a private party at the site. 
Since Phase I is defined as the time from Discovery to the first ROD issued at a site; if multiple 
RODs are issued (as is often the case with complex and private party sites) then the duration of 
Phase I can be expected to be decreased.  Future research to examine the schedule impact of 
defining a site with multiple RODs in a more detailed manner is recommended. 
For Phase II (ROD to closure, Table 7-7), several Cox survival model runs are performed 
with different model specifications; Cox 3a with the variable tagdum (gets a TAG without regard 
to timing), Cox 3b which incorporates the predicted probability of TAG to address possible 
endogeneity in the schedule and drivers for TAG award, Cox 3c which utilizes a time dependent 
variables of TAG before ROD and TAG after ROD instead of tagdum, and Cox 2d which 
incorporates the TAG probability with TAG before/after ROD.  The award of a TAG, either 
before or after the ROD, was not found to be significant (at the 0.05 level) for Phase II survival 
analysis.  The only factors shown to significantly impact the expected duration were increased 
home value, increased site complexity and the presence of a private party.  Each of the factors 
resulted in a significant increase in the expected duration of the ROD to closure phase.  These 
results indicate that site characteristics (complexity, risk and private party involvement) have a 
bigger impact on schedule than does the community characteristic (home value).    
The results of survival analysis modeling for the overall Superfund process (Discovery to 
Closure) are shown in Table 7-8.  Model specifications were Cox 1a (no TAG variable, regional 
effects, year of discovery effects), Cox1b (no TAG variable, regional effects, no year effects), 
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Cox 1c (additional of OU-squared term to account for non-linearity of that variable), Cox 1d 
(tagdum variable), Cox 1e (TAG before ROD and TAG after ROD instead of tagdum), Cox 1f 
(Cox 1d plus probability of TAG award to address possible endogeneity), and Cox 1g (Cox 1e 
with probability of TAG award).  Results show that the TAG award variables do not have a 
significant impact on the schedule, contrary to Hypotheses 4, 5 and 6.  While not significant, the 
hazard ratios in Cox1f and Cox1g indicate a direction of impact for TAG awarded without regard 
to timing (tagdum) and TAG after ROD to be consistent with the findings of the OLS predictions 
(Table 7-4) and Hypotheses 4 and 6.  The direction of impact for TAG before ROD (again not 
significant) suggests a faster process for site closure, contrary to OLS predictions and Hypothesis 
5.  The only factors that significantly impact the schedule are increasing home value, increasing 
site complexity and the presence of a private party, with each of these factors increasing the 
duration.    
For the annualized data set survival analysis (Table 7-9), one survival model was 
performed for each duration interval; Cox 4a (discovery to closure), Cox 4b (discovery to ROD), 
and Cox 4c (ROD to closure).  The models included an entry for each site for every year after 
discovery and the following variables were defined and calculated; hasTAG (a measure of 
whether the site has a TAG award at the start of the year), probability of TAG (constant for each 
year), years from TAG (a measure of the time the TAG was in effect), as well as similar end-
point variables (hasROD, hasClose) indicating whether the event of interest occurred. The results 
of the annual survival models indicate that “Years from TAG” is significant and speeds up the 
process from discovery to closure, which makes sense in that it predicts that the more mature a 
TAG group is the more they positively affect the process.  The variable “hasTAG” is also 
significant and speeds up the process from discovery to ROD issuance.  This is somewhat 
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counterintuitive, but may support the premise that a TAG awarded earlier in the process may 
help to avoid pitfalls and schedule delays associated with conflicts over remedy selection.  The 
same site and community variables as previous modeling are significant in the annualized 
duration/survival modeling (home value, site complexity, risk, and private party involvement).  
7.4 Impact of TAG Award on Remedy 
Ordered Logit statistical modeling was performed as outlined in Section 6.1.4.  The 
model estimates the impact of the independent variables on the classification of the remedy 
selection.  The remedy selection variable is ordered from 0 (no action taken) to 7 (greatest 
remedy) with increasing remedy/risk reduction for each category. The ordered logit reports the 
odds ratio, or the odds of being in a higher group divided by the odds of being in lower group 
with a value of greater than 1 indicating a variable that results in higher (more protective 
remedy).  The results of the remedy evaluation are shown in Table 7-10. Ologit1 includes the 
probability of TAG variable to address potential endogeneity while Ologit2 includes only the 
tagdum variable for the presence of TAG.  As shown in Table 7-10, the award of a TAG does not 
significantly impact the selection of remedy for the sites, consistent with Hypothesis 7.  This 
finding is further investigated in the multiple case study. 
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Table 7-10 Remedy Selection-Ordered Logits 
Odds Ratios Reported for Remedy Code Change
Ologit 1 Ologit 2
TAG Dummy 0.954 0.903
(0.130) (0.121)
Probability of TAG 0.978** 
(0.00761)
Normalized Home Value 1.019 1.005
(0.0134) (0.0122)
Normalized Income 0.991 1.004
(0.0293) (0.0288)
Population Density 1.000** 1.000*** 
(0.0000316) (0.0000305)
Minority (%) 1.001 1.000
(0.00292) (0.00288)
Less than College Degree (%) 0.994 0.996
(0.00553) (0.00548)
Pct Owner Occupied (%) 1.000 1.002
(0.00429) (0.00420)
Tenure > 5 years (%) 1.005 0.998
(0.00616) (0.00566)
OU count 1.052 0.988
(0.0337) (0.0223)
OU Count Squared 0.999 1.000
(0.000467) (0.000360)
Removal Action 1.474*** 1.260* 
(0.172) (0.128)
HRS Score 1.002 0.999
(0.00406) (0.00397)
PRP Site Dummy 1.186 1.051
(0.154) (0.128)
Fed Facility Dummy 0.857 0.848
(0.181) (0.178)
cut1 - Constant 0.139*** 0.105*** 
(0.0674) (0.0504)
cut2 - Constant 0.151*** 0.115*** 
(0.0736) (0.0550)
cut3 - Constant 0.216** 0.163*** 
(0.104) (0.0778)
cut4 - Constant 0.257** 0.194*** 
(0.124) (0.0922)
cut5 - Constant 0.382* 0.291** 
(0.184) (0.138)
cut6 - Constant 1.285 0.970
(0.619) (0.459)
cut7 - Constant 5.700*** 4.231** 
(2.758) (2.010)
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: chi-squared test indicates that tagdum=1 is significant at the 0.001 level for both Ologit models. 
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Chapter 8 - Case Study Findings 
This section presents a summary of the findings from the multiple case study, or 
qualitative, portion of the study.  Interviews were conducted with community representatives, 
EPA project managers and TAG technical consultants for each of six Superfund cases selected.  
The sites are all located in central New York and were awarded a TAG; three were awarded 
before the ROD was issued and three were awarded after the ROD was issued.  Two sites (Sites 
C and D) had the same TAG group, community representative and EPA project manager since 
they were nearby properties with many shared community and technical issues.   
Four EPA project managers were interviewed; one manager chose not to participate in 
the interview and one manager covered two sites.  Each of the EPA managers had been with 
EPA and working on Superfund sites for fifteen years or more (in two cases more than 30 years), 
managed multiple Superfund sites, and managed projects with and without TAG group 
involvement.   
Seven community representatives were interviewed including three representatives for 
Site F.  The community representatives were all female; some were employed and some were 
retired; one was a tenured professor at a state university; and three were previously very active in 
community advocacy projects, including a clean drinking water campaign, community recycling 
efforts, organic farming, peace activities, planning and zoning, and at a nearby State Superfund 
site.   
Through the interview process, it was learned that one of the community members was 
involved in some fashion at three of the other five sites.  Prior to the interviews, I was only aware 
of her involvement as the community representative for Site E.  In my interview with her, she 
spoke very briefly about other sites, but took much less credit for work on other sites than the 
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primary community representatives gave her.  The background of this advocate is quite 
impressive.  She was actively involved in ensuring that safe drinking water was provided for her 
community before becoming involved at Site E.  She was also heavily involved in NY State 
Superfund programs and assisted in providing support to numerous communities on 
environmental issues.  Her experience and connection resulted in her becoming a sought-after 
resource for communities, as well as EPA personnel to assist with community involvement 
processes at NPL sites.  Based on this finding of the importance of network connections, I 
revisited the quantitative study and incorporated a variable to address the occurrence of a 
previous, nearby TAG.  As discussed in the previous chapter, this relationship was found to have 
a significant impact, positively affecting the award of a TAG.         
Two technical advisors were interviewed; one consultant worked on three sites and the 
other consultant worked on the other three sites.  One technical advisor was associated with a 
local university and was familiar with one of the community representatives through common 
task force work and the other advisor worked for a firm that provided environmental consulting 
services and performed much of their work on Superfund sites. 
The interviews were semi-structured, with a pre-determined list of questions that solicited 
open-ended answers.  Follow up questions were asked as needed for clarity or additional details.  
The interview question decks are included in Appendix A.  The results from the interviews were 
captured and compiled in mind maps.  The responses on a question-by-question basis are 
included in Appendix B (for community representatives), Appendix C (for EPA representatives) 
and Appendix D (for technical advisors/consultants.  The thematic responses to interview 
questions by community representatives and EPA are summarized in Table 8-1.  
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Site A
Comm EPA Comm EPA Comm EPA Comm EPA Comm EPA Comm
Table 8-1
Drivers and Impacts
TAG Awards at Selected NY Superfund Sites
Themes
Site D Site E Site FSite B Site C
BENEFITS
Empowerment X X X X
Streamline Process X X X
Educate citizens X X X X X
Increase trust X X X
EPA credibility X X X
Comm credibility X X X X X
Access to EPA X X X X X X
Question options X X
Understand options X X X X X X
Info from community X X X X X
Info to community X X X
Balance PRPs X X X X
DRAWBACKS
Admin burden X X X X X X
City resentment X
Comm. resentment X X
Resources limited X
Limited recipients X X
Expensive process X
OUTCOMES
Slowed process
Sped process X X X X
Impacted remedy X X X X X
No impact on remedy X X X X X X
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Many of these responses are consistent with the theoretical bases presented in Section 
3.1, regarding democracy (equity and power), resource dependency, network support and others. 
8.1 Why do communities pursue a TAG award? 
A summary of the reasons that individual community representatives decided to pursue a 
TAG is presented in Figure 8-1.   
The common themes among the responses are a lack of trust in the process and the 
agency, dissatisfaction with the speed of the process or information flow, opposition to the 
remedy being proposed and the influence of more powerful players, and the desire for more 
information and transparency.  At one site (Site E), the state agency was being replaced by EPA 
as the lead agency and the community did not trust EPA to correct the missteps and adequately 
address community concerns so action was driven by a history of inadequate involvement.  At 
two sites (Sites C and D), there were powerful private parties involved in the process and the 
community felt that they needed to provide an alternate voice at the table and they needed to 
“provide a spine to EPA” to stand up to the PRPs.   
The understanding that the community needed technical expertise to better understand the 
massive quantities of technical data was mentioned for every site.  This included one site (Site B) 
where the community representative had significant experience in dealing with similarly 
complex data from a state Superfund site (where no TAG program was available) and still 
realized that assistance was needed to assist in making informed decisions.   
In addition, every community representative learned about the TAG program from a 
representative of another site or from EPA introducing them to the TAG process.  Even the 
representative for Site E, who was involved in an assistance role at three of the other five sites, 
learned about the TAG program from her involvement in a state-wide task force and from a TAG 
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Why did
Group pursue
TAG?
Site A -
To obtain
information,
learned from
EPA
Site B -
Previous experience
with complex issues,
obtain information,
learned from another 
TAG (Site E)
Site C -
To get involved,
influence decision,
provide a voice to
EPA, "Spine to
EPA"
Site D -
To get involved,
influence decision,
provide a voice to
EPA, "Spine to EPA"
Site E -
Obtain technical expertise,
voice concerns over State
remedy, learned from
another TAG
Site F
Rep 2 -
Lack of trust in
State and EPA,
lack of technical
knowledge,
opposed remedy
Rep 1 -
Unknown
Rep 3 -
Speed up
process,
involved in TAG
group for Site E,
counteract PRP
influence
EPA = Environmental Protection 
Agency
PRP = Potentially Responsible 
Parties
Figure 8-1. Why pursue TAG? Community rep. responses
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coordinator for a site that was not a part of this study, underscoring the importance of network 
connections and support.   
Dissatisfaction with the current rate of progress of the process was a stated driver for one 
site (Site F).  This supports the idea that slow progress can encourage mobilization and public 
participation to address the concern. The community representatives for all but one of the sites 
(Site A) had previous community advocacy experience and existing social capital to assist them 
in the process.  This ranged from direct NPL site experience to state Superfund site experience to 
addressing local environmental concerns (drinking water, organic gardening and recycling) to 
social outreach programs (such as the Salvation Army). 
Table 8-2 presents a comparison of the findings from EPA and TAG group interviews on 
the question of why a community pursues a TAG.  There is consistency on the responses and 
both groups mention trust of the agency, lack of information flow, and an uneasiness with the 
Superfund process.  The community representatives also mention the need to counterbalance 
PRP influence while the agency identifies agency procedural problems as drivers.  
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Table 8-2 
Why do communities pursue TAGs? 
EPA Community Group 
Mistrust of state and EPA Mistrust of state and EPA 
Lack of information flow Lack of information flow 
Overall unease with Superfund Need for technical knowledge 
Government procedural problems Balance PRP influence 
Knew advocate with experience 
 Opposed proposed remedy 
Learned about program from others 
8.2 How did the TAG process work? 
The TAG program does not, overall, embody the ideals of “good participation”. It is 
technocratic, not a designed deliberative, solution to the participation question.  A summary of 
community representative responses on how the TAG application and process work is presented 
in Figure 8-2.         
Overall, community members were frustrated with both the application process and the 
administrative burdens of the program, which may partially explain why the take-up rate for 
TAGs is so low (~15%).  The availability of a seasoned TAG veteran (the Site E representative) 
was cited as a positive factor for three of the other five sites.  
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How did TAG
application
and process
work?
Site A -
Fairly smooth, hired
another TAG
recipient to write
application, lots of 
paperwork
Site B -
Hired another TAG
recipient to write
application, administration
difficult, well educated
group (2 PhDs), lower 
resource community would
have given up
Site C -
Many obstacles, EPA 
assisted with process
(only group with
TAGs for 2 sites),
well educated group
Site D -
Many obstacles, EPA 
assisted with process
(only group with TAGs
for 2 sites), well
educated group
Site E -
Steep learning curve
(group and EPA),
EPA's focus on
accounting (not
results) made it
difficult, discouraging
Site F
Rep 2 -
Used TAG recipient
for another site for 
application, tedious,
difficult, confusing,
made a trip to EPA-
DC, met with Lois
Gibbs (Love Canal)
Rep 1 -
No recall
Rep 3 -
Completed
application for 
Site E, this site
took longer,
suspects reason
EPA = Environmental 
Protection Agency 
DC = Washington, D.C.
Figure 8-2. How did TAG process work - Community rep responses
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While none of the groups stated that they would forego the TAG, they did express 
concern that a group without access to the resources that they had may not pursue the TAG 
award.  Several groups referenced EPA’s assistance in the process as a positive, while others 
stated dissatisfaction with EPA’s focus on accounting, not results.  This may be partially 
explained by the difference in dealing with EPA technical versus accounting personnel, but may 
also be an indicator of the role of individual EPA project manager support for the program.  In 
addition, at Site F, one of the community representatives expressed the concern that EPA sped up 
the ROD process to avoid dealing with the TAG consultant prior to issuing the ROD.   
The two primary representatives for Site B were university professors with PhDs; the 
interviewed representative stated that they joked that “it takes a PhD to administer a TAG and 
they still had to hire someone to write the grant for them.”  She also stated that she heard 
anecdotes about groups that gave the grant back after recognizing the administrative burden of 
the program.  Most of the groups met the 10% matching fund requirement by providing “in kind” 
services, such as photocopying, accounting, or administrative/technical services.   
8.3 What are the benefits of the TAG program? 
While the TAG process may have been a frustrating one for the communities, 
interviewees also identified numerous benefits resulting from the TAG award and expressed 
overall support for the TAG process.  A summary of the benefits referenced by the community 
are presented in Figure 8-3. 
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What did TAG
add and what
were
downsides of 
TAG award?
Site A -
Community awareness,
PRP-compliance (fencing/
buyouts), improved
community credibility
Site B -
TAG is critical, technical
expertise, identified
investigation gaps
(groundwater and
chemicals), gained
legitimacy with community
Site C -
Better support of EPA,
added remediation
components (removal
and groundwater)
Site D -
Better support of EPA,
serious support for under-
resourced community
Site E -
Credibility and legitimacy
with EPA, increased
information from EPA,
understand technical issues,
confidence to question
agency
Site F
Rep 2 -
Empowered
community, gained
information,
understand
outcomes, credibility
with EPA and
community at large
Rep 1 -
No recall
Rep 3 -
Added leverage with 
EPA and DEC, prodded
RPM to move things
along and include public
in decisions, balanced
PRP influence
RPM = Remedial Project Manager
EPA = Environmental Protection 
Agency
DEC = Department of Environmental 
Conservation
PRP = Potentially Responsible Parties
Figure 8-3. What does TAG add? Community rep responses
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The findings show that the TAG process empowers and educates citizens, increases the 
credibility of the community and governmental agency, increases trust in and legitimacy of the 
agency and the process, gives citizens a voice in the process that matters deeply to them. The 
problem, as postulated in Chapter 4 and confirmed in the quantitative research, is that the TAG 
program is an underutilized resource; therefore, many of the potential gains go unrealized 
because of the barriers.   
Table 8-3 presents a comparison of the findings from EPA and TAG group interviews on 
the question of benefits of the TAG program.  Both groups identified added credibility as a 
benefit.  Interestingly, each group focused on their own credibility, not the credibility of the other 
party or the process in general.  EPA and the community also agreed that the TAG increased the 
flow of information to and from the public, streamlines communication, improves technical 
understanding, and speeds the schedule by addressing conflict in a constructive manner.  
Community groups also stressed their input being taken seriously and counterbalancing influence 
of PRPs.   One EPA manager also noted that the TAG improved the remedy selection process.  
8.4  What are drawbacks of the TAG program? 
There were observed problems or drawbacks with the TAG process as shown in Figure 8-
4. The heavy administrative and resource burden of the program was mentioned by most
participants.  The TAG program requires that the group incorporate and provide 10% matching 
funding to obtain the TAG.  One group (Site F) ran the TAG through the group that formed for 
another site (Site E) to share resources and spread the administrative burden.  One group applied 
for and received TAGs for two proximally located sites (Sites C and D).  The representative 
stated that her group was the only one that she knew of with two TAGs.   
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Table 8-3 
What are the benefits of TAGs? 
EPA Community Group 
Credibility for EPA Credibility of TAG group 
Citizen confidence in the process Community input taken seriously 
Increased info to and from public Technical info to public 
Coalesce the community Means to inform EPA 
Streamlines communication Streamlines communication 
Speeds up schedule Speeds up schedule 
Strengthens community voice Balance PRP power/influence 
Improves technical understanding Improves technical understanding 
Strengthened remedy selection Provides access to EPA 
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What were
downsides of 
TAG award?
Site A -
Other group tried to co-
opt them, concerns over 
property values
Site B -
Administration of the 
grant, very time
consuming
Site C -
Perceived as outsiders (not
long time locals),
perception of pay-off,
stress of responsibility for 
whole community
Site D -
Perceived as outsiders (not long
time locals), perception of pay-
off, stress of responsibility for 
whole community
Site E -
Conflict with local
government, local business
resented, EPA focused on
administration, administrative
burden
Site F
Rep 2 -
TAG awarded too
late in process, may
have slowed
progress
Rep 1 -
No recall
Rep 3 -
Administrative 
burden
EPA = Environmental Protection Agency
DEC = Department of Environmental 
Conservation
PRP = Potentially Responsible Parties
RPM = Remedial Project Manager
Figure 8-4. What were downsides of TAG? Community rep responses
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There were several interesting consequences that were revealed.  One participant 
mentioned the attempt by another environmental (an anti-nuclear group) to co-opt the TAG 
group once they found about its existence.  Other group representatives spoke of resentment 
from the community that the TAG group was given access to the process and other citizens felt 
that group members “got a payoff” to go along with the agency. Other resentment from both the 
local community and local government focused on the potential impact that aggressive 
community involvement would have on the industrial and business community, either through 
“attacks” on major employers or through an overall community stigma resulting from publicizing 
the presence of an NPL site. 
Table 8-4 presents a comparison of the findings from EPA and TAG group interviews on 
the question of the drawbacks of the TAG program.  Again, most parties agreed that the program 
comes with significant administrative burdens and that the bureaucracy of the program (or 
accountability) tends to focus on resource utilization instead of process improvement or 
outcomes.  One EPA manager, who worked on two sites in the study, was a bit skeptical of the 
TAG program and its implementation at the sites that they managed.  The manager felt that the 
TAG group was very limited and was not representative of the community and that the cost of 
the TAG program was high to please such a small contingent of the population.  These sites were 
in a community where the major PRP was also one of the largest employers in the area and many 
citizens were reluctant to get involved in the process, so the community representative felt the 
TAG group gave voice to the public that would not have otherwise been heard.  Interestingly, her 
assessment of the success of the TAG process at the two sites (very beneficial) was in contrast to 
the EPA manager’s assessment (too expense and focused on too narrow a group of citizens). 
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Table 8- 4 
What are the drawbacks of a TAG? 
EPA Community Group 
Administrative burden for citizens Administrative burden 
Limited community resources Cost sharing requirements 
Inefficient process Community and government resentment 
Limited audience of impact Burden of responsibility 
Attempting co-opting from other causes 
8.5 How does TAG award impact schedule and remedy selection? 
Several questions were fashioned to elicit input regarding the impact of the TAG award 
on schedule and remedy.  I attempt to identify impacts to the process schedule separately from 
the schedule for implementation of the selected remedy.  These questions were difficult for many 
of the community representatives to answer, since they had limited, or no, involvement at other 
NPL sites and no real basis for comparison.   
Community responses to the impact of the TAG on schedule issues are presented in 
Figure 8-5.   
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What was
your 
impression of 
the remedy
selection
schedule?
Remediation
schedule?
Site A -
Selection - Very
slow
Remediation -
Normal to faster 
than expected
Site B -
Selection - Normal
(did research to
confirm)
Remediation - No
recall
Site C -
Selection - Community
thought it was slow, TAG
coordinator thought it
was faster than normal
Remediation - Normal,
no impact from TAG
Site D -
Selection - Slower 
than expected,
because of complexity
Remediation - Normal
for Superfund
Site E -
Selection - Fairly
quick
Remediation -
Quick
Site F
Rep 2 -
Selection -
Seemed slow
Remediation -
Rapid
Rep 1 -
Selection - Not sure,
seemed long but no
comparison
Remediation - No
reference
Rep 3 -
Selection - It seemed like
EPA sped up to get ROD
issued before TAG was
awarded
Remediation - Pretty
quick
Figure 8-5. What was impact of TAG on schedule? Community rep responses
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While many respondents stated the TAG group streamlined the process, many perceived 
the remedy selection schedule to be normal, but again had a limited frame of reference.  One of 
the representative for Site F felt that the remedy selection process went very quickly.  This TAG 
application process was underway during the selection time-period and was awarded after the 
ROD. The representative expressed concern that the ROD was “sped up” to complete it before 
the TAG was awarded.  As it turns out, the remedy was changed after the ROD was issued from 
incineration to a more palatable remedy (low temperature thermal desorption).   
Table 8-5 presents a comparison of the findings from EPA and TAG group interviews on 
the question of the schedule impacts of the TAG program.   
 
Table 8- 5 
What were the impacts of the TAG on remedy and schedule? 
 
 
EPA 
 
Community Group 
Some observed no schedule impact No perceived schedule impact 
Some saw a streamlining “It felt streamlined” 
No impact of remedy Perceived impact on remedy 
Collaboration improved 
 
Acceptance increased 
Dependent on: 
EPA manager  
Timing of TAG award 
 
  
  
  
 
The differences between EPA and community respondents illustrates the importance of 
perspective and the operational lens through which one views the process.  Most EPA managers, 
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who had experience at many non-TAG sites for comparison, observed no impact on the selection 
(ROD) or implementation schedules, although one manager did mention that the TAG 
streamlined the process.  While there may not have been schedule impacts, EPA managers still 
recognized that the TAG (and resulting improvement in communication) resulted in better 
conflict resolution processes.  EPA managers, who are shaped by professionalism and technical 
expertise, felt that the TAG had no effect on the remedy chosen.  They took inputs of 
information, processed the data, and made the selection of the proper response action.  The 
responses are like the “decide, inform and convince” model of decision-making.  The role of the 
TAG was to create a more knowledgeable public, get the but-in and support from a neutral third 
party (the technical advisor), manage the conflict process and keep the program moving forward. 
The community groups were convinced that the TAG resulted in a better remedy, either 
by changing the remedy, providing a “spine” to EPA, or being a watchdog on the system.  While 
trust may have been improved in the process, it was not full confidence in the agency to act in 
the best interest of the community.  At the site mentioned above, where the TAG was awarded 
after the ROD and the remedy was subsequently changes, views on the driver for that change 
differed by respondent.  The EPA manager stated that EPA made the decision based on new 
technical information and convinced the community that the change was the right thing to do.  
One community representative felt that the community pressured EPA to make the change and 
one community representative felt that the PRPs forced the change because of significant cost 
savings.      
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8.6  Other observations 
EPA managers, community representatives and TAG technical consultants all offered 
insights into the TAG process that were general in nature and not a response to a specific 
question from the interview deck.   
The EPA manager for Sites C and D stated that they were involved in numerous sites 
without TAGs where the community provided meaningful information and insight and could 
impact the Superfund process and did not see that the TAG program added much to the process.  
These two sites (Sites C and D) had a strong PRP presence and a limited number of community 
members that were involved in the TAG and Superfund process. 
The three sites where the community representative from Site E supported their efforts in 
the TAG program all highlighted the importance of a strong support system to navigate the 
process and attain success.  Other observations from community members included a feeling of 
being an “outsider” in the community, which is contrary to the findings of community and social 
capital building expressed at other sites.  Many of the community members stated that the 
bureaucracy of the program would limit participation by many communities without educational 
resources and assets to participate.  One community member who was familiar with the 
operations at multiple states mentioned the importance of a strong EPA manager to successful 
inclusion of the community in the process. 
The technical consultants also provided interesting insights into the process.  The 
consultant for Site B, C, and D was a professional environmental consultant with broad 
Superfund experience, with and without TAGs.  He observed that community members were 
going to participate regardless of the TAG program, and once they were committed they went 
out and found funding.  While a TAG did not impact the quantity of communities that would 
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participate in the process, it absolutely impacted the quality of participation.  He also noted 
several key aspects in the process, as follows: 
• Site setting (rural, urban/ suburban); 
• The interactions between the PRP group and the community; 
• The importance of trust building to success; 
• The TAG increases community acceptance of the chosen remedy; 
• Third-party technical review does impact the quality of investigation and remedy 
selection at a site; 
• The TAG increases overall community awareness and knowledge, not just among active 
group members; and  
• While $50,000 per site sounds like a lot, there is a lot of work performed by the 
consultant and they must learn to be efficient to provide true value. 
 
The consultant for Site A, E, and F was a university professor with technical knowledge 
and insight into Superfund, but was not a full-time environmental consultant.  He reiterated that a 
TAG was not necessary for community involvement and he served in similar roles on sites with 
no TAG.  He also stated that in some ways the TAG created friction that increased the level of 
effort to maintain a cohesive community.  
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Chapter 9 – Conclusions and Synthesis of Findings 
This research was performed to investigate the performance of public participation in 
highly technical policy scenarios and the outcomes of this participation.  A detailed evaluation of 
community involvement at Superfund sites, a specific type of complex, highly-technical policy 
problem, was performed using a mixed methods approach, incorporating a quantitative 
econometric evaluation and qualitative multiple case study of selected Superfund sites.  Public 
participation within the Superfund program was evaluated via a detailed study of the Superfund 
Technical Assistance Grant (TAG) program. 
The existing literature on public participation presents that citizen involvement, while not 
without its potential drawbacks, is central to democratic decision-making and is an important 
part of the policy process.  This study was rooted in a series of research questions about public 
participation in technical settings. These questions addressed the attributes of successful 
participation, the characteristics of technical policy issues that could lead to gaps in successful 
participation, the expected impact of the Superfund TAG program in addressing these gaps, and 
questions about the specific impacts of the TAG program at Superfund sites on outcomes 
(schedule, remedy selected, and community perceptions and satisfaction with the outcomes).   
The research began with a summary of the Superfund program and public participation 
since the program’s inception in 1980 (Chapter 2), a detailed review of literature on public 
participation theory and previous research on public participation (Chapter 3), and the 
development of expectations about participation in complex, technical policy settings (Chapter 
4).   
Chapters 5 through 7 presented the research framework and the detailed procedures for 
performance of the quantitative and qualitative studies.  Chapters 7 and 8 present the results of 
159
qualitative analysis and quantitative evaluation, respectively, of the research questions.  The 
quantitative evaluation provides more definitive answers to environmental outcome based 
questions with measurable results, while the qualitative assessment provides more detailed 
understanding of the “why and how questions” and addresses topics of process outcomes and 
community satisfaction and gains beyond the environmental outcomes.  Previous public 
participation research and theory have identified the importance of the process gains in 
community and capacity building as well the enlargement of democracy.   
Table 9-1 presents a summary of the integrated findings from the two major parts of the 
study. There is strong agreement between the quantitative and qualitative studies, with the 
biggest difference being the perception by community leaders that the TAG impacted the remedy 
chosen.  This finding from the case studies was not born out in the quantitative evaluation, which 
showed no differences in remedies for TAG and non-TAG sites.  This finding of no impact on 
remedy was also consistent with the EPA project managers’ perception from the case studies. 
The case studies added significant insight into the reasons for and results of TAG award 
based on factors that were not measurable in the quantitative data set (such as trust, experience 
and relationships of community advocates, desires to change the remedy, and previous activity of 
the community at the site).  The case studies also added knowledge about outcomes; the capacity 
building within the community, the credibility gains for EPA and the community, and the 
increased acceptance of the agency decisions.    
The Superfund program is a highly technical and complex policy arena.  It has the 
hallmark characteristics identified in Section 4.1 – technical complexity, expensive solutions to 
the problems, public involvement is expensive, the process is slow, and the technical parties 
typically have better access to information than does the public.  The TAG program is 
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Table 9-1 
Integrated Summary of Findings 
Quantitative Study Qualitative Study 
Community Attributes 
Driving TAG 
# of #, indicates how many cases met 
criterion 
Resources/assets Home value (+) 
Income (-) 
Rural/urban/suburban and mostly middle- to 
working-class 
Education Some college (-) Sites were varied, education < mean value 
Community leader typically well educated 
Tenure/social capital > 5 years (+) Stable, long-tenured neighborhoods 
PRP present Yes (+) 6 of 6 sites 
Site complexity Operable Units (+) 
Removal (+) 
5/6 sites complex (groundwater, innovative 
remedies) 
Previous advocacy of 
leader  
NM 5 of 6 sites 
Community already 
active at site 
NM 6 of 6 sites 
Slow ROD process DS to ROD duration (?) 3 of 6 sites 
Gain technical 
knowledge 
NM 6 of 6 sites 
Influence decision, 
concerns over remedy 
NM 3 of 6 sites 
Mistrust of agency NM 4 of 6 sites 
Nearby TAG 
(awareness) 
Nearby TAG 6 of 6 sites 
Schedule Impact of 
TAG 
Overall TAG before ROD (slower but not 
significant) 
TAG after ROD (faster but not 
significant) 
One site closed – consistent with national 
averages 
Discovery to ROD TAG before ROD (-) TAG before ROD (2 of 3 sites slower) 
ROD to closure 
TAG before ROD (faster but not 
significant) 
TAG after ROD (faster but not 
significant) 
One site closed – consistent with national 
averages 
Remedy Impact of 
TAG 
Impact on remedy 
selected 
Not significant 3 of 6 sites, community perceived that TAG 
impacted remedy selection. 
EPA stated no impact 
Community Gains 
Capacity NM Yes 
Technical knowledge NM Yes 
Trust and credibility NM Yes 
Voice and meaningful 
input 
NM Yes 
Balance to Power NM Yes 
Notes: 
+ = statistically significant positive impact 
- = statistically significant negative impact 
? = not statistically significant 
NM = not measure in quantitative study 
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 specifically designed to improve the participation process at Superfund sites. The case studies 
provided support for the expectations presented in Chapter 4 – expectations about barriers to 
public participation in complex, technical settings and expectations about the ability of the TAG 
program to address some of the participation gaps. 
It was expected that the presence of a TAG would alleviate problems with trust, 
credibility, communications, differences in power in the decision-making process, and overall 
satisfaction with the participation process.  These hypotheses were supported by the findings of 
the qualitative case study research.  A problem is that only a small fraction (about 15%) of 
communities near Superfund sites actually apply for and are awarded a TAG.  The case study 
interviews support the idea that this is a result of the financial and administrative burdens that 
make a TAG infeasible or undesirable for many communities.   This study has highlighted the 
complexity of the Superfund process, the many factors that influence the schedule and 
remediation decisions at these sites and the many facets of community involvement. 
The following sections describe a number of findings from the study that can improve 
public participation in complex policy decisions.  The extrapolation from the TAG program to 
other technical policy areas is an important and valid application.  The findings are rooted in the 
complexity of the policy issue are more widely applicable to complex, technical problems 
beyond Superfund and the TAG program. 
9.1  The Importance of a Technical Advisor and Communication 
  A number of interrelated findings are based on the availability and selection of a trusted, 
independent technical advisor. The advisors improved the ability of the agency to communicate 
with the public and vice versa, serving as both an advocate for the community and an 
intermediary with the ability to interpret technical information and translate community 
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preferences into the technical language of the agency representatives.  This also served to 
increase trust and credibility on both sides of the decision-making.  The technical representatives 
were also unbiased (or even biased toward the community views) increasing the public trust in 
the process.  The consultants also provided an interpretation of technical results in a manner that 
non-technical community members could understand, removing potential power imbalances and 
“leveling the field” for community involvement in decision-making.  They were also able to 
present community views in a way that was more readily incorporated into the process. 
  
9.2 The Importance of Networks 
The case studies identified the importance of established networks of support and 
resource provision.  Each of the TAG groups relied heavily on a “mentor” in the process to 
identify the program and assist in navigation of the complexities and bureaucracy of applying for 
and properly using a TAG.  This also highlights the opportunity for government agencies to 
assist in establishing the infrastructure for such resource networks and building the capacity of 
citizens to participate and add to the process.  Such programs could increase the availability of 
resources for community involvement and the knowledgebase of available methods and actors to 
assist in the process. 
 
9.3 The Importance of the Citizen Advocate 
The case studies also underscore the importance of previous community advocacy for 
public participation in environmental policy decisions.  All but one of the community leaders had 
a strong track record of community involvement prior to pursuing the TAG.  The one member 
that did not have such experience relied heavily on another TAG leader to work through the 
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process.  This finding supports the previous concept of the importance of a support network for 
community involvement in technical issues. 
A key question for public administration is how to cultivate this behavior and support the 
growth and development of community leaders.  Strong movements require strong leaders, and 
as, EPA representatives stated, the process was streamlined through the informed and reasoned 
action of a knowledgeable public.  
 
9.4 Capacity Building within Public Administration 
This research demonstrated that a capable and experienced public administrator provides 
support, process structure, and enhances the opportunities for successful public participation.      
The importance of a strong EPA manager was a constant thread throughout the interview 
process.  A strong and supportive manager made the TAG process meaningful, productive and 
successful.  The communities that referenced capable and experienced project managers also 
mentioned that as a reason for satisfaction with the process and one of the keys to success.   
While the motivation of an individual manager is important to support and enhance 
public participation, sustainable improvements in the citizen involvement process require 
organizational support.  Individual managers can change jobs, be moved to other projects, or lack 
the stamina to continue as the catalyst for public participation efforts.  Organizational support 
and programs, such as resource provision, managerial incentives, and public participation 
training, can increase the likelihood that managers support public participation.  This level of 
organizational support can also signal the importance of citizen involvement to managers that are 
not predisposed to encourage participation.  
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EPA has community engagement personnel (Community Involvement Coordinators) who 
are active in the planning of the public participation programs, and provide support and guidance 
to the manager. This is one of the provisions of the TAG program to enhance public participation 
at Superfund sites. Additional training and support to agency project managers, who are the 
personnel most likely to interact with the public on a frequent basis, is also expected to improve 
participatory programs. Public managers, who are often technically trained scientists, will benefit 
from training in the skills in negotiation, conflict resolution, collaboration and facilitation, as 
well as the temperament to “govern with instead of governing over” (L. Bingham, O'Leary, & 
Nabatchi, 2005).   
 
9.5  Areas for further research 
There are a number of questions that were raised during this study that could benefit from 
additional research.  First, the case study research included only Superfund sites where a TAG 
had been awarded.  Expanding the case studies to include sites that did not receive a TAG would 
provide useful information on the reasons why communities did not pursue and obtain a TAG.   
Second, additional information from the community could be obtained by expanding the 
interviews to include community members that were not active members of the TAG group.  The 
interviews included only community members who were leaders in the TAG group, introducing 
potential bias to the case study findings. 
Third, the interview program could be expanded to include additional personnel involved 
in the process.  This could include additional EPA personnel (the CIC), members of the PRP 
community, and state and local government officials.  This information would provide additional 
perspectives on process outcomes.       
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Fourth, the case studies could be expanded to additional geographic areas.  This would 
provide information about the potential regional, cultural or political differences.  It would also 
provide the opportunity to assess EPA regional and state regulatory differences. 
Finally, the research program could be expanded to investigates a different highly 
technical problem area.  This would provide information to confirm (or refute) the findings 
herein that relate to the extrapolation of the findings.  It is also likely that the study of another 
policy area will identify additional areas for improvement of the public participation process.    
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Interview Questionnaires
TAG Case Study
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Appendix A-1
Interview Questionnaires 
Community Representatives
168
 
C.  Community Group Representative   
.  
1. How familiar were you with the Superfund process before you got involved 
at this site?   
2. Are you active in community involvement at other Superfund sites? Other 
environmental sites? Other community advocacy projects? 
3. How long have you been representing the community for this site?   
4. At what stage of the Superfund process did you get involved in the site?  
5. Based on your familiarity with the historical aspects of the site, is there 
anyone else that I should talk to in the community group regarding earlier 
time periods?          
6. Are you familiar with the Technical Assistance to Support Communities 
(TASC) program?           
7. Have you ever utilized this program?         
8. If so, what were the results?        
 
TAG Process (for the Site) 
 
9. Who are the stakeholders in the process at this site? 
10. What were the community involvement activities at the site prior to the 
TAG award?            
11. When in the process did your group become involved?    
12. What group received the TAG for this site?      
13. Besides the group that holds the TAG, are there other citizens involved in 
the process?           
14. Why did the group decide to obtain a TAG?      
15. How did the TAG application and award process work?     
16. Tell me about the impact that you feel the TAG award has had at this site. 
• What do you feel that the TAG adds at a site?    
• Are there any downsides that you see resulting from TAG award? 
 
Remedy Selection Process and Project Schedule 
 
17. I understand the Superfund remedy decision process well but I am 
interested in the specifics of the remedy selection process for this site. 
• Who was involved in decision/negotiation process?    
• Was there conflict surrounding the ROD? Lawsuits? ROD 
amendments?          
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18. If there were changes to the remedy (such as a ROD amendment), what 
was the relative importance of the following in the decision to change the 
remedy? Use the following scale to rate impact.     
 
1- No impact  2- Little impact 3- Not sure   
 4- Moderate impact 5- Significant impact     
      
• New technical information  
a. About new remedies available  
b. About site problems        
c. About site risks       
d. Public perception or involvement (TAG)     
• Private party involvement 
• Institutional precedent         
• Other          
          
19. What is your impression of the schedule for the remedy selection process 
for the site?            
20. What is your impression of the schedule for remediation for the site?  
21. Is there anything else that you feel I should know about the remedy 
selection at this site?         
 
Interaction between TAG and Remedy Selection 
 
I am going ask questions now regarding the interaction between the TAG award 
and remedy selection.  The first question relates to the process and subsequent 
questions relate to the specific outcomes. 
 
22. What is your impression of the impact of the TAG award on the remedy 
selection process for this site?         
23. How did the TAG award influence the actual chosen remedy?   
24. If there was a remedy change, was the revised remedy technically better?  
25. Is the remedy more complex than it would have otherwise been as a result 
of the TAG award?          
26. If so, did the technical issues merit this more complex remedy? Was the 
more complex remedy driven by public acceptance of the remedy?   
 
Interactions between Community Involvement Programs 
 
27.  Are there other community involvement programs that are applicable to 
this site (DOE, DOD, State)?     
28. If so, have you worked within any of those programs?  
29. Did the additional programs require more work on your part?  
30. Do the programs work well together?       
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Appendix A-2
Interview Questionnaires 
EPA Representatives
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A.  Regulatory Project Manager (State and Federal).  
This individual is the agency representative that is currently managing the 
activities at the case site.  This individual (or potentially a predecessor) should be 
the most familiar with the technical details at the site.  The goal of interviewing 
this person is to obtain insight into the interaction between TAG award and the 
remedy selection process and the implementation process.  This individual will 
hopefully have insight into both the technical aspects of remedy selection and 
implementation and the role of public participation attributable to TAG award. 
Project Manager Background 
1. How long have you been with the agency?
2. How many Superfund projects do you manage?
3. At a typical site, tell me about your interactions with community
involvement coordinator?
4. Your involvement with the community?
5. What percentage of your sites is awarded TAGs?
Site Background 
6. How long have you been the project manager at this site?
7. At what stage of the Superfund process did you get involved in the site?
8. Based on your familiarity with the historical aspects of the site, is there
anyone else that I should talk to at the agency regarding earlier time
periods?
TAG Process (for the Site) 
9. Who are the stakeholders in the process at this site?
10. Were there any community involvement activities at the site prior to the
TAG award?
11. What group received the TAG for this site?
12. Do you know how the group has utilized the grant funds? If so, how?
13. Besides the group that holds the TAG, are there other citizens involved in
the process? Is this typical for your sites?
14. Did the award of the TAG to one group change the way that other groups
interacted?
15. Did you notice any change in the level of the group’s knowledge of the
technical issues after the TAG award?
16. Tell about the impact that you feel the TAG award has had at this site.
• What do you feel that the TAG adds at a site?
• Are there any downsides that you see resulting from TAG award?
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Remedy Selection Process and Project Schedule 
17. I understand the Superfund remedy decision process well but I am
interested in the specifics of the remedy selection process for this site.
• Who was involved in decision/negotiation process?
• Was there conflict surrounding the ROD? Lawsuits? ROD
amendments?
18. If there were changes to the remedy (such as a ROD amendment), what
was the relative importance of the following in the decision to change the
remedy?
1 – No Impact 2 – Little Impact  3 – Not Sure 
4 – Moderate Impact 5 – Significant Impact 
• New technical information
a. About new remedies available
b. About site problems
c. About site risks
• Public perception or involvement (TAG)
• Private party involvement
• Institutional precedent
• Other
19. What is your impression of the schedule for the remedy selection process
for this site? How does this compare with other sites with TAGs? Sites
without TAGs?
20. What is your impression of the schedule for remediation for the site? How
does it compare to other sites with TAGs? Sites without TAGs?
21. Is there anything else that you feel I should know about the remedy
selection at this site?
Interaction between TAG and Remedy Selection 
I am going ask questions now regarding the interaction between the TAG award 
and remedy selection.  The first question relates to the process and subsequent 
questions relate to the specific outcomes. 
22. What is your impression of the impact of the TAG award on the remedy
selection process for this site?
23. How did the TAG award influence the actual chosen remedy?
24. If there was a remedy change, was the revised remedy technically better?
25. Is the remedy more complex than it would have otherwise been as a result
of the TAG award?
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26. If so, did the technical issues merit this more complex remedy? Was the
more complex remedy driven by public acceptance of the remedy?
Interactions between Community Involvement Programs 
27. Are there other community involvement programs that are applicable to
this site (DOE, DOD, State)? 
28. If there are other programs, which program took precedence?
29. Are the programs collaborative in nature or is there a different method in
complying with each?
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Appendix A-3
Interview Questionnaires 
TAG Consultant Representatives
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E.  Technical Assistance Grant Consultant   
 
This individual is the representative from the firm that was hired by the 
community group to serve as a technical advisor.  This individual should be able 
to identify technical issues that were most problematic at the site for the 
layperson and identify areas in which the TAG award had the most impact. 
   
Consultant Background 
1. How long have you been performing technical activities at Superfund 
sites?  Tell me about your typical project.  Who is your client and what is 
your role?  
2. How many Superfund projects have you worked on? What percentage of 
your work is Superfund related? 
3. How many TAG grants have you worked under?  Which ones? 
4. At the typical site with a TAG, tell me about your involvement with the EPA 
RPM?  
5. At the typical site without a TAG, tell me about your involvement with the 
community advocacy leader? 
Site Background 
6. How long were you involved at this site? 
7. At what stage of the Superfund process did you get involved in the site? 
8. Based on your familiarity with the historical aspects of the site, is there 
anyone else that I should talk to regarding earlier time periods? 
TAG Process (for the Site) 
9. Besides the group that holds the TAG, were there other citizens involved 
in the Superfund process?  
10. Did you notice any change in the level of the group’s knowledge of the 
technical issues after the TAG award? 
11. Tell about the impact that you feel the TAG award has had at this site. 
• What do you feel that the TAG adds at a site? 
• Are there any downsides that you see resulting from TAG award? 
 
Remedy Selection Process and Project Schedule 
 
12. I understand the Superfund remedy decision process well but I am 
interested in the specifics of the remedy selection process for this site.   
• What role did you have in decision/negotiation process? 
• Was there conflict surrounding the ROD? Lawsuits? ROD 
amendments?  
13. If there were changes to the remedy (such as a ROD amendment), what 
was the relative importance of the following in the decision to change the 
remedy? 
           1 – No Impact  2 – Little Impact  3 – Not Sure 
 4 – Moderate Impact 5 – Significant Impact 
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• New technical information  
a. About new remedies available 
b. About site problems 
c. About site risks 
• Public perception or involvement (TAG) 
• Private party involvement 
• Institutional precedent 
• Other 
14. What is your impression of the schedule for the remedy selection process 
for this site? How does this compare with other sites with TAGs? Sites 
without TAGs? 
15. What is your impression of the schedule for remediation for the site? How 
does it compare to other sites with TAGs? Sites without TAGs? 
16. Is there anything else that you feel I should know about the remedy 
selection at this site? 
 
Interaction between TAG and Remedy Selection 
 
I am going ask questions now regarding the interaction between the TAG award 
and remedy selection.  The first question relates to the process and subsequent 
questions relate to the specific outcomes. 
17. What is your impression of the impact of the TAG award on the remedy 
selection process for this site?  
18. How did the TAG award influence the actual chosen remedy? 
19. If there was a remedy change, was the revised remedy technically better? 
20. Is the remedy more complex than it would have otherwise been as a result 
of the TAG award? 
21. If so, did the technical issues merit this more complex remedy? Was the 
more complex remedy driven by public acceptance of the remedy? 
 
Interactions between Community Involvement Programs 
 
22.  Are there other community involvement programs that are applicable to 
this site (DOE, DOD, State)? 
23. If there are other programs, which program took precedence? 
24. Are the programs collaborative in nature or is there a different method in 
complying with each? 
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Appendix B
Interview Responses 
Community 
Representatives
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How familiar 
were you
Superfund
process?
Site A -
Not at all
Site B -
Aware of SF, 
no
experience
Site C -
Aware of SF, 
no
experience
Site D -
Aware of SF, 
no
experience
Site E -
Not
aware,
learned
later (via
Love
Canal)
Site F
Rep 1-
Slightly
Aware
Rep 2-
Not at all
Rep 3-
Aware of SF, 
no
experience
Question 1 - Comm Rep
Superfund Awareness
SF = Superfund
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What is your 
previous
community
involvement
experience?
Site A -
None
Site B -
Very
Active - 
State
Superfund
Site C -
Very Active -
Organic
farming, peace
activities,
development
planningSite D -
Very Active -
Organic
farming, peace
activities,
development
planning
Site E -
Very Active - Safe
drinking water, planning,
Salvation Army
Site F
Rep 1 -
Active - 
Environmental
issues
Rep 2 -
Slightly
Active - 
Peace
activities
Rep 3 -
Very Active - Safe
drinking water,
planning
Question 2 - Comm Rep
Previous Community Involvement Experience
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What was CI
at the site pre-
TAG?
Site A -
Public
meetings,
information
gathering
Site B -
Required
access control
(fencing),
monitored
Site C - Media
contact, local
meetings,
concerned
because PRP
was large
employer
Site D - Media
contact, local
meetings,
concerned
because PRP was
large employer
Site E -
Communications
with local officials,
business
community not
supportive
Site F
Rep 1 -
Community
meetings
Rep 2 -
Information
gathering,
dumping ban
enforcement,
worked with
local professor
Rep 3 -
Community
meetings,
information
gathering
Question 10 - Comm Rep
Previous Community Involvement at Site
CI = Community Involvement
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Why did
Group pursue
TAG?
Site A -
To obtain
information,
learned from
EPA
Site B -
Previous experience
with complex issues,
obtain information,
learned from another 
TAG (Site E)
Site C -
To get involved,
influence decision,
provide a voice to
EPA, "Spine to
EPA"Site D -
To get involved,
influence decision,
provide a voice to
EPA, "Spine to EPA"
Site E -
Obtain technical expertise,
voice concerns over State
remedy, learned from
another TAG
Site F
Rep 2 -
Lack of trust in
State and EPA,
lack of technical
knowledge,
opposed remedy
Rep 1 -
Unknown
Rep 3 -
Speed up
process,
involved in TAG
group for Site E,
counteract PRP
influence
Question 14 - Comm Rep
Why did group pursue a TAG
EPA = Environmental Protection Agency
PRP = Potentially Responsible Parties
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How did TAG
application
and process
work?
Site A -
Fairly smooth, hired
another TAG
recipient to write
application, lots of 
paperwork
Site B -
Hired another TAG
recipient to write
application, administration
difficult, well educated
group (2 PhDs), lower 
resource community would
have given up
Site C -
Many obstacles, EPA 
assisted with process
(only group with
TAGs for 2 sites),
well educated group
Site D -
Many obstacles, EPA 
assisted with process
(only group with TAGs
for 2 sites), well
educated group
Site E -
Steep learning curve
(group and EPA),
EPA's focus on
accounting (not
results) made it
difficult, discouraging
Site F
Rep 2 -
Used TAG recipient
for another site for 
application, tedious,
difficult, confusing,
made a trip to EPA-
DC, met with Lois
Gibbs (Love Canal)
Rep 1 -
No recall
Rep 3 -
Completed
application for 
Site E, this site
took longer,
suspects reason
Question 15 - Comm Rep
How did TAG application and process work?
EPA = Environmental Protection Agency 
DC = Washington, D.C.
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What did TAG
add and what
were
downsides of 
TAG award?
Site A -
Adds - community awareness,
PRP-compliance (fencing/
buyouts), improved community
credibility
Downsides - Other group tried
to co-opt them, concerns over 
property values
Site B -
Adds - TAG is critical, technical
expertise, identified
investigation gaps (groundwater 
and chemicals), gained
legitimacy with community
Downsides - administration of 
the grant, very time consuming
Site C -
Adds -  better support of 
EPA, added remediation
components (removal and
groundwater)
Downsides - perceived as
outsiders (not long time
locals), perception of pay-off,
stress of responsibility for 
whole community
Site D -
Adds -  better support of 
EPA, serious support for 
under-resourced community
Downsides - perceived as
outsiders (not long time
locals), perception of pay-
off, stress of responsibility
for whole community
Site E -
Adds -  credibility and legitimacy
with EPA, increased information
from EPA, understand technical
issues, confidence to question
agency
Downsides - conflict with local
government, local business
resented, EPA focused on
administration, administrative
burden
Site F
Rep 2 -
Adds - empowered
community, gained
information, understand
outcomes, credibility with
EPA and community at
large
Downsides - TAG
awarded too late in
process, may have
slowed progress
Rep 1 -
Adds - No
recall
Downsides -
No recall
Rep 3 -
Adds -  Added leverage
with EPA and DEC,
prodded RPM to move
things along and
include public in
decisions, balanced
PRP influence
Downsides -
administrative burden
Question 16 - Comm Rep
What did TAG add and what were downsides
EPA = Environmental Protection Agency
DEC = Department of Environmental Conservation
PRP = Potentially Responsible Parties
RPM = Remedial Project Manager
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Who was
involved in
decision
making? Were
there outside
conflicts?
Site A -
Decision makers - EPA,
DEC, community,
congressman
Conflicts - ROD
amendment,
disagreement on remedy
Site B -
Decision makers - EPA,
PRPs, community was "told"
about decision not involved
Conflicts - community wanted
groundwater treatment but
EPA went with MNA, no
lawsuits or ROD amendments
Site C -
Decision makers - EPA,
PRPs, community
Conflicts - no lawsuits or 
ROD amendments, was
conflict between community
desires and PRPsSite D -
Decision makers -
EPA, PRPs,
community
Conflicts - none
Site E -
Decision makers - EPA, DEC,
community, higher education
group
Conflicts - no ROD
Amendments or lawsuits, there 
was an ESD (explanation of 
significant differences) to
explain remedy change
Site F
Rep 2 -
Decision makers -
EPA and community
Conflicts - No
lawsuits, but remedy
was changed during
process
Rep 1 -
Decision
makers -
EPA and PRPs,
not public
Conflicts - No
recall
Rep 3 -
Decision makers -
EPA and PRPs,
community smaller 
role
Conflicts - Unknown
Question 17 - Comm Rep
Who was involved in decision process and were there conflicts?
EPA = Environmental Protection Agency
DEC = Department of Environmental Conservation 
PRP = Potentially Responsible Parties
ROD = Record-of-Decision
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Were there
remedy
changes and
if so, what
influenced?
Site A -
Remedy changed from
LTTD to ISVE and PCB
cleanup limits were raised
Why? New information
(technolgy, site risks, TAG
group, PRPs (PCBs)
Site B -
No remedy
changes
Site C -
Remedy changed to
eliminate groundwater 
treatment
Why? New information
about potential success of 
remedy
Site D -
No remedy
changes
Site E -
Remedy changed from
incineration to LTTD.
Added freeze wall to dig 
below water table.
Why? New information
(technology - LTTD and
freeze wall), TAG group,
PRPs
Site F
Rep 2 -
Remedy changed from
incineration to removal/
cap
Why? New information
(lab data to replace
State data), Community
opposition to
incineration
Rep 1 -
Remedy changed from
incineration to
removal/cap
Why? New information
(lab data to replace
State data),
Community opposition
to incineration
Rep 3 -
Remedy
changed from
incineration to
removal/cap
Why? PRPs
Question 18 - Comm Rep
Were there remedy changes and why?
PRP = Potentially Responsible Parties 
LTTD = low-temp thermal desorption 
ISVE = in-situ soil vapor extraction
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What was
your 
impression of 
the remedy
selection
schedule?
Remediation
schedule?
Site A -
Selection - Very
slow
Remediation -
Normal to faster 
than expected
Site B -
Selection - Normal
(did research to
confirm)
Remediation - No
recall
Site C -
Selection - Community
thought it was slow, TAG
coordinator thought it
was faster than normal
Remediation - Normal,
no impact from TAG
Site D -
Selection - Slower 
than expected,
because of complexity
Remediation - Normal
for Superfund
Site E -
Selection - Fairly
quick
Remediation -
Quick
Site F
Rep 2 -
Selection -
Seemed slow
Remediation -
Rapid
Rep 1 -
Selection - Not sure,
seemed long but no
comparison
Remediation - No
reference
Rep 3 -
Selection - It seemed like
EPA sped up to get ROD
issued before TAG was
awarded
Remediation - Pretty
quick
Questions 19/20 - Comm Rep
Your impression of remedy selection and remediation schedule?
ROD = Record-of-Decision
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What was the
TAG impact
on the remedy
selection
PROCESS?
Site A -
Access (technical 
knowledge, EPA/DEC
personnel), knew
questions to ask, push to
counter PRP influence
Site B -
Remedy was less
"skimpy", support for 
EPA to demand more in
the remedy, political
process to balance
PRPs
Site C -
Allowed EPA to stand 
up for best remedy,
regardless of source of 
issues (Site C and D
were adjacent)
Site D -
Allowed EPA to stand 
up for best remedy,
regardless of source
of issues (Site C and
D were adjacent)
Site E -
Free access to
EPA, enhanced
direct
communication
Site F
Rep 2 -
"Threat of 
TAG" sped
up process
Rep 1 -
None, remedy
selection was
complete before
TAG awarded
Rep 3 -
No recall
Question 22 - Comm Rep
What was the impact of TAg on remedy selection process?
PRP = Potentially Responsible Parties
EPA = Environmental Protection Agency
DEC = Department of Environmental Conservation
188
How did TAG
influence the
CHOSEN
remedy?
Site A -
Gave input, monitored
progress, became part of 
process, weekly updates,
"watchdog"
Site B -
Kept EPA from selecting
"cheapest remedy", kept
the site in public eye
(media), added
additional investigation,
community education
Site C -
No influence on
final remedy
Site D -
No influence on
final remedy
Site E -
Influenced the
change from
incineration to
thermal desorption
Site F
Rep 2 -
Influenced
away from
incineration
(working with
contractor 
before TAG)
Rep 1 -
Not applicable,
remedy was
already chosen
Rep 3 -
Not applicable,
remedy was
already chosen
Question 23 - Comm Rep
How did TAG influence the remedy chosen?
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If there was a
remedy
change, was
the new
remedy
technically
better?
Site A -
More of a lateral
move, performed as
well and was safer.
Site B -
Not applicable
Site C -
Not applicable
Site D -
Not applicable
Site E -
Yes, technically
better and more
acceptable to
public
Site F
Rep 2 -
Not sure. Looking for 
perfect and there is no
perfect.
Rep 1 -
Not applicable
Rep 3 -
Difficult to say,
much more
could have
been done.
Question 23 - Comm Rep
How did TAG influence the remedy chosen?
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Miscellaneous
general
comments
Site A -
1) Support of TAG
representative from Site E
was key to success
2) EPA requirements are
tough for small
community
Site B -
1) 2 PhDs on
committee were key
2) Hiring TAG rep
from Site E was key
to getting the TAG
3) Heard that there
were communities
that turned down
TAGs
Site C -
New to
community, so
outsider status
was perceived
Site D -
New to
community, so
outsider status
was perceived
Site E -
Assistance from 
another TAG rep
was key
Site F
Rep 2 -
1) Influenced
remedy before
TAG award
2) Site E TAG
rep was key
Rep 1 -
1) Support  from
TAG rep from Site
E was key
2) Became
involved before
TAG
Rep 3 -
Difference between
Site E and Site F
highlighted the
importance of 
strong EPA 
manager
Comm Rep
General Comments
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A p p e n d i x  C
I n t e r v i e w  R e s p o n s e s  
E P A  M a n a g e r s
1 9 2
What
percentage of 
your sites
have TAGs?
Site A -
Unwilling to
interview
Site B -
1/8 (12%) now,
pretty typical
historically.
Site C -
50%
Site D -
50%
Site E -
40%
Site F
15-20 %
EPA Q5
What percentage of your sites have TAGs?
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Was there
community
involvement
pre-TAG?
Site A -
Unwilling to
interview
Site B -
Pre-dated PM,
so no
observation.
Site C -
Pre-dated PM,
so no
observation
Site D -
Pre-dated
PM, so no
observation
Site E -
Yes, not happy
with State
proposed
remedy.
Site F
Yes, very active.
opposed the initial
remedy
(incineration)
EPA Q10
Was there community involvement pre-TAG?
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Change in
Group's
knowledge
post-TAG?
Site A -
Unwilling to
interview
Site B -
No basis for 
observation.
Site C -
No noticeable
difference
Site D -
No noticeable
difference
Site E -
Yes, more comfortable in
dealing with the data,
understood technical
issues
Site F
Yes, more technically
knowledgeable,
questions improved.
EPA Q15
Did you notice change in group's knowledge post-TAG?
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What did TAG
add at the
Site?
Site A -
Unwilling to
interview
Site B -
Increased confidence in process
and agency;
community more organized;
increased trust in agency;
streamlined and coordinated
process
Site C -
TAG rep was sole
contact, seemed
"satisfied"
Site D -
TAG rep was sole
contact, seemed
"satisfied"
Site E -
Better understanding of facts;
improved trust;
organized community;
accelerated process b/c of 
relationships
Site F
impartial technical
advisor added to EPA 
credibility.
EPA Q16A
What did TAG add at the Site?
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Were there
downsides to
TAG?
Site A -
Unwilling to
interview
Site B -
Not aware of any
Site C -
Expensive to make
one citizen more
comfortable
Site D -
Expensive to make
one citizen more
comfortable
Site E -
Not aware of any
Site F
Significant
administrative burdens
(on EPA and public)
EPA Q16B
Were there downsides to TAG?
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What is
impression of 
TAG impact
on Remedy
Selection at
site?
Site A -
Unwilling to
interview
Site B -
No impact, normal
Superfund schedule
Site C -
Not applicable
Site D -
No impact, normal
schedule
Site E -
Early involvement
accelerated schedule,
community buy in and
ongoing dialogue
Site F
No impact, normal
schedule for size and
complexity;theoretically
should have improved
schedule
EPA Q19
TAG impact on remedy selection schedule?
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What is
impression of 
TAG impact
on
remediation
schedule at
site?
Site A -
Unwilling to
interview
Site B -
No impact, normal
Superfund schedule
Site C -
No impact, normal
Superfund scheduleSite D -
No impact, normal 
Superfund schedule
Site E -
Positive impact on
remediation schedule, field
changes more readily
accepted
Site F
No impact, schedule
was short but due to
low complexity, not
TAG
EPA Q20
TAG impact on remediation  schedule?
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What was the
impact of the
TAG on
remedy
selection
process (not
schedule)?
Site A -
Unwilling to
interview
Site B -
Strengthened process,
educated public, increased
communication, confidence and
trust, TAG group added value
Site C -
No impactSite D -
No impact
Site E -
Resulted in improved trust,
opened communication
and accelerated process
Site F
None, TAG after 
remedy selection
EPA Q22
TAG impact on remedy selection process (not schedule)?
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What was the
impact of the
TAG on
remedy
chosen?
Site A -
Unwilling to
interview
Site B -
Public supported the approach
proposed by EPA for multi-use
outcome, no impact but support
Site C -
No impactSite D -
No impact
Site E -
No impact, but EPA was
able to overcome
community skepticism and
agree on best remedy
Site F
None, TAG after 
remedy selection
EPA Q23
TAG impact on remedy chosen?
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General
Observations
Site A -
Unwilling to
interview
Site B -
No additional
Site C -
No additional
Site D -
At sites without TAGs, 
community able to have 
impact on the process (2 
concrete examples), didn't 
really see that TAG added 
much
Site E -
No additional
Site F
No additional
General Observations from EPA project manager
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A p p e n d i x  D  I n t e r v i e w  
R e s p o n s e s  T e c h n i c a l  
C o n s u l t a n t
2 0 3
How long
have you
performed
technical
support at
Superfund
Sites?
Sites A,E and F -
Since the late 1970sSites B,C, and D -
Since 1988 -1989
Q1 Technical Consultant
How long have you performed technical support at Superfund Site?
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How many
Superfund
Sites have
you worked
on?
Sites A,E and F -
3 or 4
Sites B,C, and D -
About 20
Q2 Technical Consultant
How many Superfund Sites have you worked on?
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How many
Superfund
Sites have
you worked
on?
Sites A,E and F -
Three, all three in this study (Sites
E and F, a little on Site A)
Sites B,C, and D -
About a dozen, 3 sites in this 
study (Sites B, C, and D)
Q3 Technical Consultant
How many Superfund Sites have you worked on?
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At what stage 
of Superfund
process did
you get
involved?
Sites A,E and F -
Site A - don't recall details
Site E - NPL listing
Site F - just before ROD
Sites B,C, and D -
Site B - RI/FS stage
Site C - At ROD
Site D - RI/FS stage
Q7 Technical Consultant
At what stage of Superfund process did you get involved?
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Did you notice
a change in
Group's
knowledge
post-TAG?
Sites A,E and F -
Yes, community was noticeably
more in tune with what EPA was
doing and involved
Sites B,C, and D -
Yes, community developed a
better understanding, asked
better questions, critiqued EPA 
methods and plans
Q10 Technical Consultant
Did you notice a change in Group's knowledge post-TAG?
208
What did the
TAG add?
Sites A,E and F -
Site E - agency closer to the
public, EPA more deliberative
Site F - community more satisfied
that problem was solved, focused
community efforts.
Sites B,C, and D -
Yes, community developed a
better understanding, asked
better questions, critiqued EPA 
methods and plans
Q11A Technical Consultant
What did the TAG add?
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What were
TAG
downsides?
Sites A,E and F -
Few downsides, perception that it
negatively affected property
values, some pushback from City
government
Sites B,C, and D -
Administrative burden, seemed 
like it may have been EPA's
attempt to "kill the program"
Q11B Technical Consultant
What were TAG downsides?
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What was
your 
impression of 
TAG impact
on schedule
for remedy
selection
process?
Sites A,E and F -
No impact, "the schedule was the
schedule"
Sites B,C, and D -
Process was slow, but unsure
whether this was TAG impact.
Q14 Technical Consultant
What was your impression of TAG impact on schedule for remedy selection process?
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What was
your 
impression of 
TAG impact
on schedule
for 
remediation?
Sites A,E and F -
No impact
Sites B,C, and D -
No observable impact.
Q15 Technical Consultant
What was your impression of TAG impact on schedule for remediation?
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What was
your 
impression of 
TAG impact
on remedy
selection
process (not
schedule)?
Sites A,E and F -
No impact, Group was already
going to do what it was doing or 
there were limited options
Sites B,C, and D -
Impacted degree of 
investigation and added areas
to look at. Identified hot spots
and added chemicals to
analyses
Q17 Technical Consultant
What was your impression of TAG impact on remedy selection process (not schedule)?
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How did TAG
affect remedy
chosen?
Sites A,E and F -
Site E - change to LTTD from
incineration
Site F - No impact
Sites B,C, and D -
Site B - No specifics
Site C - No specifics
Site D - better delineation of 
source areas and addressing
wetlands, incorporating
groundwater treatment
Q18 Technical Consultant
How did TAG affect remedy chosen?
LTTD - low temperture thermal desorption
214
General
Observations
Sites A,E and F -
- TAG not required for 
community involvement
- TAG may increase the 
work to keep the group 
together
Sites B,C, and D -
Important aspects:
- Site setting (rural/urban)
- PRP/community interaction
- Activism of community
- Trust building
- TAG increases acceptance
- TAG did not increase participation, funded
what would already occur
- Third Party review increased quality of 
investigation and selection
- TAG increased community awareness and
knowledge
- Lots of work for the compensation, must be
efficient
General Observations from technical consultants
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